EITC, AFDC, and the Female Headship Decision

Concerns about the incentives for female headship for low-income families have focused on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); however, the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has brought more low-income households into the tax system, subjecting them to additional marriage nonneutralities. Theoretical predictions about the correlations between the EITC and female headship are ambiguous. This paper is the first to provide empirical evidence that the EITC is correlated with female headship decisions. Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, we find no significant correlations between AFDC and female headship. However, the ambiguous effect of the EITC on female headship is evident in our empirical analysis. After controlling for individual effects, we find that higher EITCs are associated with increased female headship for white women, but with decreased female headship for black women. For a sample of white women, we find that a $100 increase in the EITC would increase the probability of female headship by 0.1 percent. For a sample of black women, we find that a$100 increase in the EITC would decrease the probability of female headship by 1.4 percent, although this result is not robust.

Helping the Working Poor: Employer- vs. Employee-Based Subsidies

In the United States and Europe there has been renewed interest in subsidizing firms that employ disadvantaged workers as a means of addressing poverty and other social problems. In contrast, the prevailing practice is largely to provide social welfare benefits directly to individuals. Which approach is better? We re-examine the relative merits of employee- versus employer-based labor market subsidies and conclude there are good reasons to continue to rely on the direct, employee-based approach. In practice, low-wage workers are seldom either low-skill or low-income workers. Furthermore, workers who might quality for a firm-based subsidy are reluctant to so identify themselves for fear of being stigmatized or labeled as needy. Thus, employer-based subsidy programs have lower participation rates and correspondingly higher per capita expenditures than employee-based subsidy programs

Social Security and Divorce Decisions

People who have divorced are entitled to Social Security spousal benefits if their marriages lasted at least ten years. This paper uses 1985–1995 Vital Statistics data and the 2008–2011 American Community Surveys to analyze how this rule affects divorce decisions. I find evidence that the ten-year rule results in a small increase in divorces for the general population; however, the effects vary greatly by age. Divorce decisions change very little for people under the age of 35. For people 55 and older, however, divorces increase by approximately 20 percent around the ten-year cutoff, which leads to an increase in the likelihood of being divorced of 11.7 percent at ten years of marriage. For people between the ages of 35 and 55, who account for over half of divorces, the likelihood of being divorced increases by almost 6 percent as marriages cross the ten-year mark. This heterogeneity across ages likely exists because older people are more focused on retirement and have less time to remarry. These results indicate many people delay divorcing because they need Social Security benefits