Parametrically excited surface waves: Two-frequency forcing, normal form symmetries, and pattern selection

Motivated by experimental observations of exotic standing wave patterns in the two-frequency Faraday experiment, we investigate the role of normal form symmetries in the pattern selection problem. With forcing frequency components in ratio m/n, where m and n are co-prime integers, there is the possibility that both harmonic and subharmonic waves may lose stability simultaneously, each with a different wavenumber. We focus on this situation and compare the case where the harmonic waves have a longer wavelength than the subharmonic waves with the case where the harmonic waves have a shorter wavelength. We show that in the former case a normal form transformation can be used to remove all quadratic terms from the amplitude equations governing the relevant resonant triad interactions. Thus the role of resonant triads in the pattern selection problem is greatly diminished in this situation. We verify our general results within the example of one-dimensional surface wave solutions of the Zhang-Vinals model of the two-frequency Faraday problem. In one-dimension, a 1:2 spatial resonance takes the place of a resonant triad in our investigation. We find that when the bifurcating modes are in this spatial resonance, it dramatically effects the bifurcation to subharmonic waves in the case of forcing frequencies are in ratio 1/2; this is consistent with the results of Zhang and Vinals. In sharp contrast, we find that when the forcing frequencies are in ratio 2/3, the bifurcation to (sub)harmonic waves is insensitive to the presence of another spatially-resonant bifurcating mode

Enhanced Cooperation in an Asymmetric Model of Tax Competition

This paper analyzes enhanced cooperation agreements in corporate taxation in a three country tax competition model where countries differ in size. We characterize equilibrium tax rates and the optimal tax responses due to the formation of an enhanced cooperation agreement. Conditions for strategic complementarity or strategic substitutability of tax rates are crucial for the welfare effects of enhanced cooperation. Simulations show that enhanced cooperation is unlikely to be feasible for small countries. When enhanced cooperation is feasible, it may hamper global harmonization. Only when countries are of similar size is global harmonization a feasible outcome