Ultimate Fate of Constrained Voters

We determine the ultimate fate of individual opinions in a socially-interacting population of leftists, centrists, and rightists. In an elemental interaction between agents, a centrist and a leftist can become both centrists or both become leftists with equal rates (and similarly for a centrist and a rightist). However leftists and rightists do not interact. This interaction step between pairs of agents is applied repeatedly until the system can no longer evolve. In the mean-field limit, we determine the exact probability that the system reaches consensus (either leftist, rightist, or centrist) or a frozen mixture of leftists and rightists as a function of the initial composition of the population. We also determine the mean time until the final state is reached. Some implications of our results for the ultimate fate in a limit of the Axelrod model are discussed.Comment: 10 pages, 6 figures, 2-column revtex format; for submission to J. Phys. A. Final version for JPA; very minor change

Scaling in Tournaments

We study a stochastic process that mimics single-game elimination tournaments. In our model, the outcome of each match is stochastic: the weaker player wins with upset probability q<=1/2, and the stronger player wins with probability 1-q. The loser is eliminated. Extremal statistics of the initial distribution of player strengths governs the tournament outcome. For a uniform initial distribution of strengths, the rank of the winner, x_*, decays algebraically with the number of players, N, as x_* ~ N^(-beta). Different decay exponents are found analytically for sequential dynamics, beta_seq=1-2q, and parallel dynamics, beta_par=1+[ln (1-q)]/[ln 2]. The distribution of player strengths becomes self-similar in the long time limit with an algebraic tail. Our theory successfully describes statistics of the US college basketball national championship tournament.Comment: 5 pages, 1 figure, empirical study adde

On The Structure of Competitive Societies

We model the dynamics of social structure by a simple interacting particle system. The social standing of an individual agent is represented by an integer-valued fitness that changes via two offsetting processes. When two agents interact one advances: the fitter with probability p and the less fit with probability 1-p. The fitness of an agent may also decline with rate r. From a scaling analysis of the underlying master equations for the fitness distribution of the population, we find four distinct social structures as a function of the governing parameters p and r. These include: (i) a static lower-class society where all agents have finite fitness; (ii) an upwardly-mobile middle-class society; (iii) a hierarchical society where a finite fraction of the population belongs to a middle class and a complementary fraction to the lower class; (iv) an egalitarian society where all agents are upwardly mobile and have nearly the same fitness. We determine the basic features of the fitness distributions in these four phases.Comment: 8 pages, 7 figure