The victory of hope over Angst? : Funding, asset allocation, and risk-taking in german public sector pension reform

Public employee pension systems throughout the developed world have traditionally been of the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) defined benefit (DB) variety, where pensioner payments are financed by taxes (contributions) levied on the working generation. But as the number of retirees rises relative to the working-age group, such systems have begun to face financial distress. This trend has been exacerbated in many countries, among them Germany, by high unemployment rates producing further deterioration of the contribution base. In the long run, public sector pension benefits will have to be cut or contributions increased, if the systems are to be maintained. An alternative path sometimes offered to ease the crunch of paying for public employee pensions is to move toward funding: here, plan assets are gradually built up, invested, and enhanced returns devoted to partly defray civil servants’ pension costs. In this study, we evaluate the impact of introducing partial prefunding, paired with a strategic investment policy for the German federal state of Hesse. The analysis assesses the impact of introducing a supplementary tax-sponsored pension fund whose contributions are invested in the capital market and used to relieve the state budget from (some) pension payments. Our model determines the expectation and the Conditional Value-at-Risk of economic pension costs using a stochastic simulation process for pension plan assets. This approach simultaneously determines the optimal contribution rate and asset allocation that controls the expected economic costs of providing the promised pensions, while at the same time controlling investment risk. Specifically, we offer answers to the following questions: 1. How can the plan be designed to control cash-flow shortfall risk, so as to mitigate the potential burden borne by future generations of taxpayers? 2. What is the optimal asset allocation for this fund as it is built up, to generate a maximum return while simultaneously restricting capital market and liability risk? 3. What are reasonable combinations of annual contribution rates and asset allocation to a state-managed pension fund, which will limit costs of providing promised public sector pensions? We anticipate that this research will interest several sorts of policymaker groups. First, focusing on the German case, the state and Federal governments should find it relevant, as these entities face considerable public sector pension liabilities. Second, our findings will also be of interest to other European countries, as most have substantial underfunded defined benefit plans for civil servants. In what follows, we first offer a brief description of the structure of civil servant pensions in Germany, focusing on their benefit formulas, their financing, and the resulting current as well as future plan obligations for taxpayers. Next, we turn to an analysis of the actuarial status of the Hesse civil servants’ pension plan and evaluate how much would have to be contributed to fund this plan in a nonstochastic context. Subsequently we evaluate the asset-liability and decision-making process from the viewpoint of the plan sponsor, to determine sensible plan asset allocation behavior. A final section summarizes findings and implications.Wie in vielen anderen Ländern auch, beruhen die deutschen Beamtenpensionen traditionell auf einem umlage- und steuerfinanzierten System der Leistungszusage (defined benefit pension – DB). Aufgrund fehlender Rücklagen resultieren aus den Pensionsverspechen ungedeckte Verbindlichkeiten in Milliardenhöhe, die als solche jedoch nicht offiziell als Staatsverschuldung ausgewiesen werden. Das damit einhergehende Problem steigender Belastungen zukünftiger Haushalte wurde von der Politik erkannt, und erste Schritte in Richtung Kapitaldeckung wurden mit der Einführung der Versorgungsrücklagen sowie der Finanzierungsfonds vollzogen. Vor diesem Hintergrund evaluiert diese Studie die Chancen und Risiken, die mit dem Übergang zu einem (partiell) kapitalgedeckten Beamtenpensionssystems verbunden sind. Als Datengrundlage dient hierzu die vollständige Personalstandsstatistik des Landes Hessen, dessen Beamtenpopulation repräsentativ für den größten Teil des deutschen Beamtensystems ist. Unter Verwendung eigens für diese Studie berechneter Beamtensterbetafeln werden zunächst die Pensionsansprüche der aktuellen Pensionäre sowie die bereits erdienten Anwartschaften der aktuell diensttuenden Beamten aktuariell bewertet. Auf Grundlage einer 50-Jahres-Prognose der Beamtenpopulationsentwicklung werden die zur Finanzierung der Pensionsversprechen benötigten Beiträge, d.h. der Beitragssatz in Bezug auf die Beamtengehälter, deterministisch bestimmt. Im Rahmen einer Monte Carlo-Studie und auf Basis eines stochastischen Barwert-Ansatzes wird sodann die Anlagestrategie für das Planvermögen bestimmt, die zu minimalem Crash-Risiko, gemessen als Conditional Value at Risk der gesamten Pensionskosten, führt. Abschließend wird aufgezeigt, welchen Freiraum der Pensionsplanmanager hinsichtlich der Wahl von Beitragssatz und Anlagestrategie hat, wenn er nur auf Einhaltung eines vorgegebenen Risikobudgets verpflichtet wurde

Monolithic flux transformer-coupled high-Tc dc SQUID magnetometers

YBa/sub 2/Cu/sub 3/O/sub 7-x/ based monolithic flux transformer-coupled high-T/sub c/ DC SQUID magnetometers operating up to 73 K have been realized. The devices are characterized by high values of the modulation voltage, up to 32 /spl mu/V at 40 K. A minimal white noise level of 0.10 pT//spl radic/Hz was obtained above 200 Hz, and 0.64 pT//spl radic/Hz at 1 Hz and 55 K. The temperature dependence of the modulation voltage, the effective sensing area and the field sensitivity are discussed. Model-calculations have been performed to investigate high frequency resonances in the washer-input coil structure. Methods for damping are considered

Managing Contribution and Capital Market Risk in a Funded Public Defined Benefit Plan: Impact of CVaR Cost Constraints

Using a Monte Carlo framework, we analyze the risks and rewards of moving from an unfunded defined benefit pension system to a funded plan for German civil servants, allowing for alternative strategic contribution and investment patterns. In the process we integrate a Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) restriction on overall plan costs into the pension manager’s objective of controlling contribution rate volatility. After estimating the contribution rate that would fully fund future benefit promises for current and prospective employees, we identify the optimal contribution and investment strategy that minimizes contribution rate volatility while restricting worst-case plan costs. Finally, we analyze the time path of expected and worst-case contribution rates to assess the chances of reduced contribution rates for current and future generations. Our results show that moving toward a funded public pension system can be beneficial for both civil servants and taxpayers

The Effect of Uncertain Labor Income and Social Security on Life-cycle Portfolios

This paper examines how labor income volatility and social security benefits influence life-cycle household portfolios. We examine how much the individual saves, and where, taking into account liquid financial wealth and annuities, and stocks versus bonds. Higher labor income uncertainty and lower old-age benefits boost demand for stable income in retirement, but also when young. In addition, a declining equity glide path with age is appropriate for the worker with low income uncertainty but for the high income risk worker, equity exposure rises until retirement. We also evaluate how changes in social security benefits influence retirement risk management

Reforming the German Civil Servant Pension Plan

We analyze the risks and rewards of moving from an unfunded defined benefit pension system to a funded plan for civil servants in Germany, allowing for alternative portfolio mixes using a Monte Carlo framework and a Conditional Value at Risk metric. First, we estimate contributions as a percent of salary that would fully fund future benefit promises for active employees. Second, we identify an investment strategy for plan assets that will minimize worst-case pension costs; this turns out to be 22% in equities, 47% in bonds, and 30% in real estate. Third, we explore the time path of pension fund asset shortfalls and the chances of contribution holidays for current and future generations. We show that moving toward a funded pension system for German civil servants can be beneficial to both taxpayers and civil servants

An equilibrium model for ribosome competition

The number of ribosomes in a cell is considered as limiting, and gene expression is thus largely determined by their cellular concentration. In this work we develop a toy model to study the trade-off between the ribosomal supply and the demand of the translation machinery, dictated by the composition of the transcript pool. Our equilibrium framework is useful to highlight qualitative behaviours and new means of gene expression regulation determined by the fine balance of this trade-off. We also speculate on the possible impact of these mechanisms on cellular physiology

Managing Contribution and Capital Market Risk in a Funded Public Defined Benefit Plan: Impact of CVaR Cost Constraints

Using a Monte Carlo framework, we analyze the risks and rewards of moving from an unfunded defined benefit pension system to a funded plan for German civil servants, allowing for alternative strategic contribution and investment patterns. In the process we integrate a Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) restriction on overall plan costs into the pension manager's objective of controlling contribution rate volatility. After estimating the contribution rate that would fully fund future benefit promises for current and prospective employees, we identify the optimal contribution and investment strategy that minimizes contribution rate volatility while restricting worst-case plan costs. Finally, we analyze the time path of expected and worst-case contribution rates to assess the chances of reduced contribution rates for current and future generations. Our results show that moving toward a funded public pension system can be beneficial for both civil servants and taxpayers.

Optimal Social Security Claiming Behavior under Lump Sum Incentives: Theory and Evidence

People who delay claiming Social Security receive higher lifelong benefits upon retirement. We survey individuals on their willingness to delay claiming later, if they could receive a lump sum in lieu of a higher annuity payment. Using a moment-matching approach, we calibrate a lifecycle model tracking observed claiming patterns under current rules and predict optimal claiming outcomes under the lump sum approach. Our model correctly predicts that early claimers under current rules would delay claiming most when offered actuarially fair lump sums, and for lump sums worth 87% as much, claiming ages would still be higher than at present

Will They Take The Money And Work? People\u27s Willingness to Delay Claiming Social Security Benefits for a Lump Sum

This article investigates whether exchanging Social Security delayed retirement credits, currently paid as increases in lifelong benefits, for a lump sum would induce later claiming and additional work. We show that people would voluntarily claim about 6 months later if the lump sum were paid for claiming after the early retirement age, and about 8 months later if the lump sum were paid only for those claiming after their full retirement age. Overall, people will work one-third to one-half of the additional months. Those who would currently claim at the youngest ages are most responsive to the lump sum offer

Will They Take the Money and Work? An Empirical Analysis of People’s Willingness to Delay Claiming Social Security Benefits for a Lump Sum

This paper investigates whether exchanging the Social Security delayed retirement credit, currently paid as an increase in lifetime annuity benefits, for a lump sum would induce later claiming and additional work. We show that people would voluntarily claim about half a year later if the lump sum were paid for claiming any time after the Early Retirement Age, and about two-thirds of a year later if the lump sum were paid only for those claiming after their Full Retirement Age. Overall, people will work one-third to one-half of the additional months, compared to the status quo. Those who would currently claim at the youngest ages are likely to be most responsive to the offer of a lump sum benefit