Declining Clientelism of Welfare Benefits? Targeting and Political Competition based Evidence from an Indian State

It has been argued that since 2014, under the BJP-led central government, welfare benefits in India have become better targeted and less prone to clientelistic control by state and local governments. Arguably this has helped to increase the vote share of the BJP vis-a-vis regional parties. We test these hypotheses using longitudinal data from 3500 rural households in the state of West Bengal. We fail to find evidence that the new “central” programs introduced after 2014 were better targeted than traditional “state” programs, or that the targeting of state programs improved after 2014. Households receiving the new “central” benefits introduced since 2014 were more likely to switch their political support to the BJP. However, changes in the scale, composition or targeting of these programs, in clientelistic effectiveness of traditional state programs or in household incomes, fail to account for the large observed increase in the voters’ support for the BJP. Non-Hindus, especially recent immigrant nonHindus, were much less likely to switch support to the BJP, even after controlling for benefits received and changes in household incomes. Our results suggest that ideology and identity politics were more important factors explaining the rising popularity of the BJP

Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries

We conduct a field experiment in India comparing two ways of delegating selection of microcredit clients among smallholder farmers to local intermediaries: a private trader (TRAIL), versus a local-government appointee (GRAIL). Selected beneficiaries in both schemes were equally likely to take up and repay loans, and experienced similar increases in borrowing and farm output. However farm profits increased and unit costs of production decreased significantly only in TRAIL. While there is some evidence of superior selection by ability and landholding in TRAIL, the results are mainly driven by greater reduction of unit production costs for TRAIL treated farmers than GRAIL treated farmers of similar ability or landholding. We develop and test a model where the TRAIL agents’ role as middlemen in the agricultural supply chain enabled and motivated them to offer treated farmers business advice, which helped them lower unit costs

Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries

We compare two different methods of appointing a local commission agent as an intermediary for a credit program. In the Trader-Agent Intermediated Lending Scheme (TRAIL), the agent was a randomly selected established private trader, while in the Gram Panchayat-Agent Intermediated-Lending Scheme (GRAIL), he was randomly chosen from nominations by the elected village council. More TRAIL loans were taken up, but repayment rates were similar, and TRAIL loans had larger average impacts on borrowers’ farm incomes. The majority of this difference in impacts is due to differences in treatment effects conditional on farmer productivity, rather than differences in borrower selection patterns. The findings can be explained by a model where TRAIL agents increased their middleman profits by helping more able treated borrowers reduce their unit costs and increase output. In contrast, for political reasons GRAIL agents monitored the less able treated borrowers and reduced their default risk

Low-temperature behaviour of ammonium ion in buddingtonite [N(D/H) 4 AlSi 3 O 8 ] from neutron powder diffraction

The structural response of buddingtonite [N(D/H) 4 AlSi 3 O 8 ] on cooling has been studied by neutron diffraction. Data have been collected from 280 K down to 11 K, and the crystal structure refined using the Rietveld method. Rigid-body constraints were applied to the ammonium ion to explore the structural properties of ammonium in the M-site cavities at low-temperature. Low-temperature saturation is observed for almost all the lattice parameters. From the present in situ low-temperature neutron diffraction studies, there is no strong evidence of orientational order–disorder of the ammonium ions in buddingtonite.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/46909/1/269_2004_Article_425.pd

Taking the detour

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/115976/1/jhm2424.pdfhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/115976/2/jhm2424-sup-0001-suppinfo.pd

Potential Unintended Consequences Due to Medicare’s “No Pay for Errors Rule”? A Randomized Controlled Trial of an Educational Intervention with Internal Medicine Residents

Medicare has selected 10 hospital-acquired conditions for which it will not reimburse hospitals unless the condition was documented as “present on admission.” This “no pay for errors” rule may have a profound effect on the clinical practice of physicians. To determine how physicians might change their behavior after learning about the Medicare rule. We conducted a randomized trial of a brief educational intervention embedded in an online survey, using clinical vignettes to estimate behavioral changes. At a university-based internal medicine residency program, 168 internal medicine residents were eligible to participate. Residents were randomized to receive a one-page description of Medicare’s “no pay for errors” rule with pre-vignette reminders (intervention group) or no information (control group). Residents responded to five clinical vignettes in which “no pay for errors” conditions might be present on admission. Primary outcome was selection of the single most clinically appropriate option from three clinical practice choices presented for each clinical vignette. Survey administered from December 2008 to March 2009. There were 119 responses (71%). In four of five vignettes, the intervention group was less likely to select the most clinically appropriate response. This was statistically significant in two of the cases. Most residents were aware of the rule but not its impact and specifics. Residents acknowledged responsibility to know Medicare documentation rules but felt poorly trained to do so. Residents educated about the Medicare’s “no pay for errors” were less likely to select the most clinically appropriate responses to clinical vignettes. Such choices, if implemented in practice, have the potential for causing patient harm through unnecessary tests, procedures, and other interventions