"Phenomenal Conservatism" - Ch 2 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification

In this chapter I introduce and analyse the tenets of phenomenal conservatism, and discuss the problem of the nature of appearances. After that, I review the asserted epistemic merits phenomenal conservatism and the principal arguments adduced in support of it. Finally, I survey objections to phenomenal conservatism and responses by its advocates. Some of these objections will be scrutinised and appraised in the next chapters

Treating symptomatic uterine fibroids with myomectomy: current practice and views of UK consultants

Background: The demand for uterus-sparing treatments is increasing as more women postpone childbirth to their 30–40s, when fibroids are more symptomatic. With an increasing choice of treatment options and changing care-provider profiles, now is an opportune time to survey current practices and opinions. Using a 25-stem questionnaire, a web-based survey was used to capture the practices and opinions of UK consultant gynecologists on the treatment of symptomatic fibroids, including the types of procedure most frequently used, methods used to reduce blood loss, and awareness and acceptability of treatment options, and to assess the impact of gender and experience of the treating gynecologist. Results: The response rate was 22%. Laparascopic myomectomy is used least frequently, with 80% of the respondents using GnRHa preoperatively to minimize blood loss and correct anemia, while vasopressin is most frequently used to reduce intraoperative blood loss. Female consultants operate significantly less frequently than males. Those with more than 10 years consultant experience are more likely to perform an open myomectomy compared to those with less than 10 years experience. Conclusions: Compared to a similar survey performed 10 years ago, surgical methods remain to be the most common treatments, but use of less invasive treatments such as UAE has increased. Consultants’ attitudes appear to be responding to the patient demand for less radical treatments. However, it is yet to be seen if the changing consultant demographics will keep up with this demand. The low response rate warrants cautious interpretation of the results, but they provide an interesting snapshot of current views and practices

Phenomenal Dogmatism, Seeming Evidentialism and Inferential Justification

Let ‘strong normative evidentialism’ be the view that a belief is doxastically justified just when (i) the belief is (properly) based on evidence in the agent’s possession, and (ii) the evidence constitutes a good reason for the belief. Strong normative evidentialism faces two challenges. One is that of explaining which kinds of evidence can serve as a good reason for belief. The other is to explain how inferential justification is possible. If a belief p is based on a belief q that justifies p, then it would seem that the subject would need to be justified in believing that q makes p likely. The problem for the evidentialist is to explain what justifies this belief about likelihood. I will argue that the evidentialist can respond to both worries by construing basic evidence as seemings and then adopt a version of phenomenal dogmatism – the view that seemings can confer immediate and full justification upon belief – that takes seemings to be good reasons when they are evidence-insensitive in virtue of their phenomenology. This view meets the first challenge by explaining what kinds of evidence constitute a good reason. It meets the second challenge by taking beliefs that one phenomenon makes another phenomenon more likely to be immediately and fully justified by memory seemings