Individualism and stock price crash risk

Employing a sample of 26,473 firms across 42 countries from 1990 to 2013, we find that firms located in countries with higher individualism have higher stock price crash risk. Furthermore, individualism can be transmitted by foreign investors from overseas markets to influence local firms’ crash risk, and can exacerbate the impact of firm risk taking and earnings management on crash risk. Moreover, the positive relation between individualism and crash risk is amplified during the global financial crisis and attenuated by enhanced country-level financial information transparency and the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards

Nutritional profile and obesity: results from a random‑sample population‑based study in Córdoba, Argentina

Introduction Obesity is a chronic, heterogeneous, multifactorial disease, which has sharply increased in prevalence in both developed and developing countries. This study aimed to estimate the prevalence of obesity and to identify socio-demographic risk factors associated with it, with special emphasis on diet. Methods Nutritional status, demographic characteristics, lifestyle habits, and food consumption patterns derived from a Food Frequency Questionnaire were investigated. Exhaustive exploratory analyses were performed in order to describe dietary patterns, and logistic regression models were used for odds ratio estimation. Results The study included 4328 subjects, over 18 years old and resident in Cordoba city. The prevalence of overweight and obesity was 34 and 17 %, respectively, with 60 % in men and 45 % in women of BMI ≥ 25. Obesity risk factors were high intake of sodium, refined grains, starchy vegetables, and snacks. A lower risk of overweight and obesity was associated with an adequate, moderate intake of meats, eggs, alcoholic beverages, sugar and sweets, milk, yogurt, and pulses. Conclusions A high intake of snacks, refined grains, starchy vegetables and sodium and low intake of yogurt, milk, pulses, and whole grains seem to be associated with the emergence and high prevalence of obesity in Cordoba, Argentina.publishedVersionFil: Aballay, Laura Rosana. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Médicas. Escuela de Nutrición. Estadística y Bioestadística; ArgentinaFil: Aballay, Laura Rosana. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Instituto de Investigaciones en Ciencias de la Salud; Argentina.Fil: De la Quintana, Ana Gabriela. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Médicas. Escuela de Nutrición; Argentina.Fil: Díaz, María del Pilar. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Médicas. Escuela de Nutrición. Estadística y Bioestadística; Argentina.Fil: Díaz, María del Pilar. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Instituto de Investigaciones en Ciencias de la Salud; Argentina.Fil: Osella, Alberto R. Hospital Saverio de Bellis. Laboratorio de Epidemiologia y Bioestadística; Italia

Asymmetric Cycles by

I estimate a model in which new technology entails random adjustment needs. Rapid adjustments may cause measured productivity to decline. The slowdowns persist because adjustment is costly and, hence, protracted. The model explains both the “steepness ” and the “deepness ” asymmetry of cycles. Adjustment costs amount to about 14 percent of output, and technological inefficiency to about 28 percent. Firms abandon technologies long before they are perfected — current-practice TFP is 20 percent below its maximal level

PUBLIC PROTECTION OR PRIVATE EXTORTION?

We analyze the strategic interaction between a firm, an extortionary mafia, and a potentially corrupt government. The model identifies several results. First, government spending is not monotonic in revenues. Second, although the firm wants the government to challenge the mafia (it uses the threat of electoral sanctions to induce the government to do so), in equilibrium, the firm does not directly appeal to the government for protection even though it is extorted. The more likely the government is to uncover mafia extortion independent of an appeal from the firm, the more effective the firm's threat of electoral sanction is at motivating the government to invest in law enforcement. This is because the electoral threat to punish failure on the government's part is only a compelling reason to invest in law enforcement when the government actually expects to confront the mafia. This same logic also implies that the relationship between mafia strength and government corruption is somewhat counterintuitive. When the mafia is strong in equilibrium (i.e. pervasive and extorting large fees), the government is not very corrupt. When the mafia is weak, the government is highly corrupt. Finally, an extension shows that if the mafia and government can collude, then the harsher the threatened sanctions against the mafia, the less likely the government is to challenge the mafia because the mafia is more willing to bribe the government. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd..