39 research outputs found

    Implementing Privacy Negotiations in E-Commerce

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    This paper examines how service providers may resolve the trade-off between their personalization efforts and users' individual privacy concerns. Finding that neither an optimized one-size-fits-all strategy, nor a market-driven specialization of providers or choices between different usage scenarios can solve the problem, we analyze how negotiation techniques can lead to efficient contracts and how they can be integrated into current technologies. The analysis includes the identification of relevant and negotiable privacy dimensions for different usage domains. Negotiations in multi-channel retailing are examined as a detailed example. Based on a formalization of the user's privacy revelation problem, we model the negotiation process as a Bayesian game where the service provider faces different types of users. Finally an extension to P3P is proposed that allows a simple expression and implementation of negotiation processes. Support for this extension has been integrated in the Mozilla browser.

    Unwillingness to pay for privacy: A field experiment

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    We measure willingness to pay for privacy in a field experiment. Participants were given the choice to buy a maximum of one DVD from one of two online stores. One store consistently required more sensitive personal data than the other, but otherwise the stores were identical. In one treatment, DVDs were one Euro cheaper at the store requesting more personal information, and almost all buyers chose the cheaper store. Surprisingly, in the second treatment when prices were identical, participants bought from both shops equally often. -- Wir messen die Zahlungsbereitschaft fĂŒr Datenschutz in einem Feldexperiment. Die Teilnehmer konnten maximal eine DVD bei einem von zwei Online-Shops kaufen. Einer der beiden LĂ€den verlangte immer mehr sensitive Daten als der andere, aber abgesehen davon waren die LĂ€den gleich. Im ersten Treatment waren alle DVDs genau einen Euro gĂŒnstiger bei dem Laden, der mehr sensitive Daten abfragte, und fast alle KĂ€ufer wĂ€hlten diesen gĂŒnstigeren Laden. In einem zweiten Treatment mit identischen Preisen bei beiden LĂ€den kauften die Teilnehmer ĂŒberraschenderweise bei beiden LĂ€den gleich hĂ€ufig.privacy,willingness to pay,field experiments

    Unwillingness to Pay for Privacy: A Field Experiment

    Get PDF
    We measure willingness to pay for privacy in a field experiment. Participants were given the choice to buy a maximum of one DVD from one of two online stores. One store consistently required more sensitive personal data than the other, but otherwise the stores were identical. In one treatment, DVDs were one Euro cheaper at the store requesting more personal information, and almost all buyers chose the cheaper store. Surprisingly, in the second treatment when prices were identical, participants bought from both shops equally often.privacy, willingness to pay, field experiments

    Unwillingness to Pay for Privacy: A Field Experiment

    Get PDF
    We measure willingness to pay for privacy in a field experiment. Participants were given the choice to buy a maximum of one DVD from one of two online stores. One store consistently required more sensitive personal data than the other, but otherwise the stores were identical. In one treatment, DVDs were one Euro cheaper at the store requesting more personal information, and almost all buyers chose the cheaper store. Surprisingly, in the second treatment when prices were identical, participants bought from both shops equally often.privacy, willingness to pay, field experiments

    Ubiquitous Social Networks: Opportunities and Challenges for Privacy-Aware User Modelling

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    Privacy has been recognized as an important topic in the Internet for a long time, and technological developments in the area of privacy tools are ongoing. However, their focus was mainly on the individual. With the proliferation of social network sites, it has become more evident that the problem of privacy is not bounded by the perimeters of individuals but also by the privacy needs of their social networks. The objective of this paper is to contribute to the discussion about privacy in social network sites, a topic which we consider to be severely under-researched. We propose a framework for analyzing privacy requirements and for analyzing privacy-related data. We outline a combination of requirements analysis, conflict-resolution techniques, and a P3P extension that can contribute to privacy within such sites.World Wide Web, privacy, social network analysis, requirements analysis, privacy negotiation, ubiquity, P3P

    Unwillingness to pay for privacy: a field experiment

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    "We measure willingness to pay for privacy in a field experiment. Participants were given the choice to buy a maximum of one DVD from one of two online stores. One store consistently required more sensitive personal data than the other, but otherwise the stores were identical. In one treatment, DVDs were one Euro cheaper at the store requesting more personal information, and almost all buyers chose the cheaper store. Surprisingly, in the second treatment when prices were identical, participants bought from both shops equally often." (author's abstract)"Wir messen die Zahlungsbereitschaft fĂŒr Datenschutz in einem Feldexperiment. Die Teilnehmer konnten maximal eine DVD bei einem von zwei Online-Shops kaufen. Einer der beiden LĂ€den verlangte immer mehr sensitive Daten als der andere, aber abgesehen davon waren die LĂ€den gleich. Im ersten Treatment waren alle DVDs genau einen Euro gĂŒnstiger bei dem Laden, der mehr sensitive Daten abfragte, und fast alle KĂ€ufer wĂ€hlten diesen gĂŒnstigeren Laden. In einem zweiten Treatment mit identischen Preisen bei beiden LĂ€den kauften die Teilnehmer ĂŒberraschenderweise bei beiden LĂ€den gleich hĂ€ufig." (Autorenreferat

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