Marital Sharing of Transfer Tax Exemptions

This Article analyzes portability and its antecedents in order to distill a positive account of marital sharing of transfer tax exemption amounts. Prior to 2010, the estate and gift tax exemption equivalent was a non-transferable, separate tax attribute of each spouse. A spouse could only access his or her spouse’s effective exemption by shifting property into the other spouse’s tax base. With the enactment of portability, Congress decoupled tax-free availability of a spouse’s unified credit from the necessity of a prior intra-spousal transfer. All that is required is an election by the decedent spouse, via the executor, to share the decedent’s unused exemption equivalent with the surviving spouse. This Article argues that a logical extension of this progression in the law, presaged by several early proposals by the American Law Institute and the U.S. Treasury, would be a regime that authorized elective sharing of estate and gift tax exemption amounts between spouses, in any proportion, during life or at death

Tax Court Sends Message On Valuation in Richmond

In Estate of Helen P. Richmond, the Tax Court determined the proper value for estate tax purposes of a minority interest in a family-owned corporation holding mostly appreciated securities. The court also sustained an accuracy-related penalty against the estate, finding that it used an unsigned draft report by a noncertified appraiser as the basis for the stock valuation reported on Form 706

Valuation Lessons From Estate of Adell

In Estate of Adell, the Tax Court determined that the correct value of a decedent’s interest in a closely held corporation was the figure reported on the original estate tax return. The court rejected alternative values as either using the incorrect valuation method or failing to account for the significant value of a key employee’s personal goodwill

Access Assured: Restoring Progressivity in the Tax and Spending Programs for Higher Education

Presently, the federal government subsidizes the higher education expenses of individual college students through two distribution channels: the tax system and the transfer system. Under each subsystem, there are a multitude of programs available to assist students in meeting their postsecondary educational expenses. The proliferation of so many forms of federal student aid raises issues of intra- and inter-program effectiveness. In their current form, the tax benefits for higher education do not get the right amount to the right people at the right time. The federal college spending programs, on the other hand, get the right amount to the right people but do so in the wrong manner. The intersection of these two financial aid distribution channels amplifies their individual deficiencies. The resulting complex web of overlapping, contradictory, and partially or completely uncoordinated tax and spending programs impedes the government\u27s ability to achieve its public policy goal in providing federal student aid, namely, to expand access to college for low income students for whom cost remains a barrier. This Article argues that significant equity, efficiency, and simplicity gains can be realized by consolidating substantially similar college tax programs and by increasing their coordination with traditional, transfer-based forms of student financial assistance

Kite: IRS Wins QTIP Battle But Loses Annuity War

In Kite, the Tax Court held that a 10-year deferred annuity constituted adequate and full consideration for a transfer of family partnership interests, even though the transferor died before receiving any payments. The court also held that the liquidation of a qualified terminable interest property trust and subsequent sale of its assets constituted a disposition of the qualifying income interest for life, resulting in a deemed transfer of the entire trust under section 2519. Ryan discusses those holdings and two more issues that were not raised in the Tax Court proceeding but are clearly implicated by the Kite facts

EITC as Income (In)Stability?

Congress enacted the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) to entice poor single mothers to work (or work more) as a means of lifting themselves out of poverty. Its design as a wage subsidy that phases out at higher earnings levels is intended to accomplish this goal. A strong labor market is crucial to the success of work-based benefit programs, like the EITC. The EITC can motivate female household heads to work (or work more) but they cannot act on that motivation if no jobs or additional hours exist. This article demonstrates that during economic downturns, the EITC wage subsidy contributes to, rather than prevents, poverty in single mother families. Lost EITC benefits exacerbate recession-induced earnings losses, a phenomenon this article refers to as income destabilization. In contrast, the EITC stabilizes the incomes of its wealthier beneficiaries as increased credit amounts offset underlying salary declines. While this pattern of income (de)stabilization is an unintended by-product of the design of the EITC as a targeted wage subsidy, its negative impact on the economic welfare of female-headed households is problematic, given that these same families are the historically-targeted program beneficiaries. This article offers a narrowly-tailored proposal that alters the structure of the EITC during recessionary periods in order to prevent EITC-induced income destabilization

EITC as Income (In)Stability?

Congress enacted the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), inter alia, to entice poor single mothers to work (or work more) as a means of lifting themselves out of poverty. Its design as a wage subsidy that phases out at higher earnings levels is intended to accomplish this goal. A strong labor market is crucial to the success of work-based benefit programs, such as the EITC. The EITC can motivate female household heads to work (or work more), but they cannot act on that motivation if no jobs or additional working hours exist. This Article demonstrates that during economic downturns, the EITC wage subsidy contributes to, rather than prevents, poverty in single-mother families. Lost EITC benefits exacerbate recession-induced earnings losses, a phenomenon this Article refers to as income destabilization. In contrast, the EITC stabilizes the incomes of its wealthier beneficiaries as increased credit amounts offset underlying salary declines. While this pattern of income (de)stabilization is an unintended byproduct of the design of the EITC as a targeted wage subsidy, its negative impact on the economic welfare of female-headed households is problematic, given that these same families are the historically targeted program beneficiaries. This Article offers a narrowly tailored proposal that alters the structure of the EITC during recessionary periods in order to prevent EITC-induced income destabilization