Delegation and Emission Tax in a Differentiated Oligopoly

This paper examines how product differentiation as well as strategic managerial delegation affects optimal emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare, under alternative modes of product market competition. It shows that, under pure profit maximization, the (positive) optimal emission tax rate is not necessarily decreasing in degree of product differentiation, irrespective of the mode of competition. The possibility of emission tax rate to be positive and lower for more differentiated products, under quantity (price) competition, is higher (lower) in case of delegation than that in case of no delegation. It also shows that, under quantity (price) competition, the equilibrium emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare are higher (lower) in case of delegation than that in case of no delegation.Emission tax, price competition, product differentiation, quantity competition, strategic managerial delegation

Technology adoption in a differentiated duopoly: Cournot versus bertrand

This paper compares equilibrium technology adoption in a differentiated duopoly under two alternative modes of product market competition, Cournot and Bertrand. It shows that the cost of technology has differential impact on technology adoption, that is, on cost-efficiency of the industry, under two alternative modes of product market competition. The possibility of ex post cost asymmetry between firms is higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. If the cost of technology is high, Bertrand competition leads to higher cost-efficiency than Cournot competition provided that the cost reducing effect of the technology is high. On the other hand, if the technology reduces the marginal cost of production by a very low amount, Cournot competition may lead to higher cost-efficiency than Bertrand competition.Differentiated duopoly, limit-pricing, price effect, selection effect, technology adoption

Estimating the probability of trade union membership in India: Impact of Communist parties, personal attributes and industrial characteristics

The paper analyses the impact of the reach of communist parties, the degree of political activism, personal attributes of workers, and industrial characteristics on the individual decision to unionise for Indian non-agricultural regular workers using micro data from the 2004-05 Employment and Unemployment Survey, NSSO, linked to state-level factors. A notable result is that the reach of communist parties has considerable effect on unionisation probability. Moreover, it seems that mere existence of communist parties in a state also facilitates unionisation to some extent. State-level political activism and unemployment rate also influence the individual decision to be unionist. The paper concludes also that worker's gender, marital status, ethnic background, employment status, experience, occupation, sector of employment, establishment size, and type of industry remain important in the determination of union membership.Communist Party, Decision, Probability, State, Trade Union

Estimating the Probability of Trade Union Membership in India - Impact of Communist Parties, Personal Attributes and Industrial Characteristics

The paper analyses the impact of the reach of communist parties, the degree of political activism, personal attributes of workers, and industrial characteristics on the individual decision to unionise for Indian non-agricultural regular workers using micro data from the 2004-05 Employment and Unemployment Survey, NSSO, linked to state-level factors. A notable result is that the reach of communist parties has considerable effect on unionisation probability. Moreover, it seems that mere existence of communist parties in a state also facilitates unionisation to some extent. State-level political activism and unemployment rate also influence the individual decision to be unionist. The paper concludes also that workers gender, marital status, ethnic background, employment status, experience, occupation, sector of employment, establishment size, and type of industry remain important in the determination of union membership.Communist Party, Decision, Probability, State, Trade Union

Delegation and emission tax in a differentiated oligopoly

This paper examines how product differentiation as well as strategic managerial delegation affects optimal emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare, under alternative modes of product market competition. It shows that, under pure profit maximization, the (positive) optimal emission tax rate is not necessarily decreasing in degree of product differentiation, irrespective of the mode of competition. The possibility of emission tax rate to be positive and lower for more differentiated products, under quantity (price) competition, is higher (lower) in case of delegation than that in case of no delegation. It also shows that, under quantity (price) competition, the equilibrium emission tax rate environmental damage and social welfare are higher (lower) in case of delegation than that in case of no delegation.Emission tax, price competition, product differentiation, quantity competition, strategic managerial delegation

Competition for foreign capital: Endogenous objective, public investment and tax

In this paper we endogenize the objective functions of the regions as well as their decision to provide public investment in a model of competition for foreign owned mobile capital. We demonstrate that the competing regions can `restrict race-to-the-bottom' in tax rates by deviating away from social welfare to net tax revenue. It is optimal for a region to be fully revenue oriented even if that region's ultimate goal is to maximize social welfare, irrespective of whether the rival region is concerned about social welfare or net tax revenue. Moreover, we demonstrate that the regions have unilateral incentive to spend on public investment, except in case of perfect spillover. In equilibrium, both the regions spend on public investment and end up with Pareto inferior outcomes.Mobile Capital, Tax Competition, Public Investment, Revenue Orientation, Social Welfare

Measuring Financial Inclusion : An Axiomatic Approach

This paper clearly demonstrates that the axiomatic measurement approach developed in the human development literature can be usefully applied to the measurement of financial inclusion. A conceptual framework for aggregating data on financial services in different dimensions is developed. The suggested index of financial inclusion allows calculation of percentage contributions of different dimensions to the overall achievement. This in turn enables us to identify the dimensions of inclusion that are more/less susceptible to overall inclusion and hence to isolate the dimensions that deserve attention from a policy perspective. The paper also illustrates the index using cross-country and sub-national level data.financial inclusion, axioms, index, policy, application

Does partial privatization improve the environment?

This paper shows that, in case of differentiated products mixed duopoly, environmental damage increases (decreases) with the level of privatization, if the level of privatization is less (more) than certain level. It also shows that partial privatization is optimal from the social welfare point of view. However, the social welfare maximizing level of privatization damages the environment most.Privatization, mixed duopoly, environmental damage, environmental tax, social welfare

Entry Threats, and Inefficiency in ‘Efficient Bargaining’

We examine whether the outcome of bargaining over wage and employment between an incumbent firm and a union remains efficient under entry threat. The workers\' reservation wage is not known to the entrant, and entry is profitable only against the high reservation wage. The entrant observes the pre-entry price, but not necessarily the wage agreements. When wage is not observed, contracts feature over-employment. Under separating equilibrium the low type is over-employed, and under pooling equilibrium the high type is over-employed. But when wage is observed, pooling equilibrium may not always exist, and separating equilibrium does not involve any inefficiency.Efficient Bargaining, Entry Threat, Signalling, Inefficiency

Environmental Standards as Strategic Outcomes : A Simple Model

This paper examines the strategic nature of choice of environmental standards under different degrees of openness of countries. It also compares and contrasts equilibrium environmental standards and levels of pollution, local and global, with the world optimum levels. It shows that, in case of open economies, environmental standards can be strategic substitutes or complements. In equilibrium, countries set higher environmental standards in case of open economies compared to that in case of closed economies. It also shows that equilibrium standards in case of open economies are higher than the world optimum in certain situations. In contrast, countries set lower environmental standards, in equilibrium, than the world optimum in absence of international trade.Environmental standards, strategic choice, openness, world optimum