Historical perspectives on financial development and economic growth

Economic development ; Financial institutions ; Macroeconomics

The Q-Theory of Mergers: International and Cross-Border Evidence

The main implications of the Q-theory of mergers are tested for United States and seven continental European countries in both the domestic and cross-border cases. I find that European firms, much like those in the United States, tend to use mergers and acquisitions to make large increases in their capital stocks, that this choice is more sensitive to the acquirer's Tobin's Q than its direct investment, and that mergers raise the efficiency of target assets. Data from cross-border mergers between U.S. acquirers and European targets support the theory most emphaticallyreallocation, Tobin's Q, European Union

A Common Currency: Early U.S. Monetary Policy and the Transition to the Dollar

The transition of the U.S. money supply from the mixture of paper bills of credit, certificates, and foreign coins that circulated at various exchange rates with the British pound sterling during the colonial period to the unified dollar standard of the early national period was rapid and had far-reaching consequences. This paper documents the transition and highlights the importance of this standardization in bringing order to the nation's finances and in facilitating the accumulation and intermediation of capital. It describes how the struggle of the colonies to maintain viable substitutes for hard money set the stage for the financial leaders of the Federalist period, led by Alexander Hamilton, to settle upon the dollar, attach it to a convertible metallic base, and create a national Bank that issued notes denominated in the new monetary unit. It also presents recently-constructed estimates of the U.S. money stock for 1790-1820 and relates them to measures of the nation's early modernization.

Backing, the Quantity Theory, and the Transition to the U.S. Dollar, 1723-1850

Among the thirteen original colonies, Pennsylvania was most successful at issuing paper money with only minimal effects on prices -- so much so that the colony's experience is sometimes seen as violating the classical quantity theory of money. Quantity theorists usually attribute this apparent anomaly to mismeasurement of the money stock. In contrast, I use data on money, prices, and real activity in Pennsylvania from 1723 to 1774 and for the United States as a whole from 1790 to 1850 (when the money stock is better measured) to show that the long-run behavior of money and prices is well explained by the quantity theory in both periods, despite the differences in institutional arrangements, once growth in monetized transactions is taken into account.

Why Wait? A Century of Life Before IPO

Firms that entered the stock market in the 1990s were younger than any earlier cohort since World War I. Surprisingly, however, firms that IPO'd at the close of the 19th century were just as young as the companies that are entering today. We argue here that the electrification-era and the IT-era firms came in young because the technologies that they brought in were too productive to be kept out very long. The model assumes that the stage before IPO is a learning period during which the firm refines the idea before committing to it at the IPO stage. The better the idea, the higher is the opportunity cost of a delay in its implementation, and the earlier the firm will have its IPO.

General Purpose Technologies

Electricity and Information Technology (IT) are perhaps the two most important general purpose technologies (GPTs) to date. We analyze how the U.S. economy reacted to them. The Electricity and IT eras are similar, but also differ in several important ways. Electrification was more broadly adopted, whereas IT seems to be technologically more "revolutionary." The productivity slowdown is stronger in the IT era but the ongoing spread of IT and its continuing precipitous price decline are reasons for optimism about growth in the 21st century.

Emerging Financial Markets and Early U.S. Growth

Studies of early U.S. growth traditionally have emphasized real-sector explanations for an acceleration that by many accounts became detectable between 1815 and 1840. Interestingly, the establishment of the nation's basic financial structure predated by three decades the canals, railroads, and widespread use of water and steam-powered machinery that are thought to have triggered modernization. We argue that this innovative and expanding financial system, by providing debt and equity financing to businesses and governments as new technologies emerged, was central to the nation's early growth and modernization. The analysis includes a set of multivariate time series models that relate measures of banking and equity market activity to measures of investment, imports and business incorporations from 1790 to 1850. The findings offer support for our hypothesis of finance-led' growth in the U.S. case. By implication, the interest today in improving financial systems as a means of fostering sustainable growth is not misplaced.

Liquidity Effects in the Bond Market

Our paper reports the following two findings: 1) In monthly data, bond purchases by the Fed raise bond prices and reduce bond yields. The residual bond-supply to traders is not fully predictable, and this supply-risk adds between 10 and 40 basis points to the standard deviation of the real interest rate on T-bills. 2) The Fed's open market purchases do not raise stock prices or reduce stock returns. If anything, they raise stock returns. More generally, bonds and stocks do not co-move at high frequencies. To explain these two facts, we model the bond and stock markets as spatially separate or 'segmented'. In the model, bond purchases lower bond rates, but they do not affect stock returns, and this is consistent with both facts.

Moore's Law and Learning-By-Doing

We model Moore's Law as efficiency of computer producers that rises as a by-product of their experience. We find that (1) Because computer prices fall much faster than the prices of electricity-driven and diesel-driven capital ever did, growth in the coming decades should be very fast, and that (2) The obsolescence of firms today occurs faster than before, partly because the physical capital they own becomes obsolete faster.