Is it relevant to use the english word "sentience" in french?

Depuis Aristote les animaux sont considérés comme des êtres sensibles, ce qui a été reconnu sur le plan juridique dans le code rural en 1976 puis le code civil en 2017. Par ailleurs, les philosophes du XVIIIe siècle ont introduit le concept de « sentience » - la capacité de ressentir - pour l’opposer à la raison - la capacité de penser -. Cette notion s’est précisée ultérieurement entre les mains des philosophes de l’esprit anglo-saxons pour exprimer la capacité d’éprouver des expériences subjectives (« qualia », « conscience phénoménale »), un concept clair et relativement « simple » mais que seule l’introspection permet d’approcher. En dépit de cette difficulté ontologique, certains penseurs en éthique animale souhaitent introduire ce concept dans la langue française, sans s’interroger sur sa polysémie qui, déjà, brouille sa signification dans la littérature anglophone. En effet, la « sentience » englobe selon les auteurs les sensations, les perceptions, les émotions, les affects, les sentiments, la cognition, la conscience, etc. Chacun de ces termes étant polysémique et appartenant à la fois aux champs philosophiques et scientifiques, le terme générique apparait comme un fourre-tout sémantique obérant toute approche raisonnée. Pour s’en convaincre, il suffit d’envisager la confusion qu’entraînerait le remplacement de l’affirmation « l’animal est un être sensible » par « l’animal est un être sentient ». Sur le plan législatif, il serait source de regrettables malentendus. Soulignons en outre le piège sémantique que dissimule l’utilisation de l’article défini et du singulier, négligeant ainsi l’extraordinaire diversité du monde animal qui s’est épanouie dans l’espace - notre planète - et le temps - 600 millions d’années -.Since Aristotle animals are considered as sensitive beings, what was recognized at the legislative level in the French rural and civil codes in 1976 and 2017, respectively. The XVIIIth century philosophers introduced the concept of «sentience» - the ability to feel - to differ from the reason - the capacity to think -. This notion was then clarified by the Anglo-Saxon philosophers of mind to express the capacity to feel subjective experiences («qualia», «phenomenal consciousness»), a clear and relatively «simple» concept but only approachable by introspection. In spite of this ontological difficulty, some animal ethics thinkers wish to introduce this concept into the French language, without wondering about its polysemy which, already, blurs its meaning in the English-speaking literature. According to the authors, «sentience» includes sensations, perception, emotions, feelings, affects, feeling, cognition, consciousness, etc. Each of these terms being polysemic and belonging to both the philosophic and scientific fields, the generic name appears as a semantic oldall compromising any reasoned approach. To convince oneself, it is enough to envisage the confusion driven by the replacement of the asser- tion «the animal is a sensitive being» by «the animal is a sentient being». At the legislative level, it would be the source of regrettable misunderstandings. Let us also underline the semantic trap that hides the grammatical use of the defined article and the singular, so neglecting the extraordinary diversity of the animal kingdom that spread out over space -our planet- and time -600 millions years-

Effects of alpha-linolenic acid vs. docosahexaenoic acid supply on the distribution of fatty acids among the rat cardiac subcellular membranes after a short- or long-term dietary exposure

Previous work showed that the functional cardiac effect of dietary alpha-linolenic acid (ALA) in rats requires a long feeding period (6 months), although a docosahexaenoic (DHA) acid-supply affects cardiac adrenergic response after 2 months. However, the total cardiac membrane n-3 polyunsaturated fatty acid (PUFA) composition remained unchanged after 2 months. This delay could be due to a specific reorganization of the different subcellular membrane PUFA profiles. This study was designed to investigate the evolution between 2 and 6 months of diet duration of the fatty acid profile in sarcolemmal (SL), mitochondrial (MI), nuclear (NU) and sarcoplasmic reticulum (SR) membrane fractions. Male Wistar rats were randomly assigned to 3 dietary groups (n = 10/diet/period), either n-3 PUFA-free diet (CTL), or ALA or DHA-rich diets. After 2 or 6 months, the subcellular cardiac membrane fractions were separated by differential centrifugations and sucrose gradients. Each membrane profile was analysed by gas chromatography (GC) after lipid extraction. As expected the n-3 PUFA-rich diets incorporated n-3 PUFA instead of n-6 PUFA in all the subcellular fractions, which also exhibited individual specificities. The diet duration increased SFA and decreased PUFA in SL, whereas NU remained constant. The SR and MI enriched in n-3 PUFA exhibited a decreased DHA level with ageing in the DHA and CTL groups. Conversely, the n-3 PUFA level remained unchanged in the ALA group, due to a significant increase in docosapentaenoic acid (DPA). N-3 PUFA rich diets lead to a better PUFA profile in all the fractions and significantly prevent the profile modifications induced by ageing. With the ALA diet the n-3 PUFA content, particularly in SR and SL kept increasing between 2 and 6 months, which may partly account for the delay to achieve the modification of adrenergic response

Experimental study of reflexive erection in rats

Les fibres du nerf dorsal du pénis véhiculent la sensibilité du pénis et constituent le versant afférent des réflexes sexuels. Leur stimulation par des chocs de faible durée provoque une augmentation réflexe de la pression intracavemeuse, qui est supprimée par la section bilatérale des nerfs pelviens efférents. Lorsqu’on augmente la durée des chocs, la réponse réflexe n’est obtenue qu’après section de la moelle en T8, suggérant la possibilité d’un contrôle inhibiteur descendant de ce réflexe d’érection. Chez les rats spinaux, la réponse réflexe diminue d’amplitude, lorsque l’on augmente l’intensité de la stimulation. Cette inhibition segmentaire n’est pas due au recrutement de fibres sensitives inhibitrices. Elle pourrait résulter de la mise en jeu d’un réflexe sympathique antiérectile s’opposant au réflexe d’érection.The dorsal nerve of the penis, which carries the somatic sensory information of the glans and the penile skin constitutes the afferent limb of sexual reflex responses. Its stimulation by trains of rectangular pulses of small duration (< 0,1 ms) leads to reflex increase of the intracavemous pressure which is abolished by bilateral section of the efferent pelvic nerves. Increasing pulse duration to 1 ms fails to elicit this reflex response in intact rats. Such a stimulation consistenly elicits it in rats with spinal transection at the level T8, suggesting a possible descending inhibitory action of supraspinal centers on the lombosacral spinal cord. In acute spinal rats, the reflex response progressively decreases when intensity of afferent stimulation increases. This inhibitory effect is not due to recruitment of inhibitory afferent fibers and could result from reflex activation of spinal sympathetic antirectile centers

Near-Fatal Multiple Organ Dysfunction Syndrome Induced by Plasmodium malariae

International audienc

Protocol design for the evaluation of chronic antioxidant supplementation on oxidative stress and cognition status in post COVID-19 patients

peer reviewe

The fables of pity: Rousseau, Mandeville and the animal-fable

Copyright @ 2012 Edinburgh University PressPrompted by Derrida’s work on the animal-fable in eighteenth-century debates about political power, this article examines the role played by the fiction of the animal in thinking of pity as either a natural virtue (in Rousseau’s Second Discourse) or as a natural passion (in Mandeville’s The Fable of the Bees). The war of fables between Rousseau and Mandeville – and their hostile reception by Samuel Johnson and Adam Smith – reinforce that the animal-fable illustrates not so much the proper of man as the possibilities and limitations of a moral philosophy that is unable to address the political realities of the state