Foreign Aid and the Question of Fungibility.

This paper analyzes whether the foreign assistance provided for specific categories of expenditure is shifted among them, contrary to the wishes of donors. It also considers whether aid reduces the tax effort of recipient governments. Econometric results are presented for the Dominican Republic that show that the fungibility of aid has resulted in a thwarting of the intentions of donors. An attempt is made to account for the observed differences in behavior of individual countries in altering expenditures. Copyright 1993 by MIT Press.

Is Foreign Aid Fungible? The Case of Indonesia.

This paper considers whether foreign aid given for specific categories of expenditure is fungible among them and whether aid reduces tax effort by the recipient government. Models developed to analyze the fiscal relations among different levels of government in the United States are applied to analysis of the impact of foreign aid. Econometric analysis of data for Indonesia reveals that aid is largely spent as the donors intended, that aid does not lead to a reduction in tax effort, and that aid is not diverted to nondevelopment current expenditures. Copyright 1990 by Royal Economic Society.

Privatization of public-sector services in theory and practice

The last ten years have seen a marked increase in the analysis and implementation of private-sector alternatives to the production of public-sector services. The impetus for privatization has two sources: (1) opposition to further growth of the public sector, and (2) the belief that the private sector would be a more efficient producer. Yet as privatization moves beyond the acquisition of intermediate goods and services (payroll processing and housekeeping services, for example) to more complex public outputs (such as education, social security, public safety, the postal system, for example), it is subject to increasing challenge on both efficiency and equity grounds. Nonetheless, private alternatives to public production are finding increased acceptance.

The states' scramble for federal funds: Who wins, who loses?

Interstate differences between federal expenditures and receipts are very large, generally favoring the southern and western states. The more slowly growing states of the northeast and midwest point to these imbalances as one source of their economic difficulties. The major source of disparity lies in revenue patterns, not in expenditure allocations. Reallocating federal expenditures on an equal per capita basis would reduce regional disparities in flows of federal funds by only about 25 percent. The principal regional beneficiary of equalized expenditures would be the midwest states of the Great Lakes region. However, contrary to the expectations of proponents of such redistribution, the southeastern states would also be major beneficiaries while the larger states of the mideast and New England would be hurt. Selective expenditure changes might be targeted more effectively to individual regions or states; but finding consistent, generally acceptable principles upon which to base such changes is a formidable problem.