Judicial Systems and Authoritarian Transitions

For several decades, development policy specialists and donor agencies have championed investment in the judicial systems of developing countries to promote economic growth and, eventually, democracy. The assumption of a causal link among these three phenomena motivates donors’ investments in the physical and human capacity of the legal system. Some reforms are narrowly focused—better enforcement of property rights and contract law—conducive to enhanced trade and investment. Although these narrow reform programs imply that political liberalisation is an ultimate objective, studies are unable to substantiate causality between the rule of law, economic growth and democracy [Carothers (2003)]. Autocratic regimes may establish courts to protect the property rights of regime insiders and to expropriate the rights of outsiders. In our view a rule of law will have emerged only once the state has achieved legitimacy in the hearts and minds of citizens. The idea that better rule of law would generate economic growth, which would in turn build constituencies for democratic reforms will be questioned in this paper. An alternative view will be suggested, most notably the alignment of national identity with the institutions of the state is critical to establishing a rule of law

Pakistan's Managerial Dilemmas

Discretion without accountability is deeply rooted in Pakistan's political history, profoundly shaping the country's administrative system. Pakistan's political institutions offer the leadership many opportunities for violating citizen trust. Institutional change is proposed as a tool for politicians to maintain their authority through policy reform rather than patronage. Institutions are needed that allow politicians to lead while preserving the impartiality, permanence, and expertise of a public bureaucracy.

Pakistan's Managerial Dilemmas (Distinguished Lecture)

Discretion without accountability is deeply rooted in Pakistan's political history, profoundly shaping the country's administrative system. Pakistan's political institutions offer the leadership many opportunities for violating citizen trust. Institutional change is proposed as a tool for politicians to maintain their authority through policy reform rather than patronage. Institutions are needed that allow politicians to lead while preserving the impartiality, permanence, and expertise of a public bureaucrac

Politiques frumentaires et violence collective en Europe au XVIIIe siècle

Grain Policies and Collective Violence in Eighteenth Century Europe. In this article the author contends that French policies designed to defend consumer interests produced price distortions that reduced overall income and transferred income from the countryside to the town. The term "moral economy" does not capture this aspect of early-modern crowd action. A more accurate description would emphasize the monopolistic character of the policies that crowds were trying to defend and the costs their actions imposed on the population at large. Although crowd actions promoted policies that imposed costs spread broadly across the population, these actions generated benefits that were localized and highly visible. Urban groups often benefitted at the expense of the more numerous but geographically diffuse peasantry. The moral economy argument does not account for these macro-economic outcomes of policies which in effect subsidized grain consumption for town dwellers. Moreover, the term ignores the competition between rural and urban interests. Most importantly, recent discussions of grain riots do not examine the different national outcomes of collective action.Root Hilton L. Politiques frumentaires et violence collective en Europe au XVIIIe siècle. In: Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations. 45ᵉ année, N. 1, 1990. pp. 167-189

En Bourgogne : l'État et la communauté rurale, 1661-1789

State Versus Rural Community in Burgundy (1661-1789) In 1756, a Burgundian seigneur, Loppin de Gemeaux, was engaged in a bitter and protracted struggle with the provincial intendant Joly de Fleury. At issue was the particular seignorial prerogative entitling Loppin to convoke, and preside over, meetings of the village assembly. But, as we shall see, Loppin was defending much more than a procedural detail. At stake was the essence of lordship, which in Loppin's view, combined the ownership of land with the exercise of public authority. The outcome of this case is highly suggestive of how relations between peasants, and seigneurs, and the state were changing in the late eighteenth century. In fact, the case was to mark a turning point the monarchy's efforts to divest the Burgundian seigneurie of its administrative functionsRoot Hilton L. En Bourgogne : l'État et la communauté rurale, 1661-1789. In: Annales. Economies, sociétés, civilisations. 37ᵉ année, N. 2, 1982. pp. 288-302