A Dialogue on Concepts

This short dialogue, in Socratic prose, explores some of the most fundamental constructs in cognition: Concepts, thinking and analogy. In short, concepts are the atoms of thought and analogy is the 'ether' of concept formation. Therefore, thinking is the process of triggering memories through analogy

Modal Similarity

Just as Boolean rules define Boolean categories, the Boolean operators define higher-order Boolean categories referred to as modal categories. We examine the similarity order between these categories and the standard category of logical identity (i.e. the modal category defined by the biconditional or equivalence operator). Our goal is 4-fold: first, to introduce a similarity measure for determining this similarity order; second, to show that such a measure is a good predictor of the similarity assessment behaviour observed in our experiment involving key modal categories; third, to argue that as far as the modal categories are concerned, configural similarity assessment may be componential or analytical in nature; and lastly, to draw attention to the intimate interplay that may exist between deductive judgments, similarity assessment and categorisation

Categorical invariance and structural complexity in human concept learning

An alternative account of human concept learning based on an invariance measure of the categorical\ud stimulus is proposed. The categorical invariance model (CIM) characterizes the degree of structural\ud complexity of a Boolean category as a function of its inherent degree of invariance and its cardinality or\ud size. To do this we introduce a mathematical framework based on the notion of a Boolean differential\ud operator on Boolean categories that generates the degrees of invariance (i.e., logical manifold) of the\ud category in respect to its dimensions. Using this framework, we propose that the structural complexity\ud of a Boolean category is indirectly proportional to its degree of categorical invariance and directly\ud proportional to its cardinality or size. Consequently, complexity and invariance notions are formally\ud unified to account for concept learning difficulty. Beyond developing the above unifying mathematical\ud framework, the CIM is significant in that: (1) it precisely predicts the key learning difficulty ordering of\ud the SHJ [Shepard, R. N., Hovland, C. L.,&Jenkins, H. M. (1961). Learning and memorization of classifications.\ud Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 75(13), 1-42] Boolean category types consisting of three\ud binary dimensions and four positive examples; (2) it is, in general, a good quantitative predictor of the\ud degree of learning difficulty of a large class of categories (in particular, the 41 category types studied\ud by Feldman [Feldman, J. (2000). Minimization of Boolean complexity in human concept learning. Nature,\ud 407, 630-633]); (3) it is, in general, a good quantitative predictor of parity effects for this large class of\ud categories; (4) it does all of the above without free parameters; and (5) it is cognitively plausible (e.g.,\ud cognitively tractable)

Complexity over Uncertainty in Generalized Representational\ud Information Theory (GRIT): A Structure-Sensitive General\ud Theory of Information

What is information? Although researchers have used the construct of information liberally to refer to pertinent forms of domain-specific knowledge, relatively few have attempted to generalize and standardize the construct. Shannon and Weaver(1949)offered the best known attempt at a quantitative generalization in terms of the number of discriminable symbols required to communicate the state of an uncertain event. This idea, although useful, does not capture the role that structural context and complexity play in the process of understanding an event as being informative. In what follows, we discuss the limitations and futility of any generalization (and particularly, Shannon’s) that is not based on the way that agents extract patterns from their environment. More specifically, we shall argue that agent concept acquisition, and not the communication of\ud states of uncertainty, lie at the heart of generalized information, and that the best way of characterizing information is via the relative gain or loss in concept complexity that is experienced when a set of known entities (regardless of their nature or domain of origin) changes. We show that Representational Information Theory perfectly captures this crucial aspect of information and conclude with the first generalization of Representational Information Theory (RIT) to continuous domains

The GIST of Concepts

A unified general theory of human concept learning based on the idea that humans detect invariance patterns in categorical stimuli as a necessary precursor to concept formation is proposed and tested. In GIST (generalized invariance structure theory) invariants are detected via a perturbation mechanism of dimension suppression referred to as dimensional binding. Structural information acquired by this process is stored as a compound memory trace termed an ideotype. Ideotypes inform the subsystems that are responsible for learnability judgments, rule formation, and other types of concept representations. We show that GIST is more general (e.g., it works on continuous, semi-continuous, and binary stimuli) and makes much more accurate predictions than the leading models of concept learning difficulty,such as those based on a complexity reduction principle (e.g., number of mental models,structural invariance, algebraic complexity, and minimal description length) and those based on selective attention and similarity (GCM, ALCOVE, and SUSTAIN). GIST unifies these two key aspects of concept learning and categorization. Empirical evidence from three\ud experiments corroborates the predictions made by the theory and its core model which we propose as a candidate law of human conceptual behavior

Towards a Law of Invariance in Human Concept Learning

Invariance principles underlie many key theories in modern science. They provide the explanatory and predictive framework necessary for the rigorous study of natural phenomena ranging from the structure of crystals, to magnetism, to relativistic mechanics. Vigo (2008, 2009)introduced a new general notion and principle of invariance from which two parameter-free (ratio and exponential) models were derived to account for human conceptual behavior. Here we introduce a new parameterized \ud exponential “law” based on the same invariance principle. The law accurately predicts the subjective degree of difficulty that humans experience when learning different types of concepts. In addition, it precisely fits the data from a large-scale experiment which examined a total of 84 category structures across 10 category families (R-Squared =.97, p < .0001; r= .98, p < .0001). Moreover, it overcomes seven key challenges that had, hitherto, been grave obstacles for theories of concept learning