Towards Better Regulation of the Legal Professions in the European Union

This article starts by discussing a number of public interest explanations for regulating the markets of legal services: information asymmetries, negative externalities and public goods. Since professional associations of lawyers meet the requirements for acting as effective lobbyists, the article subsequently investigates private interest explanations. Empirical work to test alternative theories of professional regulation so far remains limited and the results are ambiguous. Even if empirical studies are able to show that there exists a correlation between levels of professional regulation and profits earned, firm policy conclusions cannot be drawn as long as quality is not adequately assessed. After an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature, the article suggests a number of best practices for policy making. The two most important guidelines seem to be the following. Regulation should not be profession-focused but targeted at market failures in particular segments of the legal services markets. Changes of the regulatory infrastructure that create scope for competitive self-regulation may be the best way for coping with market failures and at the same time reducing the scope for rent-seeking

Unmasking mutual recognition : current inconsistencies and future chances

The principle of 'mutual recognition' is almost universally acclaimed for removing barriers to trade (e.g., within the EU), for enabling regulatory competition, and for preserving scope for regulatory autonomy instead of embarking on a path to harmonisation and centralisation. Through the analysis of the application of 'mutual recognition' within the EU (by using economic theories of legal federalism and regulatory competition), we show that this principle leads to a number of serious inconsistencies and problems, which question its suitability as a conflict of law rule that leads to a stable allocation of regulatory powers within a two-level system of regulations. 'Mutual recognition' should be understood more as a dynamic principle, which triggers a reshuffling of regulatory powers between different jurisdictional levels. It leads either back to the country of destination principle, to a free (internal) market for regulations, or to harmonisation and centralisation. In particular, the European experiences suggest that the introduction of a regime of 'mutual recognition' seems to be primarily another path to convergence and harmonisation instead of being an instrument that preserves decentralised regulatory powers or even regulatory competition

Optimal Enforcement of Safety Law

Given the threats of our current 'risk society', there is an ever-increasing demand for safety regulation to counter the harmful effects of an equally growing number of dangerous activities. Claims for more safety and security abound, ranging from concerns about people killed in traffic accidents and consumers harmed by unsafe products to anxiety about environmental disasters (global warming) and terrorism. This state of affairs poses difficult issues for policy makers. While government resources are necessarily limited, demands for safety and security are in principle without bounds. It is thus unavoidable that difficult choices must be made and priorities must be set. The Law and Economics literature has developed a comprehensive normative framework to prescribe optimal legal policies when individuals behave rationally. It is well established that enforcement agents should not aim at a minimum level of violations of legal norms but at an optimal level. The main goal of this paper is to apply the insights from the Law and Economics literature on optimal law enforcement to the area of safety regulation. Our paper distinguishes between the form of the sanctions (monetary versus non-monetary), the role of private parties versus public agents in enforcement (e.g. group actions), the timing of the enforcement measures (preclusion, act-based sanctions and harm-based sanctions) and the division of competencies between central enforcement authorities and decentralized enforcement agencies. Furthermore, we discuss several criticisms on the rational choice model (especially related to terrorism) and briefly discuss compliance strategies as alternative approach to deterrence strategies

Caltech Faint Galaxy Redshift Survey XIV: Galaxy Morphology in the HDF (North) and its Flanking Fields to z=1.2

Morphological classifications are reported for Hubble Space Telescope (HST) images of 241 galaxies in the Hubble Deep Field (HDF) and its Flanking Fields (FF) with measured redshifts in the interval 0.25 < z < 1.2, drawn from a magnitude-limited redshift survey to R = 24.0. The galaxies are divided into three groups with redshifts in the intervals [0.25,0.6], [0.6,0.8], [0.8,1.2]. R606 images from the first group and I814 images from the second and third groups are compared with B-band images of nearby galaxies. All classifications were therefore made at approximately the same rest wavelength. Selection biases are discussed. We corroborate and extend the results of earlier investigations by observing that: Most intermediate and late-type galaxies with $z\gtrsim0.5$ have morphologies that are dramatically different from those of local galaxies and cannot be shoehorned into the Hubble ``tuning fork'' classification scheme. Grand-design spirals appear to be rare or absent for $z\gtrsim0.3$. Many Sa and Sb spirals with $z\gtrsim0.6$ do not exhibit well-defined spiral arms. The arms of distant Sc galaxies appear more chaotic than those of their nearby counterparts. (abridged) On the basis of these and similar observations, it is inferred that the development of pronounced spiral structure was delayed until \~5 Gyr and that most bulges are probably not formed by disintegrating bars. Major morphological changes were still taking place only ~5 Gyr ago even though changes in the integrated light of most galaxies were then much slower than they were ~10 Gyr ago.Comment: Accepted by the Astronomical Journa

The preventive function of collective actions for damages inconsumer law

From a deterrence perspective, private enforcement of consumer law can be insufficient for several reasons. Individual consumers may find it too costly to start a lawsuit (‘rational apathy’) or they may not even know that an infringement has occurred (‘information asymmetry’). If public enforcement is not available, or if the budget of public authorities is limited and used for other purposes, the problem of under-enforcement will persist. Collective actions may be able to mitigate these problems. If many consumers can join their claims, the costs per claim decrease so that the rational apathy problem might be overcome. If consumer associations have standing, they might be able to acquire better information regarding infringements than individual consumers are able to do. However, collective actions pose problems of their own. The leading plaintiff or the organisation issuing the collective action could try to advance its own interests, rather than furthering overall consumer interests. Moreover, a large-scale lawsuit might harm the reputation of the defendant and thus create the possibility of ‘frivolous suits’. The paper discusses a number of possibilities to overcome these problems. Ultimately, private and public enforcement will need to co-exist, since collective actions are not a perfect instrument to achieve optimal deterrence

Consumer Sales Law from an Economic Perspective

Introduction: In the European internal market consumers have a wide choice of products that become increasingly available through cross-border shopping. Sometimes sellers frustrate consumers‟ contractual expectations by delivering goods that are not of satisfactory quality. To guarantee a minimum level of consumer protection, EC Directive 1999/44 requires that goods must be in conformity with the contract of sale.1 This rule applies regardless of whether the seller behaved negligently. In cases of non conformity consumers have a choice of different remedies for breach of contract by the seller, such as repair or replacement or price reduction. The Directive has been presented as a significant step towards creating an internal consumer market, which would be impeded by fragmented and heterogeneous consumer protection rules. It may be followed in the future by further harmonization initiatives in the field of consumer sales law. From an economic perspective, two sets of questions arise. First, it may be asked whether legal intervention is necessary to guarantee quality in markets for consumer goods. The standard economic answer to this question is that legal rules may cure market failures, in particular problems of asymmetric information. However, any legal intervention must be justified by a benefit-cost analysis to enhance economic efficiency and avoid counterproductive effects. Consumer protection should be increased only up to the point where its marginal cost equals its marginal benefit. Moreover, market failures should not be replaced by government failures, which lead to outcomes that are worse than those of imperfect markets. Second, Law and Economics scholars have critically analyzed the question relating to the best level of government for designing regulatory responses to market failures. Should rules of consumer protection be enacted at the European level or should regulatory action be taken by the Member States? The economic analysis of federalism and regulatory competition provides several useful insights that are also relevant for discussing the desirability of harmonization of consumer sales law to further market integration

The Principles of European Tort Law

__Abstract:__ The goal of the _Principles of European Tort Law_ is to serve as a basis for the enhancement and harmonization of tort law in Europe. This paper takes a critical look at these _Principles_ from a Law and Economics perspective. The first part of the paper questions the traditional arguments in favour of harmonization, such as the need to achieve a ‘level playing field’ for industry and the reduction of legal uncertainty which may hinder cross-border trade. There are several economic arguments in favour of diverging tort laws: the possibility to satisfy heterogeneous preferences and the learning processes generated by competition between legal orders. Economic arguments in favour of harmonization are weak. There is no need for central rules to internalize externalities; a race to the bottom is unlikely and the amount of transaction cost savings may be low. The second part of the paper examines whether the _Principles_ may contribute to ‘better’ tort law. Large parts of the _Principles_, such as the fault standard and some of the rules on causation, are in conformity with economic insights. According to Article 10:101, damages serve the goal of compensation but also the aim of preventing harm. However, it is shown that several provisions of the Principles are not in conformity with the goal of prevention. The analysis focuses on the limitation of damages to normal losses, the different levels of protection in functio

Poisson (co)homology and isolated singularities

To each polynomial \v\in\F[x,y,z] is associated a Poisson structure on \F^3, a surface and a Poisson structure on this surface. When \v is weight homogeneous with an isolated singularity, we determine the Poisson cohomology and homology of the two Poisson varieties obtained.Comment: 27 page

Hubble Space Telescope WFPC-2 Imaging of Cassiopeia A

The young SNR Cassiopeia A was imaged with WFPC-2 through four filters selected to capture the complete velocity range of the remnant's main shell in several important emission lines. Primary lines detected were [O III] 4959,5007, [N II] 6583, [S II] 6716,6731 + [O II] 7319,7330 + [O I] 6300,6364, and [S III] 9069,9532. About 3/4th of the remnant's main shell was imaged in all four filters. Considerable detail is observed in the reverse-shocked ejecta with typical knot scale lengths of 0.2"-0.4" (1 - 2 x 10^16 cm). Both bright and faint emission features appear highly clumped. Large differences in [S III] and [O III] line intensities indicating chemical abundance differences are also seen, particularly in knots located along the bright northern limb and near the base of the northeast jet. A line of curved overlapping filament in the remnant's northwestern rim appears to mark the location of the remnant's reverse shock front in this region. Finger-like ejecta structures elsewhere suggest cases where the reverse shock front is encountering the remnant's clumped ejecta. Narrow-band [N II] images of the remnant's circumstellar knots ("QSFs") reveal them to be 0.1"-0.6" thick knots and filaments, often with diffuse edges facing away from the center of expansion. Three color composite images of the whole remnant and certain sections along with individual filter enlargements of selected regions of the bright optical shell are presented and discussed.Comment: 26 pages, 12 figures Accepted to the Astronomical Journa