La vía negativa de acceso a la dignidad y la expresión "muerte digna"

The negative approach can be justified as an alternative to Skeptical and metaphysical conceptions of dignity. This approach conceives dignity as a boundary of what is morally admissible and it’s essentially negative content consists in not being treated in a cruel, inhuman, discriminative degrading or humiliating way. From that starting point, we proceed to study the expression “death with dignity” in the borderline cases when it´s impossible to appeal to the principle of personal autonomy.Se justifica un enfoque negativo de la noción de dignidad como alternativa posible a las concepciones escéptica y metafísica. Tal enfoque consiste en comprender la dignidad como un límite de lo moralmente admisible cuyo contenido sería esencialmente negativo: no recibir un trato cruel, inhumano, degradante, discriminatorio o humillante. Desde este enfoque se analiza la expresión “muerte digna” en los casos límite en que es imposible apelar al principio de autonomía personal

Note on Los lenguajes de la jurisprudencia, la sociología y la ética, Retributionism vs. Utilitarism

A partir de una revisión crítica de algunas obras emblemáticas del filósofo del derecho mexicano Ulises Schmill, se aborda el debate recurrente entre retribucionismo y utilitarismo con respecto a la justificación del castigo y su relación con el poder. Se propone un tercer modelo, cooperativo y constructivista, a medio camino entre el absolutismo de una ética de la coacción y el subjetivismo de una ética de la responsabilidad. Desde este tercer modelo se procede a hacer una crítica al consecuencialismo de Schmill y a una propuesta alternativa a la del autor con respecto a los planteamientos de Tucídides y Shakespeare.Taking as a starting point a critical review of Mexican law philosopher Ulises Schmill’s emblematic writings, we consider the recurring debate concerning retributivism and utilitarianism regarding the justification behind punishment and its relationship with power. A third model, halfway between the absolutism of the ethics of punishment and the subjectivity of ethics of responsibility, is proposed. Such a model is both cooperative and constructivist. From this third model a critique of Schmill’s consequentialism can be made, which alongside Thucydides and Shakespeare’s approaches, allows us to arrive at an alternative proposal

JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL, DERECHOS HUMANOS Y ARGUMENTO CONTRAMAYORITARIO

The author, in the context of the debate on the relationship between constitutional justice and the democratic process, argues in favour of considering the constitutional judicial review as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of a democratic rule of law. After analyzing the positions and general arguments of this debate, as well as some specific aspects of how it is being developed in Latin America, he argues for a model of a weak democracy, in which a series of rights, mainly civil and political rights are constitutionally entrenched and are considered preconditions of the democratic process. For this very reason, these two types of rights may be protected by constitutional courts, even against the majority legislature, without undermining the democratic dimension of the political system. With regard to welfare rights, given their distributive dimension and their relation with the welfare and needs of the population, their guarantee should not be left exclusively in the hands of the judges, because they can hardly be considered preconditions of democracy. That does not means, the author says, that they should not be constitutionalized, or that somehow the constitutional court should not be involved in their guarantee by the legislature.El autor, en el contexto del debate sobre la relación entre la justicia constitucional y el proceso democrático, argumenta a favor de considerar al control jurisdiccional de constitucionalidad como un requisito necesario, pero no suficiente, para la existencia de un Estado democrático de derecho. Tras analizar las posturas y argumentos generales de ese debate, así como aspectos singulares del modo en que se viene desarrollando en Latinoamérica, abogará por un modelo de democracia débil, en el que una serie de derechos, fundamentalmente civiles y políticos, estén atrincherados constitucionalmente y sean considerados precondiciones del proceso democrático. Por este último motivo, estos dos tipos de derechos podrían estar protegidos por la justicia constitucional, incluso frente al legislador mayoritario, sin merma de la dimensión democrática del sistema político. Respecto de los derechos sociales, dada su dimensión distributiva y su relación con el bienestar y las necesidades de la población, su garantía no debería de quedar exclusivamente en manos de los jueces, ya que difícilmente pueden ser considerados precondiciones de la democracia: esto no significa, afirma el autor, que no hayan de ser constitucionalizados ni tampoco que en su garantía por parte de los parlamentarios no participe, de algún modo, la justicia constitucional

Laicidad, ¿neutralidad? y deliberación pública. Un diálogo con Alfonso Ruiz Miguel. Comentario a Alfonso Ruiz Miguel, Cuestiones de principios: entre política y Derecho

Este artículo reseña: Alfonso Ruiz Miguel, Cuestiones de principios: entre política y Derecho, Madrid, 2020,  Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 615 pp

Legalidad y laicidad

Para constatar la existencia de un auténtico Estado de Derecho —a diferencia de un simple Estado con Derecho— el sistema jurídico debe satisfacer cuatro exigencias internas: primacía de la ley y principio de imperatividad, deliberación democrática y responsabilidad pública de los funcionarios, independencia judicial y control de constitucionalidad y reconocimiento y promoción de los derechos fundamentales. Mi propósito en este ensayo es desarrollar y defender dos de los cuatro principios que componen al Estado de Derecho: la primacía de la ley y la deliberación pública. Argumentaré que el primero de estos dos elementos encuentra fundamento en la idea de autonomía personal: para que los ciudadanos de cualquier Estado puedan desarrollarse plenamente, escogiendo su propio plan de vida de manera legal y legítima, es menester que el Estado no cambie de manera arbitraria aquello que considera legal y legítimo. El principio de deliberación pública, por otro lado, está anclado en la idea liberal del laicidad: las normas que han de atarnos como comunidad política deben discutirse de manera racional y razonable, asegurándonos de no privilegiar una cosmovisión que anule la posibilidad de perseguir ciertos planes de vida que deberían considerarse válidos y legítimos. Palabras clave: Estado de Derecho, laicidad, legalidad, deliberación, discusión pública, autonomía. Abstract: To distinguish between a normative Rule of Law versus a simple rule by law, the State must satisfy and be organized by four indispensable principles: primacy of the law and law’s empire; democratic deliberation and public responsibility of public officials; judicial independence with mechanisms of constitutional control; and recognition and promotion of fundamental rights. My purpose in this essay is to elaborate on, and defend only two of the four principles that together make the rule of law: primacy of the law and public deliberation. I will argue that the first of these elements is founded on the notion of personal autonomy: in order for the citizen of the nation-state to be able to fully develop and legally and legitimately pursue her own notion of the good life, the State must not—indeed, cannot—arbitrarily change what it deems to be legal and legitimate. The principle of public deliberation, on the other hand, is anchored to the liberal idea of secularism: the norms, rules, laws that are to bind us together as a political community must be discussed rationally and reasonably, making sure that the product of those deliberations—and the arguments put forth—do not annihilate the possibility of pursuing certain life plans that should be otherwise deemed valid and legitimate. Keywords: Rule of law, rule by law, secular, legality, deliberation, public reasoning, personal autonom

Luzes e sombras na trajetória dos Satyros

This article aims to discuss the relation between the mise-en-scène and the light design in Os Satyros’ history, since its foundation in 1989, emphasizing the aspects of the chiaroscuro game, their light operation and its impact in the aesthetics of the performance, the physical impact of lights in the reception by the spectator and potentialities of augmented lighting, based on cyborg concepts by Donna Haraway and Amber Case. The work was written based on Os Satyros’ ideas about lighting. The goal is to discuss the new lighting capabilities for contemporary theater.A proposta deste artigo é discutir a relação entre a encenação e a iluminação na trajetória de Os Satyros, desde sua fundação em 1989, destacando os aspectos do jogo de chiaroscuro, a operação das luzes e seu impacto na estética do espetáculo, o impacto físico da iluminação na recepção do espectador e as potencialidades da iluminação expandida, a partir dos conceitos ciborgues de Donna Haraway e Amber Case. O trabalho foi escrito a partir das reflexões realizadas pelo grupo dentro de suas próprias pesquisas sobre a iluminação. O objetivo é discutir as novas potencialidades luminotécnicas do teatro contemporâneo. 

Periodic spatial variation of the electron-phonon interaction in epitaxial graphene on Ru(0001

We have performed low temperature scanning tunnelling spectroscopy (STS) measurements on graphene epitaxially grown on Ru(0001). An inelastic feature, related to the excitation of a vibrational breathing mode of the graphene lattice, was found at 360 meV. The change in the differential electrical conductance produced by this inelastic feature, which is associated with the electron-phonon interaction strength, varies spatially from one position to other of the graphene supercell. This inhomogeneity in the electronic properties of graphene on Ru(0001) results from local variations of the carbon-ruthenium interaction due to the lattice mismatch between the graphene and the Ru(0001) lattices.Comment: 6 Pages, 3 figure

Study of the growth mechanisms of low-pressure chemically vapour deposited silica films

7 pages, 5 figures.-- Issue title: "Proceedings of the Twelfth European Conference on Chemical Vapour Deposition" (Sitges, Barcelona, Spain, Sep 5-10, 1999).We have studied the surface morphology evolution of SiO2 films grown at 20 nm/min in a low-pressure chemical vapour deposition reactor from SiH4/O2 mixtures at low (611 K) and high (723 K) temperatures. Films have been deposited for times ranging from 10 min up to 48 hours. It is shown that the SiO2 growth at high temperature becomes stable, whereas at low temperature it is unstable (i.e., the surface roughness increases continuously with deposition time). This clear difference is explained on the basis of the different growth mechanisms operating under both experimental conditions. These results are compared with the predictions of the few theoretical works on growth evolution by chemical vapour deposition.This work was partially realized within the frame of the CONICET-CSIC research cooperation program, partially supported by Ministerio de Educación y Cultura (Programa de Cooperación Científica con Iberoamérica), by the 7220-ED/082 project from ECSC and by the 07M/0710/97 project from CAM. F. Ojeda gratefully acknowledges the grant financed by the Comunidad de Madrid (683/96, BOCM 22/4/96).Publicad