Amnesic Selves Craver a preliMinary case for aMnesic selVes: toWard a clinical Moral psychology

Does episodic memory make us who we are? Scholars from Aristotle to the present claim that episodic memory is necessary for one to be a self, a person, or an agent. A consequence of the episodic necessity hypothesis (n) is that individuals with episodic amnesia fail to qualify as selves, persons, or agents. This ethical demotion requires empirical justification. I show that established dissociations in individuals with episodic amnesia falsify many initially plausible formulations of n. The task going forward is to formulate a hypothesis that avoids falsification or to conclude that no plausible formulation succeeds. This method of clinical moral psychology affords incremental progress in the difficult task of showing how selves, persons, and agents are implemented in cognitive mechanisms