Authority without privilege: How to be a Dretskean conciliatory skeptic on self-knowledge

Dretske is a “conciliatory skeptic” on self-knowledge. Take some subject S such that S thinks that P and S knows that she has thoughts. Dretske’s theory can be put as follows: S has a privileged way of knowing what she thinks, but she has no privileged way of knowing that she thinks it. There is much to be said on behalf of conciliatory skepticism and Dretske’s defense of it. We aim to show, however, that Dretske’s defense fails, in that if his defense of CS’s skeptical half succeeds, then his defense of CS’s conciliatory half fails. We then suggest a potential way forward. We suggest in particular that the correct way of being a Dretskean conciliatory skeptic is to deny that S has a privileged way of knowing about her thoughts, but to grant that she is nonetheless an authority on her thoughts

Dretske on Self-Knowledge and Contrastive Focus: How to Understand Dretske’s Theory, and Why It Matters

Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge is interesting but peculiar and can seem implausible. He denies that we can know by introspection that we have thoughts, feelings, and experiences. But he allows that we can know by introspection what we think, feel, and experience. We consider two puzzles. The first puzzle, PUZZLE 1, is interpretive. Is there a way of understanding Dretske’s theory on which the knowledge affirmed by its positive side is different than the knowledge denied by its negative side? The second puzzle, PUZZLE 2, is substantive. Each of the following theses has some prima facie plausibility: there is introspective knowledge of thoughts, knowledge requires evidence, and there are no experiences of thoughts. It is unclear, though, that these claims form a consistent set. These puzzles are not unrelated. Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge is a potential solution to PUZZLE 2 in that Dretske’s theory is meant to show how,, and can all be true. We provide a solution to PUZZLE 1 by appeal to Dretske’s early work in the philosophy of language on contrastive focus. We then distinguish between “Closure” and “Transmissibility”, and raise and answer a worry to the effect that Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge runs counter to Transmissibility. These results help to secure Dretske’s theory as a viable solution to PUZZLE 2

Review of Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar’s (Eds.) Introspection and consciousness (2012, Oxford University Press)

This is an excellent collection of essays on introspection and consciousness. There are fifteen essays in total (all new except for Sydney Shoemaker’s essay). There is also an introduction where the editors explain the impetus for the collection and provide a helpful overview. The essays contain a wealth of new and challenging material sure to excite specialists and shape future research. Below we extract a skeptical argument from Fred Dretske’s essay and relate the remaining essays to that argument. Due to space limitations we focus in detail on just a few of the essays. We regret that we cannot give them all the attention they merit

Solving Exchange Rate Puzzles with neither Sticky Prices nor Trade Costs

We present a simple framework in which both the exchange rates disconnect and forward bias puzzles are simultaneously resolved. The flexible-price two-country monetary model is extended to include a consumption externality with habit persistence. Habit persistence is modeled using Campbell Cochrane preferences with ‘deep’ habits. By deep habits, we mean habits defined over goods rather than countries. The model is simulated using the artificial economy methodology. It offers a neo-classical explanation of the Meese-Rogoff puzzle and mimics the failure of fundamentals to explain nominal exchange rates in a linear setting. Finally, the model naturally generates the negative slope in the standard forward market regression.Exchange Rate Puzzles; Forward Foreign Exchange; Habit Persistence

Solving Exchange Rate Puzzles with neither Sticky Prices nor Trade Costs

We present a simple framework in which both the exchange rates disconnect and forward bias puzzles are simultaneously resolved. The flexible-price two-country monetary model is extended to include a consumption externality with habit persistence. Habit persistence is modeled using Campbell Cochrane preferences with deep? habits. By deep habits, we mean habits defined over goods rather than countries. The model is simulated using the artificial economy methodology. It offers a neo-classical explanation of the Meese-Rogoff puzzle and mimics the failure of fundamentals to explain nominal exchange rates in a linear setting. Finally, the model naturally generates the negative slope in the standard forward market regression.Exchange Rate Puzzles; Forward Foreign Exchange; Habit Persistence

For Rich or for Poor: When does Uncovered Interest Parity Hold?

We present a model that simultaneously explains why uncovered interest parity holds for some pairs of countries and not for others. The flexible-price two-country monetary model is extended to include a consumption externality with habit persistence. Habit persistence is modeled using Campbell Cochrane preferences with ‘deep’ habits along the lines of the work of Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe. By deep habits, we mean habits defined over goods rather than countries. The negative slope in the Fama regression arises when monetary instability is low and the precautionary savings motive dominates the intertemporal substitution motive. When monetary instability is high, the Fama slope is positive in line with uncovered interest parity. The model is simulated using the artificial economy methodology for 34 currencies against the US dollar. We conclude that, given the predominance of precautionary savings, the degree of monetary instability explains whether or not uncovered interest parity holds.Monetary instability; Uncovered interest parity; Forward biasedness puzzle; Carry trade; Habit persistence

Knowing What One Believes – In Defense of a Dispositional Reliabilist Extrospective Account

We seem to enjoy a special kind of access to our beliefs. We seem able to know about them via a distinctively first-personal method, and such knowledge seems epistemically superior to any knowledge that others might attain of our beliefs. This paper defends a novel account of this access. The account is extrospective in that it explains this access in terms of our ability to think about the (non-mental) world. Moreover, it does not require the contentious claim that judging that p suffices for coming to believe that p. This is a significant strength of the account

W. W. Smith (1852-1942): “Second to None in the Dominion as a Field Naturalist”

On his death in 1942, W. W. Smith was described in an obituary as “second to none in the Dominion as a field naturalist.” This phrase had been used some years earlier by scientist-politician George Malcolm Thomson. Today, Smith is largely recalled for his membership of the Scenery Preservation Commission (1904-1906) and work as the domain curator in Ashburton (1894-1904) and Pukekura Park in New Plymouth (1908-1920). This paper revisits Smith’s reputation as a naturalist. In so doing it considers the fields of knowledge he engaged with and identifies some of the scientific networks in which he was embedded

Summary of American Ethanol v. Cordillera Fund, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 13

The Court reviews an appeal from a district court decision in a corporation action

Dr. J. M. Bell, FRGS: A Canadian Auxiliary Geographer in New Zealand

Using Hodder’s notion of “biography as method,” this paper examines the geographical endeavours of James Mackintosh Bell, Director of the New Zealand Geological Survey from 1905 to 1911, in New Zealand and Canada. Canadian born, Harvard trained, Bell has a significant place in the history of geology in New Zealand and mining geology in Canada, yet much of his writing was explicitly geographical in orientation. This essay analyses this body of work and its significance and limitations in adding to and disseminating knowledge of the geography of NZ, particularly. Bell credentialed himself geographically as a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society (FRGS). The FRGS were important builders of geographical knowledge in NZ from the 1850s up to the establishment of university geography in the 1930s when formal geographical research commenced. Geologists were a numerically significant group amongst the NZ FRGS, distinctive in that they held university qualifications, and Bell was particularly wide ranging in his geographical interests