Securitization and community lending: a framework and some lessons from the experience in the U.S. mortgage market

The purpose of this article is to provide a framework for analyzing the development of securitization as a vehicle for funding community economic development (CED) loans. Broadly speaking, there are two models for funding assets: the portfolio lender model, which typically involves banks or other intermediaries originating and holding the loans and funding them mainly with debt, most often deposits, and the securitization model, which involves tapping bond markets for funds, for instance, by pooling loans and selling shares in the pools. The focus here is on broad issues of when securitization is likely to be the more economic form of funding, some specifics of how the funding might be structured, and an analysis of the experience in the U.S. mortgage market.Mortgage loans ; Asset-backed financing

Momentum and House Price Growth In the U.S.: Anatomy Of a "Bubble"

This paper analyzes the bubble in property values in the U.S. in the period from 1999 through 2005. We define a bubble as a regime shift characterized by a change in the properties of house price deviations from underlying “fundamentals” that become more self-sustaining and/or more volatile than in other periods. We model the fundamentals of house price growth as lagged adjustments of prices to the expected present value of future service flows (imputed rent) from owner-occupied properties. We then study the autoregressive behavior of the errors generated from the estimated fundamentals equations with panel data from 44 Metropolitan Statistical Areas for the period of 1980-2005. We find evidence of momentum in house price growth throughout the period, but momentum increased after 1999. Breaking down the period further, we find that the bubble happened mostly after 2003; it was for a relatively short period and was characterized by a series of positive, seemingly random, shocks. Before that, price changes were reasonably well explained by the “fundamentals,” such as a decline in long term real rates in the early part of the 1999-2005 period.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/61511/1/1124_VanOrder.pd

A Regime Shift Model of the Recent Housing Bubble in the United States

It has been widely assumed that there was a bubble in the U.S. housing market after1999. This paper analyzes the extent to which that was true. We define a bubble as: (1) a regime shift that is characterized by a change in the properties of deviations from the fundamentals of house price growth, and (2) where a shock to the fundamental equation is more self sustaining and volatile than in other periods. We model the fundamentals of price growth as a lagged adjustment of prices to the expected present value of future rent. We then study the autoregressive behavior of the residuals thus generated. We look at changes in momentum (the extent to which a shock to house price growth leads to further increases in house price growth) of the residuals. Our results from 44 Metropolitan Statistical Areas for the period of 1980-2005 (quarterly data) are mixed. There is evidence of momentum in house price growth throughout the period, and momentum did increase after 1999, indicating a regime shift; but by a modest amount, and while momentum was sometimes strong it was not explosive. The regime shift was less apparent in the likely bubble candidate cities along the coasts, which had shown high growth in the past. The evidence on volatility is strong. In general, volatility did not increase in the nonbubble MSAs, and it decreased in the faster-growing bubble MSAs.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/55445/1/1084-VanOrder.pd

Risk Taking, Guarantees, Securitization and the Option to Change Strategy: The Economics of Pulling a Fast One

This paper analyzes the risk-taking behavior of financial intuitions that have guarantees (e.g., banks with deposit insurance or Government Sponsored Enterprises with implicit guarantees) and/or institutions that find it beneficial to develop a reputation for not taking risk. For instance, banks putting together asset-backed securities have a choice of delivering the riskiest loans they can get away with or putting safe loans into deals because developing a reputation for selling good securities will get them larger fees later. The paper focuses on the following questions: Is it rational for financial institutions to take on less risk than they can get away with, and if it is rational, under what conditions will they shift strategies and increase their risk after having established a reputation for low risk? To answer the question we allow for future benefits from survival in the form of “franchise value, which comes from a good reputation and/or from continuing to receive a guarantee, and which they might lose if they increase risk. With franchise value they might take less risk than they are allowed; however, if they experience large enough negative shocks, they can reach a tipping point where they will change their strategy discontinuously, and“gamble for resurrection.”http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/61510/1/1123_VanOrder.pd

Integration of Mortgage and Capital Markets and the Accumulation of Residential Capital

The securitization of fixed-rate mortgages suggests that the FRA/VA market was fully integrated with capital markets by the early l98Os and that the conventional market moved toward integration during the l98Os. Assuming full integration of FHA/VA5 via the GNMA securitization process, we first estimate equations explaining near-par GNMA prices weekly for the 1981-88 period. The price is then set equal to the new-issue price and, based upon the preferred equation, the perfect-market retail coupon rate is computed. Next we estimate equations (for three year segments of the 1971-88 period) explaining conventional commitment mortgage coupon rates in terms of current and lagged values of this perfect-market coupon rate. Finally, we examine differences between the perfect-market and actual coupon rates and compute the impact of these differences on residential capital accumulation.

Pricing Mortgages: An Interpretation of the Models and Results

Mortgages, like all debt securities, can be viewed as risk-free assets plus or minus contingent claims that can be usefully viewed as options. The most important options are: prepayment, which is a call option giving the borrower the right to buy back the mortgage at par, and default, which is a put option giving the borrower the right to sell the house in exchange for the mortgage. This paper reviews and interprets the large and growing body of literature that applies recent results of option pricing models to mortgages. We also provide a critique of the models and suggest directions for future research.

Comparing mortgage credit risk policies : an options-based approach

Buckley, Karaguishiyeva,Van Order, and Vecvagare analyze the structure of approaches to mortgage credit risk that are now being used in a number of OECD and transition economies. The authors'basic approach is to show how option pricing models can help measure and evaluate the risks of various schemes. They find that mortgage default insurance can be a cost-effective tool for both improving housing affordability and efficiently addressing some of the rationing that characterizes this market. When correctly structured, as it is in a number of transition and market countries, this kind of program can be expected to reduce nonprice rationing at an actuarially fair price. At the same time, considerable care must be exercised in the development of such instruments. Geographical risk diversification, particularly across borders, can play a major role in the success of these programs. Such diversification could be important not only in smaller transition economies but in EU countries as well.Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Banks&Banking Reform,Environmental Economics&Policies,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Labor Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Housing Finance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Health Economics&Finance

Mortgage Default and Low Downpayment Loans: The Costs of Public Subsidy

This paper presents a unified model of the default and prepayment behavior of homeowners in a proportional hazard framework. The model uses the option-based approach to analyze default and prepayment and considers these two interdependent hazards as competing risks. The results indicate the sensitivity of default to the initial loan-to-value ratio of the loan and the course of housing equity. The latter is a measure of the extent to which the default option is in the money. The results also indicate the importance of trigger events, namely unemployment and divorce, in affecting prepayment and default behavior. The empirical results are used to analyze the costs of a current policy proposal -- stimulating homeownership by offering low downpayment loans. We simulate default probabilities and costs on zero-downpayment loans and compare them to conventional loans with conventional underwriting standards. The results indicate that if zero-downpayment loans were priced as if they were mortgages with ten percent downpayments, then the additional program costs would be two to four percent of funds made available -- when housing prices increase steadily. If housing prices remained constant, the costs of the program would be much larger indeed. Our estimates suggest that additional program costs could be between $74,000 and$87,000 per million dollars of lending. If the expected losses from such a program were not priced at all, the losses from default alone could exceed ten percent of the funds made available for loans.