Writing (figures) music.

Because values are an implicit subject in the writings of music theory, readers and writers alike confront a connection between rhetoric and value whose expression can be traced in the figures of speech used by writers to present theories and analyses of music. Readers face problems of first recognizing and then deciding whether to accept the values proffered in musical discourse. This theme is explored by considering two rhetorical figures that Heinrich Schenker uses to express his wonder at the so-called masterworks--the metaphors of concealed repetitions and musical procreation--and the reception accorded the procreation metaphor by American theorists. Schenker's figure of concealment, through its relation to a cult of genius, is shown to be an implicit invitation for readers to consider themselves members of an interpretive elite. The figure of procreation, on the other hand, focuses readers' attention on the musical work as an image of human life in all its richness and complexity. The removal of Schenker's figure of procreation in the translation of his ideas to America transformed the values presented to readers, for the replacement of procreation figures with the figure of natural science, in that it focuses attention on the scientist's activity in relation to a passive specimen, displaces the musical work from its place at the center of the Schenker's thought and invites readers to value analytic activity in its stead. This transformation is supported by the replacement of Schenker's image of musical growth with the Schenkerians' images of structure and analytical reduction. Having seen that figurative language has the potential to persuade readers of accepting values, a question arises concerning how a writer will address the connections between rhetoric and value, namely, how to craft texts that persuasively invite readers to share the writer's values and how to avoid using rhetoric that contradicts those values. The concluding chapter approaches this writerly problem from a practical and personal standpoint by exploring a variety of rhetorical means that can effectively invite readers to participate in music as an art of motion and time.Ph.D.Communication and the ArtsMusicUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/128777/2/9135696.pd

Под знаменем Ленина. 1971. № 013

Wittgenstein’s later remarks on music, those written after his return to Cambridge in 1929 in increasing intensity, frequency, and elaboration, occupy a unique place in the annals of the philosophy of music, which is rarely acknowledged or discussed in the scholarly literature. These remarks reflect and emulate the spirit and subject matter of Romantic thinking about music, but also respond to it critically, while at the same time they interweave into Wittgenstein’s forward thinking about the philosophic entanglements of language and the mind, and also his pervasive pessimism as a philosopher of culture. In this essay I explore and explicate some of the major tenets of this unique position. I argue that Wittgenstein appropriates the Romantic focus on the specificity of musical expression by means of the idea that gesture consists in complex vertical interrelations between language games. Understanding what a musical passage is about logically presupposes a myriad of correlate moves in the entire range of our language-games. Wittgenstein explicates the notion of musical aboutness in terms of intransitive understanding, which expresses an internal relation conjoining musical gesture and our culture, our entire life in practice, whereupon the related concepts cannot be identified independently of the relation which holds them together. Wittgenstein responds to the Romantic focus on the unique knowledge of human life which is afforded by musical experience with his idiosyncratic later notion of Menschenkenntnis. I conclude that, in the context of Wittgenstein’s late work, ineffability pertaining to musical meaning is not a shortcoming, but rather constitutional of the type of games, which admit what Wittgenstein calls ‘imponderable evidence’, or indefiniteness