33 research outputs found

    Abolishing All Mechanisms for Fixing Elections: The Citizens\u27 Initiative to Change the Electoral System of Croatia

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    In October 2014 a citizens’ initiative called ‘In the Name of the Family’ collected more than 380,000 signatures demanding a constitutional referendum on comprehensive electoral reform in Croatia. The Initiative aimed to introduce preferential voting for MPs; new criteria for the establishment of electoral constituencies; a lower electoral threshold from five to three per cent; a ban on pre-electoral coalitions and joint lists of several parties; and postal and electronic voting. The constitutional referendum demanded by the initiative was not held due to the organizers collecting an insufficient number of signatures for the referendum petition to be valid, and only a limited reform of the electoral system was enacted with the introduction of preferential voting for MPs. What had started as a bottom-up citizens’ initiative (or ‘mass imposition’ in Renwick’s terminology) finally ended as an ‘elite majority imposition’ of an electoral reform

    ‘The Assent of the People is Not Necessary to the Formation of a Confederation’: Notes on the Failure of the European Constitutional Referendums

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    It is the thesis of this paper that the main causes for the failure of the European Constitution result from the bad preparation and management of a complex process of constitution-making for a union of states of continental proportions. The crucial reasons for the failure of the European Constitution are elaborated as certain preliminary propositions. The first proposition is that in the normative sense, there is no reason and need for the people to be directly engaged in the creation of a confederal union or in the amending of its fundamental documents. The next and related proposition is that there are powerful political reasons to avoid popular ratification of constitutional documents, especially in federal unions. The argument is that a referendum is more suitable for pulling down than to build up Constitutions is similar to the former – that the people should have nothing with confederations. However, the former argument starts from the normative proposition that the people should not ratify confederal treaties, and the latter means to point out that there could be significant problems with constitutional acceptance when that constitution has to be ratified by some sort of direct involvement of citizens (by people’s conventions or referendum). The third argument is that the European constitution-makers’ ambivalent approach to the method of constitutional ratification and the complete absence of a ratification strategy, resulting in the compromise procedure of ratification “in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements”, was extremely detrimental from the standpoint of ratification. The final error is that they have not made use of comparative experiences of constitution-making of other federal unions

    BASIC FEATURES OF THE SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM

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    Maurice Duverger popularizirati kao novi model političkog sustava. Različitost pojedinih definicija polupredsjedničke vlade i njihovi nedostatci naznačuju nepostojanje konsenzusa o temeljnim značajkama toga sustava što posljedično omogućuje da se politički sustavi promatraju ili kao parlamentarni ili kao polupredsjednički, ovisno o značajkama koje se koriste u pojedinim definicijama. Na temelju analize izvornih polupredsjedničkih modela (Weimarski ustav, Ustav francuske Pete Republike) u radu se nastoji ponuditi jednu sveobuhvatniju definiciju polupredsjedničke vlade kao sustava predsjedničke dominacije u političkom sustavu. U tom se smislu taj sustav definira kao sustav u kojem: 1. predsjednika države neposredno izabiru građani, odnosno posredno izborni kolegij u kojem ne prevladava predstavničko tijelo ili je ono isključeno iz njega; 2. njegov se mandat ne može okončati političkom odlukom predstavničkoga tijela; 3. je on stvarni šef izvršne vlasti, a obavlja je osobno i putem vlade koju predlaže parlamentu i 4. temelj njegova ključnoga položaja unutar izvršne vlasti određeni su ustavni prerogativi (raspuštanje parlamenta, imenovanje i razrješenje vlade) i/ili liderski položaj u stranci/stranačkoj koaliciji koja ima većinu zastupnika u parlamentu.The article elaborates the basic features of the system of semi-presidential government, which was popularized by Maurice Duverger as a ”new model of the political system“. The diversity of individual definitions of semi-presidential government and their shortcomings indicate a lack of consensus on the fundamental features of the system, which in turn allows individual political systems to be viewed as either parliamentary or semi-presidential, depending on the features used in individual definitions. Based on the analysis of the original semi-presidential models (Weimar Constitution, the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic), the paper seeks to elaborate a more comprehensive definition of semi-presidential government as a system of presidential domination in the political system. In this sense, this system is defined as a system in which 1. the president is elected directly by the citizens, i e indirectly by an electoral college in which a representative body does not dominate or is excluded from it; 2. his term of office may not be terminated by a political decision of the representative body; 3. he is the actual head of the executive and performs it personally and through the government proposed by him to the parliament and 4. the basis of his key position within the executive are certain constitutional prerogatives (dissolution of parliament, appointment, and dismissal of the government) and / or leadership position in the party / a party coalition that has a majority in parliament

    WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE FEDERATION! CONSTITUENT AUTHORITY IN CLASSIC AND MODERN FEDERATIONS

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    Bez obzira na ranije postavke o zastarjelosti klasične federalne teorije u radu se naglašava suvremeni značaj i aktualnost federalizma. Upravo je Europa epicentar suvremenih procesa federalizacije, ne samo kada je riječ o Europskoj uniji, već i nizu europskih država poput Belgije, Španjolske i Ujedinjene Kraljevine. U radu se ukazuje na temeljno razlikovanje klasičnog i suvremenog federalizma, koje ima ishodište upravo u činjenici da federalni sustavi različito „nastaju“ kao rezultat suprotnih procesa federalizacije i da u tom smislu možemo razlikovati klasični „integrativni“ i suvremeni „devolutivni“ federalizam. Temeljne su postavke rada da 1) između ta dva obrasca federalizma izvorno postoji suštinska razlika u karakteru temeljnog konstitutivnog akta federalnog saveza s obzirom na subjekta stvaranja federacije, i 2) s obzirom na to da su suvremene federacije „savezne države bez federalnog temelja“ ta razlika danas više nije zamjetna, već je ona, naprotiv, u velikoj mjeri nestala i na taj način zapravo se premošćuje razlika između klasičnog i suvremenog federalizma.Regardless of the earlier assumptions about the obsolescence of the classic federal theory, the paper emphasizes the contemporary significance and relevance of federalism. Europe is the epicentre of modern federalization processes, not only when it comes to the European Union, but also a number of European countries such as Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom. The paper points out the fundamental distinction between the classic and modern federalism, which has its origin in the fact that federal systems \u27arise\u27 differently as a result of opposite processes of federalization and that in this sense we can distinguish between classic “integrative” and modern “devolutive” federalism. The basic assumptions of the paper are that 1) these two federalism patterns originally differ in the character of the basic constitutive act of the federal union with regard to the subject of creating a federation, and 2) because contemporary federations are “federal states without a federal foundation” this difference is not noticeable today. On the contrary, it has largely disappeared, and in this way, the difference between classic and modern federalism is actually bridged

    Die kroatische EU-Mitgliedschaft und die verfassungsrechtlichen Optionen der europäischen Zukunft

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    Neuspjeh predloženog europskog Ustava i zaustavljanje procesa njegove ratifikacije učinilo je upitnim konstitucionalizaciju EU u jednog cjelovitom dokumentu, a istodobno je izostala institucionalna prilagodba europskih institucija znatno većem broju država članica. Kako daljnje proširenje EU nije izgledno dok se ne riješi pitanje ratifikacije Ustava, Republika Hrvatska suočena je s mogućnošću "zamrzavanja" njezina pristupa članstvu Unije za dogledno vrijeme. U ovom radu analiziraju se moguće opcije ustavne budućnosti EU i procjenjuje se koja bi među njima mogla biti najprihvatljivija sa stajališta Republike Hrvatske. Najvažnije opcije koje se izlažu jesu: mogući nastavak ratifikacije postojećeg ustavnog teksta, ponovno pregovaranje o novom ustavu, opcija stvaranja "federalne" ustavne jezgre, zagovaranje izgradnje Unije bez ustava, izmjene Ugovora iz Nice te moguća ratifikacija "ustavnog nukleusa", odnosno I. dijela predloženog Ustava. Autor razmatra predloženu opciju ratifikacije nekih amandmana na postojeće ugovore u obliku pristupnog ugovora s Hrvatskom kao pragmatičnu opciju jedne potrebne i minimalne institucionalne prilagodbe EU. Ta je opcija vrlo "zavodljiva" sa stajališta hrvatskih interesa, ali autor smatra da bi sa stajališta konstitucionalizacije europskog pravnog poretka najprihvatljivija opcija bila ratifikacija prvoga dijela ustavnoga ugovora.The failure of the proposed European constitution and interruption of the process of its ratification have made doubtful the constitutionalisation of the EU in one complete document, and at the same time, the institutional adaptation of European institutions to a much larger number of Member States has failed. As further enlargement of the EU is not probable until the question of the ratification of the Constitution is settled, the Republic of Croatia is facing serious difficulties and the possibility of \u27freezing\u27 its admission to the Union. In the article several options of the constitutional future of the EU are analyzed, and assessed from the Croatian standpoint. The most important options discussed are: the possible continuation of the ratification of the actual constitutional text, new negotiations on the constitutional document, the option of creating a \u27federal constitutional nucleus\u27, building the Union without a constitution (status quo option), amendments to the Treaty of Nice, and finally the possible ratification of the \u27constitutional nucleus\u27, namely the first part of the constitutional treaty. The author considers also the recently proposed option of ratification of some treaty amendments in the form of accession treaty with Croatia as a pragmatic option of needed and minimal institutional adaptation of the EU. This option is \u27seducing\u27 from the standpoint of Croatian interests and therefore acceptable. However, from the standpoint of the constitutionalisation of the European legal order the most preferable option would be the ratification of the first part of the constitutional treaty.Der Misserfolg des europäischen Verfassungsentwurfs und der Stillstand seines Ratifizierungsprozesses stellen die Konstitutionalisierung der EU auf der Basis eines einheitlichen Dokuments in Frage, wobei die institutionelle Anpassung der europäischen Institutionen an eine erheblich größere Anzahl von Mitgliedstaaten ausgeblieben ist. Da eine Fortsetzung der EU-Erweiterung nicht in Aussicht steht, solange die Frage der Ratifizierung der Verfassung nicht geklärt ist, sieht sich die Republik Kroatien einer möglichen „Einfrierung“ ihres Beitritts auf absehbare Zeit gegenüber. In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden mögliche Varianten der verfassungsrechtlichen Zukunft der EU analysiert sowie Einschätzungen vorgenommen, welche aus Sicht der Republik Kroatien die annehmbarste Variante sein könnte. Als wichtigste Optionen werden dargestellt: die mögliche Fortsetzung der Ratifizierung des bestehenden Verfassungstextes, erneute Verhandlungen über die neue Verfassung, die mögliche Schaffung eines „Nukleus einer Verfassung der Föderation“, die Befürwortung des Ausbaus einer Europäischen Union ohne Verfassung, die Änderung des Vertrags von Nizza und eine mögliche Ratifizierung eines „Verfassungskerns“ bzw. des ersten Teils des Verfassungsentwurfs. Als pragmatische Option der erforderlichen institutionellen Mindestanpassung der EU analysiert der Autor den Vorschlag, im Wege des Beitrittsvertrags mit Kroatien einige Änderungen der bestehenden Verträge zu ratifizieren. Vom Standpunkt der kroatischen Interessen aus ist diese Option sehr verlockend, doch der Autor hält im Lichte der Konstitutionalisierung der europäischen Rechtsordnung die Ratifizierung des ersten Teils des Verfassungsvertrages für die aussichtsreichste Option

    Die Wahl der Richter des Verfassungsgerichts der Republik Kroatien in der Rechtsvergleichung

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    Komparativna analiza izbora ustavnih sudaca u europskim državama pokazuje da postoje dva temeljna opredjeljenja – jednim se nastoji omogućiti izbor sudaca koji neće biti ovisni za svoj izbor jednom ogranku vlasti pa u izboru sudaca sudjeluje više ogranaka vlasti, najčešće izvršni i zakonodavni, a ponekad i sudbeni. U onim državama gdje je parlament jedino tijelo koje sudjeluje u izboru ustavnih sudaca odluka se ne prepušta običnoj parlamentarnoj većini, već se traži u pravilu dvotrećinska većina odnosno ista većina koja se traži za ustavne promjene u tim državama. Također je pravilo de se suci ustavnih sudova biraju na jedan duži mandat, bez prava reizbora. U radu se također analizira različitost američkog izbora sudaca Vrhovnog suda u odnosu prema europskom modelu izbora ustavnih sudaca. Autor zaključuje da je Hrvatska jedna od rijetkih država u kojima je izbor ustavnih sudaca prepušten najblažoj kvalificiranoj parlamentarnoj većini (većina ukupnog broja zastupnika), a u izboru ne sudjeluje neki drugi ogranak vlasti. Stoga se autor zalaže za takve promjene Ustava Republike Hrvatske i Ustavnog zakona o Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske prema kojima će se suci Ustavnog suda birati dvotrećinskom većinom glasova svih zastupnika u Hrvatskom saboru, ne bi smjeli imati pravo reizbora na tu dužnost, a njihov mandat bio bi produžen sa sadašnjih 8 na 10 do 12 godina.The comparative analysis of the election of constitutional judges in the European countries shows that there are two basic approaches – one which endeavours to enable the election of judges who will not depend on one branch of power, so that more branches of power participate in their election, most frequently executive and legislative, and sometimes even judicial. In those countries in which the parliament is the only body that participates in the election of judges, the decision is not left only to the ordinary parliamentary majority, but as a rule the two-thirds majority is required, that is, the same majority which is required for constitutional amendments in these countries. There is also a rule that the judges of constitutional courts are elected for a longer mandate, without the right to re-election. The difference between the American election of justices of the Supreme Court in relation to the European model of the election of constitutional judges is analyzed as well. The author concludes that Croatia is one of the rare countries in which the election of constitutional judges is left to the softest qualified parliamentary majority (the majority of the overall number of representatives), while no other branch of power participates in the election. Therefore, the author pleads for such amendments of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia according to which the judges of the Constitutional Court will be elected by the two-thirds majority of all the representatives in the Croatian Parliament (Sabor), who should not have the right to re-election to this office, and their mandate would be prolonged from the present 8 to 10 or 12 years.Die rechtsvergleichende Analyse der Verfassungsrichterwahl in den europäischen Staaten zeigt, dass es zwei grundlegende Verfahren gibt. Das eine versucht die Wahl eines Richters zu gewährleisten, der bezüglich seiner Wahl nicht von einer einzelnen Gewalt abhängen soll, weshalb mehrere Staatsgewalten an der Wahl beteiligt sind, meist die Exekutive und die Legislative, vereinzelt auch die Judikative. In jenen Staaten, in denen das Parlament das einzige Organ der Verfassungsrichterwahl darstellt, bleibt die Entscheidung nicht der einfachen parlamentarischen Mehrheit überlassen, sondern wird gewöhnlich eine Zwei-Drittel-Mehrheit verlangt beziehungsweise diejenige Mehrheit, die für Verfassungsänderungen in dem jeweiligen Staat vorgeschrieben ist. Ebenfalls werden die Verfassungsrichter in der Regel für eine längere Amtszeit gewählt, jedoch ohne die Möglichkeit, eine weitere Amtszeit anzuhängen. In dieser Arbeit werden ebenfalls die Unterschiede zwischen der Verfassungsrichterwahl in den USA und dem europäischen Modell untersucht. Der Autor kann schließen, dass Kroatien zu den wenigen Staaten gehört, in denen die Entscheidung bei der Verfassungsrichterwahl der niedrigsten qualifizierten parlamentarischen Mehrheit (der Mehrheit der Gesamtzahl der Abgeordneten) obliegt, wobei keine andere Staatsgewalt an der Wahl beteiligt wird. Daher befürwortet der Autor, die Verfassung der Republik Kroatien und das Verfassungsgesetz über das Verfassungsgericht der Republik Kroatien dahingehend zu ändern, dass die Wahl zum Verfassungsrichter zwei Drittel der Stimmen aller Abgeordneten des Kroatischen Parlaments erfordert, dass es keine zweite Amtszeit mehr gibt und die Amtszeit selbst von den jetzigen 8 auf 10 bis 12 Jahre verlängert wird

    Warum die Europäische Verfassung scheiterte - Der verfassungsgebende Aspekt

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    Temeljna je teza rada da glavni uzroci neuspjeha Europskog ustava proizlaze iz loše pripreme i provedbe jednog kompleksnog procesa ustavotvorstva za savez država kontinentalnih razmjera. Taj proces uključuje pitanja vremenskog aspekta ustavotvorstva, subjekta donošenja ustava, strategije ustavne ratifikacije, ustavotvoritelje i konačno sam ustavni tekst. Po tim pitanjima nedostaje značajnija rasprava, što je pogrešno, jer bi ti ustavni uzroci neuspjeha trebali biti poučni za eventualni budući europski proces ustavotvorstva. Krucijalni uzroci neuspjeha Europskog ustava izlažu se u vidu određenih preliminarnih postavki. Prema mišljenju autora prvenstvene greške europskog ustavotvorstva ogledaju se u započinjanju ustavotvornog procesa u trenutku nepogodnom za ustavotvorstvo, u neodređenosti dokumenta glede njegova ustavnog ili ugovornog karaktera, u stvaranju ustavnog teksta potpuno neprimjerenog razumijevanju običnog građanina, u stvaranju ustava bez vizije i ambicije, u potpunoj odsutnosti bilo kakve strategije ustavne ratifikacije, u inzistiranju na neposrednom sudjelovanju naroda u prihvaćanju ustava, koji je mišljen pravno i politički prvenstveno kao međunarodni ugovor te u loše vođenoj medijskoj prezentaciji i obrani ustava pred europskom javnošću. Najvažnija među tim greškama je ambivalentan pristup europskih ustavotvoritelja prema načinu ratifikacije ustava, a nakon nje neuvažavanje komparativnh iskustava ustavotvorstva drugih federalnih saveza.It is the thesis of this paper that the main causes of the failure of the European Constitution result from bad preparation and management of a complex process of constitution-making for a union of states of continental proportions. This process includes the questions of the temporal aspect of constitution-making, the subjects of constitution-making, the strategy of constitutional ratification, the constitution-makers themselves, and finally the very text of the Constitution. Significant discussion on these questions is missing, which is wrong, because these constitutional causes of failure should be instructive for a possible future European constitution-making process. The crucial reasons for the failure of the European Constitution are elaborated as certain preliminary propositions. In the author\u27s opinion, the principal errors of the European constitution-making are evident in the beginning of the constitution-making process in the moment not suitable for the constitution-making, in the ambiguity of the document regarding its constitutional or treaty character, in creating the document completely unintelligible to a common citizen, in making the Constitution without vision and ambition, in the complete absence of any strategy of constitutional ratification, in insisting on direct involvement of the people in the acceptance of the Constitution, which was contemplated legally and politically principally as an international treaty, and in a poorly managed media presentation and defence of the Constitution before the European public. The most important of them is an ambivalent approach of the European constitution-makers to the method of ratification of their Constitution. The next most important error is that they have not made use of comparative experiences of constitution-making of other federal unions.Die Hauptthese dieser Arbeit besagt, dass die wichtigsten Ursachen für das Scheitern der europäischen Verfassung in der schlechten Vorbereitung und Umsetzung eines komplexen Verfassungsgebungsprozesses für einen Staatenbund von kontinentalen Ausmaßen liegen. Dieser Prozess umfasst die Fragen des zeitlichen Aspekts der Verfassungsgebung, des Subjekts der Konstitutionalisierung, der Strategie der Verfassungsratifizierung, die Verfassungsgeber und schließlich den eigentlichen Verfassungstext. In diesem Bereich ist eine relevante Debatte ausgeblieben, was ein Fehler ist, da diese konstitutionellen Gründe des Scheiterns für einen künftigen europäischen Verfassungsgebungsprozess äußerst lehrreich sein könnten. Die zentralen Ursachen des Scheiterns der europäischen Verfassung werden hier in Form einiger im Vorfeld zu beachtender Kriterien vorgetragen. Der Autor sieht die vorrangigen Fehler der europäischen Verfassungsgebung darin, dass der Verfassungsgebungsprozess zu einem hierfür ungünstigen Zeitpunkt aufgenommen wurde, dass das Dokument hinsichtlich seines Verfassungs- oder Vertragscharakters vage geblieben ist, dass der Verfassungstext sich dem Verständnis des gewöhnlichen Bürgers völlig entzieht, dass die Verfassung jeglicher Vision und Ansprüche entbehrt, dass nicht einmal ansatzweise eine Ratifizierungsstrategie konzipiert wurde, dass darauf bestanden wurde, die Bevölkerung an der Verabschiedung einer Verfassung zu beteiligen, die rechtlich und politisch in erster Linie als völkerrechtlicher Vertrag gedacht war, und darin, dass die Verfassung gegenüber der europäischen Öffentlichkeit in den Medien schlecht präsentiert und verteidigt wurde. Der schwerwiegendste Fehler war jedoch der ambivalente Ansatz der europäischen Verfassungsgeber bezüglich des Ratifizierungsmodus, gefolgt von der Nichtbeachtung vergleichbarer Erfahrungen bei der Konstitutionalisierung anderer föderativer Staatenbunde

    The Causes of Failure of the European Constitution From the Perspective of the Constitution-Making Process

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    Temeljna je tvrdnja rada da glavni uzroci neuspjeha europskog ustava proizlaze iz loše pripreme i provedbe jednog kompleksnog procesa ustavotvorstva za savez država kontinentalnih razmjera. Taj proces uključuje pitanja vremenskog aspekta ustavotvorstva, subjekta donošenja ustava, ustavnog teksta, strategije ustavne ratifi kacije te samih ustavotvoritelja. Krucijalni uzroci za neuspjeh europskog Ustava bit će izloženi u vidu određenih preliminarnih postavki. Pritom će one biti razmotrene u svjetlu određenih komparativnih iskustava ustavotvorstva u dva federalna sustava – američkom i švicarskom. Prvenstvene greške europskog ustavotvorstva ogledaju se u nedostajućem ustavnom trenutku, neodređenosti dokumenta glede njegova ustavnog ili ugovornog karaktera, u stvaranju ustavnog teksta potpuno neprimjerenog razumijevanju običnog građanina, u stvaranju ustava bez vizije i ambicije, u potpunoj odsutnosti bilo kakve strategije ustavne ratifi kacije, u inzistiranju na neposrednom sudjelovanju naroda u prihvaćanju ustava, koji je mišljen pravno i politički prvenstveno kao međunarodni ugovor te u loše vođenoj medijskoj prezentaciji i obrani ustava pred europskom javnošću. Najvažnije greške, koje su presudno utjecale na neuspjeh ustava, su ambivalentan pristup europskih ustavotvoritelja prema načinu ratifikacije ustava te njihovo neuvažavanje iskustva ustavotvorstva drugih federalnih saveza.The basic argument of the article is that the main causes of failure of the European Constitution stem from an inadequate preparation and implementation of a complex procedure of constitution-making for a federation of countries on a continental scale. This process includes the issues of temporal aspects of constitutionmaking, the subject of constitution-making, the text of the constitution, the strategy of constitutional ratifi cation and the constitution-makers themselves. The principal causes of failure of the European Constitution will be presented in the form of certain preliminary assumptions, which will then be examined in the light of certain comparative experiences of constitution-making in two federal systems – the American and the Swiss system. The primary mistakes of the European constitution-making are refl ected in the lack of an appropriate moment for making the constitution, in the vagueness of the document in terms of its constitutional or contractual quality, in the creation of a text of the Constitution which is completely incomprehensible to the average citizen, in the making of the Constitution without a vision or ambition, in the complete lack of any strategy of ratifi cation of the Constitution, in the insistence on the direct participation of the people in the adoption of the Constitution, which is legally and politically considered primarily an international treaty, and in badly managed media presentation and defence of the Constitution before the European public. The most important mistakes, crucial to the failure of the Constitution, are the ambivalent approach of the European constitutionmakers to the mode of ratifi cation of the Constitution, and their disregard of the constitution-making experience of other federal countries
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