Auditing Nicaragua’s anti-corruption struggle, 1998 to 2009

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Four social audits in 1998, 2003, 2006 and 2009 identified actions that Nicaragua could take to reduce corruption and public perception in primary health care and other key services.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>In a 71-cluster sample, weighted according to the 1995 census and stratified by geographic region and settlement type, we audited the same five public services: health centres and health posts, public primary schools, municipal government, transit police and the courts. Some 6,000 households answered questions about perception and personal experience of unofficial and involuntary payments, payments without obtaining receipts or to the wrong person, and payments "to facilitate" services in municipal offices or courts. Additional questions covered complaints about corruption and confidence in the country's anti-corruption struggle. Logistic regression analyses helped clarify local variations and explanatory variables. Feedback to participants and the services at both national and local levels followed each social audit.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Users' experience of corruption in health services, education and municipal government decreased. The wider population's perception of corruption in these sectors decreased also, but not as quickly. Progress among traffic police faltered between 2006 and 2009 and public perception of police corruption ticked upwards in parallel with drivers' experience. Users' experience of corruption in the courts worsened over the study period -- with the possible exception of Managua between 2006 and 2009 -- but public perception of judicial corruption, after peaking in 2003, declined from then on. Confidence in the anti-corruption struggle grew from 50% to 60% between 2003 and 2009. Never more than 8% of respondents registered complaints about corruption.</p> <p>Factors associated with public perception of corruption were: personal experience of corruption, quality of the service itself, and the perception that municipal government takes community opinion into account and keeps people informed about how it uses public funds.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>Lowering citizens' perception of corruption in public services depends on reducing their experience of it, on improving service quality and access and -- perhaps most importantly -- on making citizens feel they are well-informed participants in the work of government.</p

Use of social audits to examine unofficial payments in government health services: experience in South Asia, Africa, and Europe

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Unofficial payments in health services around the world are widespread and as varied as the health systems in which they occur. We reviewed the main lessons from social audits of petty corruption in health services in South Asia (Bangladesh, Pakistan), Africa (Uganda and South Africa) and Europe (Baltic States).</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>The social audits varied in purpose and scope. All covered representative sample communities and involved household interviews, focus group discussions, institutional reviews of health facilities, interviews with service providers and discussions with health authorities. Most audits questioned households about views on health services, perceived corruption in the services, and use of government and other health services. Questions to service users asked about making official and unofficial payments, amounts paid, service delivery indicators, and satisfaction with the service.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Contextual differences between the countries affected the forms of petty corruption and factors related to it. Most households in all countries held negative views about government health services and many perceived these services as corrupt. There was little evidence that better off service users were more likely to make an unofficial payment, or that making such a payment was associated with better or quicker service; those who paid unofficially to health care workers were not more satisfied with the service. In South Asia, where we conducted repeated social audits, only a minority of households chose to use government health services and their use declined over time in favour of other providers. Focus groups indicated that reasons for avoiding government health services included the need to pay for supposedly free services and the non-availability of medicines in facilities, often perceived as due to diversion of the supplied medicines.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>Unofficial expenses for medical care represent a disproportionate cost for vulnerable families; the very people who need to make use of supposedly free government services, and are a barrier to the use of these services. Patient dissatisfaction due to petty corruption may contribute to abandonment of government health services. The social audits informed plans for tackling corruption in health services.</p

Reducing corruption in a Mexican medical school: impact assessment across two cross-sectional surveys

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Corruption pervades educational and other institutions worldwide and medical schools are not exempt. Empirical evidence about levels and types of corruption in medical schools is sparse. We conducted surveys in 2000 and 2007 in the medical school of the Autonomous University of Guerrero in Mexico to document student perceptions and experience of corruption and to support the medical school to take actions to tackle corruption.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>In both 2000 and 2007 medical students completed a self-administered questionnaire in the classroom without the teacher present. The questionnaire asked about unofficial payments for admission to medical school, for passing an examination and for administrative procedures. We examined factors related to the experience of corruption in multivariate analysis. Focus groups of students discussed the quantitative findings.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>In 2000, 6% of 725 responding students had paid unofficially to obtain entry into the medical school; this proportion fell to 1.6% of the 436 respondents in 2007. In 2000, 15% of students reported having paid a bribe to pass an examination, not significantly different from the 18% who reported this in 2007. In 2007, students were significantly more likely to have bribed a teacher to pass an examination if they were in the fourth year, if they had been subjected to sexual harassment or political pressure, and if they had been in the university for five years or more. Students resented the need to make unofficial payments and suggested tackling the problem by disciplining corrupt teachers. The university administration made several changes to the system of admissions and examinations in the medical school, based on the findings of the 2000 survey.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>The fall in the rate of bribery to enter the medical school was probably the result of the new admissions system instituted after the first survey. Further actions will be necessary to tackle the continuing presence of bribery to pass examinations and for administrative procedures. The social audit helped to draw attention to corruption and to stimulate actions to tackle it.</p

An inter-country comparison of unofficial payments: results of a health sector social audit in the Baltic States

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Cross-country comparisons of unofficial payments in the health sector are sparse. In 2002 we conducted a social audit of the health sector of the three Baltic States.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Some 10,320 household interviews from a stratified, last-stage-random, sample of 30 clusters per country, together with institutional reviews, produced preliminary results. Separate focus groups of service users, nurses and doctors interpreted these findings. Stakeholder workshops in each country discussed the survey and focus group results.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Nearly one half of the respondents did not consider unofficial payments to health workers to be corruption, yet one half (Estonia 43%, Latvia 45%, Lithuania 64%) thought the level of corruption in government health services was high. Very few (Estonia 1%, Latvia 3%, Lithuania 8%) admitted to making unofficial payments in their last contact with the services. Around 14% of household members across the three countries gave gifts in their last contact with government services.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>This social audit allowed comparison of perceptions, attitudes and experience regarding unofficial payments in the health services of the three Baltic States. Estonia showed least corruption. Latvia was in the middle. Lithuania evidenced the most unofficial payments, the greatest mistrust towards the system. These findings can serve as a baseline for interventions, and to compare each country's approach to health service reform in relation to unofficial payments.</p

Knowledge synthesis of benefits and adverse effects of measles vaccination: the Lasbela balance sheet

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>In preparation for a cluster-randomized controlled trial of a community intervention to increase the demand for measles vaccination in Lasbela district of Pakistan, a balance sheet summarized published evidence on benefits and possible adverse effects of measles vaccination.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>The balance sheet listed: 1) major health conditions associated with measles; 2) the risk among the unvaccinated who contract measles; 3) the risk among the vaccinated; 4) the risk difference between vaccinated and unvaccinated; and 5) the likely net gain from vaccination for each condition.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Two models revealed very different projections of net gain from measles vaccine. A Lasbela-specific combination of low period prevalence of measles among the unvaccinated, medium vaccination coverage and low vaccine efficacy rate, as revealed by the baseline survey, resulted in less-than-expected gains attributable to vaccination. Modelled on estimates where the vaccine had greater efficacy, the gains from vaccination would be more substantial.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>Specific local conditions probably explain the low rates among the unvaccinated while the high vaccine failure rate is likely due to weaknesses in the vaccination delivery system. Community perception of these realities may have had some role in household decisions about whether to vaccinate, although the major discouraging factor was inadequate access. The balance sheet may be useful as a communication tool in other circumstances, applied to up-to-date local evidence.</p