Moral Luck and The Unfairness of Morality

Moral luck occurs when factors beyond an agent’s control positively affect how much praise or blame she deserves. Kinds of moral luck are differentiated by the source of lack of control such as the results of her actions, the circumstances in which she finds herself, and the way in which she is constituted. Many philosophers accept the existence of some of these kinds of moral luck but not others, because, in their view, the existence of only some of them would make morality unfair. I, however, argue that this intermediary approach is unstable, because either morality is fair in ways that rule out resultant, circumstantial, and constitutive moral luck (and this leads to moral responsibility skepticism), or morality is unfair in ways that permit the existence of those kinds of moral luck. Thus, such intermediary approaches lack the motivation that their proponents have long taken them to have. In the appendix, I point to ways in which morality is unfair concerning the scope of moral responsibility, moral obligation, moral taint, being a good or bad person, and flourishing

Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck

Martin Luther affirms his theological position by saying “Here I stand. I can do no other.” Supposing that Luther’s claim is true, he lacks alternative possibilities at the moment of choice. Even so, many libertarians have the intuition that he is morally responsible for his action. One way to make sense of this intuition is to assert that Luther’s action is indirectly free, because his action inherits its freedom and moral responsibility from earlier actions when he had alternative possibilities and those earlier directly free actions formed him into the kind of person who must refrain from recanting. Surprisingly, libertarians have not developed a full account of indirectly free actions. I provide a more developed account. First, I explain the metaphysical nature of indirectly free actions such as Luther’s. Second, I examine the kind of metaphysical and epistemic connections that must occur between past directly free actions and the indirectly free action. Third, I argue that an attractive way to understand the kind of derivative moral responsibility at issue involves affirming the existence of resultant moral luck

Against the Character Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck

One way to frame the problem of moral luck is as a contradiction in our ordinary ideas about moral responsibility. In the case of two identical reckless drivers where one kills a pedestrian and the other does not, we tend to intuit that they are and are not equally blameworthy. The Character Response sorts these intuitions in part by providing an account of moral responsibility: the drivers must be equally blameworthy, because they have identical character traits and people are originally praiseworthy and blameworthy in virtue of, and only in virtue of, their character traits. After explicating two versions of the Character Response, I argue that they both involve implausible accounts of moral responsibility and fail to provide a good solution to the problem of moral luck. I close by noting how proponents of moral luck can preserve a kernel of truth from the Character Response to explain away the intuition that the drivers are equally blameworthy

Constitutive Moral Luck and Strawson's Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility

Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument is that because self-creation is required to be truly morally responsible and self-creation is impossible, it is impossible to be truly morally responsible for anything. I contend that the Basic Argument is unpersuasive and unsound. First, I argue that the moral luck debate shows that the self-creation requirement appears to be contradicted and supported by various parts of our commonsense ideas about moral responsibility, and that this ambivalence undermines the only reason that Strawson gives for the self-creation requirement. Second, I argue that the self-creation requirement is so demanding that either it is an implausible requirement for a species of true moral responsibility that we take ourselves to have or it is a plausible requirement of a species of true moral responsibility that we have never taken ourselves to have. Third, I explain that Strawson overgeneralizes from instances of constitutive luck that obviously undermine moral responsibility to all kinds of constitutive luck

Accepting Moral Luck

I argue that certain kinds of luck can partially determine an agent’s praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. To make this view clearer, consider some examples. Two identical agents drive recklessly around a curb, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. Two identical corrupt judges would freely take a bribe if one were offered. Only one judge is offered a bribe, and so only one judge takes a bribe. Put in terms of these examples, I argue that the killer driver and bribe taker are more blameworthy than their counterparts. I offer three arguments for that view, and, in doing so, I exemplify a general way to advance the moral luck debate. First, I argue against an account of moral responsibility that implies that the judges are equally blameworthy. Second, I argue that the killer driver is more blameworthy than the merely reckless driver. Third, I locate an alternative sense in which the agents in each case pair are morally on par

Water Balance of a Small Lake in a Permafrost Region

The work upon which this report is based was supported in part by funds (Project A-031-ALAS) provided by the United States Department of the Interior, Office of Water Resources Research, as authorized under the Water Resources Act of 1964, as amended

Armstrong on Probabilistic Laws of Nature

D. M. Armstrong famously claims that deterministic laws of nature are contingent relations between universals and that his account can also be straightforwardly extended to irreducibly probabilistic laws of nature. For the most part, philosophers have neglected to scrutinize Armstrong’s account of probabilistic laws. This is surprising precisely because his own claims about probabilistic laws make it unclear just what he takes them to be. We offer three interpretations of what Armstrong-style probabilistic laws are, and argue that all three interpretations are incompatible either with some feature of Armstrong’s broader metaphysics or with essential features of his account of laws (or both)

The Theory of Neurological Organization in Historical Perspective

The treatment program for speech and reading disorders employed by the Institutes for the Achievement of Human Potential is discussed and relevant research and opinion cited. Questions related to the viability of the theoretical formulations and efficacy of the treatment procedures are raised. The authors conclude that the theory of neurological organization and the remedial principles based on that theory are scientifically unsubstantiated

Health Care Expenditures in the National Health Expenditures Accounts and in Gross Domestic Product: A Reconciliation

This paper provides a most detailed reconciliation to date of the National Health Expenditure Accounts (NHEA), the official estimates of health care spending in the United States from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and the estimates of health expenditures that are part of gross domestic product (GDP) produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) as part of the national income and product accounts (NIPAs). For the period from 1997-2008, the estimates of total national health spending in the NHEA and in the GDP data are relatively similar, differing by less than 2 percent annually. Well over 90 percent of the total estimated expenditures in the two accounts appear to consist of the same expenditures. The differences in the estimates of expenditures for specific categories of health care – physician services, hospitals, drugs, health insurance, investment in equipment, and government programs – are, however, proportionately larger. The differences in the estimates of spending for specific categories of health care partly reflect differences in the way CMS and BEA classify certain healthrelated expenditures that are included in both accounts. The differences in the two estimates of health care spending also reflect some differences in the composition of health care spending in the two accounts, the use of some different estimation methods, and the use of some different data sources.

Environmental boundary conditions for the origin of life converge to an organo-sulfur metabolism

Published in final edited form as: Nat Ecol Evol. 2019 December ; 3(12): 1715–1724. doi:10.1038/s41559-019-1018-8.It has been suggested that a deep memory of early life is hidden in the architecture of metabolic networks, whose reactions could have been catalyzed by small molecules or minerals before genetically encoded enzymes. A major challenge in unravelling these early steps is assessing the plausibility of a connected, thermodynamically consistent proto-metabolism under different geochemical conditions, which are still surrounded by high uncertainty. Here we combine network-based algorithms with physico-chemical constraints on chemical reaction networks to systematically show how different combinations of parameters (temperature, pH, redox potential and availability of molecular precursors) could have affected the evolution of a proto-metabolism. Our analysis of possible trajectories indicates that a subset of boundary conditions converges to an organo-sulfur-based proto-metabolic network fuelled by a thioester- and redox-driven variant of the reductive tricarboxylic acid cycle that is capable of producing lipids and keto acids. Surprisingly, environmental sources of fixed nitrogen and low-potential electron donors are not necessary for the earliest phases of biochemical evolution. We use one of these networks to build a steady-state dynamical metabolic model of a protocell, and find that different combinations of carbon sources and electron donors can support the continuous production of a minimal ancient 'biomass' composed of putative early biopolymers and fatty acids.80NSSC17K0295 - Intramural NASA; 80NSSC17K0296 - Intramural NASA; T32 GM100842 - NIGMS NIH HHSAccepted manuscrip