Do International Shocks Affect Small Wholesalers and Retailers?

Previous research has suggested that the smallest firms are those most vulnerable to international competition, as measured by exchange rate fluctuations and import shares. However, that work – and the overwhelming bulk of the empirical literature on determinants of exit or firm survival – dealt entirely with the manufacturing sector of the economy. Are firms further down the distribution chain, small wholesalers and retailers, hurt by real exchange rate movements? Annual data for 1989-2005 are analyzed to explain small firm exit rates in several employment size categories – under 10 employees, 10-19 employees, 20-99 employees, and 100-499 employees. While there is variation across industry sectors, the basic result is that wholesalers respond negatively to a stronger currency in a manner similar to that of manufacturers, while retailers are generally unaffected.

Foreign Competition and Small-Firm Entry in US Manufacturing

In our increasingly globalized economy, the growth and profit prospects of domestic firms, especially small firms, seem clearly impacted by competitive pressures from foreign firms. This article analyzes annual data for 1989-1998 for 140 3-digit SIC manufacturing industries and for 1998-2004 for 86 4-digit NAICS industries on establishment -- plant-level -- births by small firms in several size categories. The major finding is that international pressures, in the form of import share weighted exchange rate appreciation, seem to lead to reduced rates of smallest-firm entry in manufacturing, though the magnitudes of these effects are smaller than sometimes discussed (and there is the suggestion that dollar appreciation may actually benefit small firm entry through access to cheaper inputs where the final product import threat is weak).small firms, entry, foreign competition, exchange rates

Antidumping as a Development Issue

Almost 90 years ago Viner (1923) identified dumping as a "problem" in international trade; more recently Prusa (2005) and Zanardi (2006) have found the overuse of antidumping to be the "problem" in international trade. Others have observed the pervasive use of antidumping since the end of the Uruguay Round and the resulting framework of trade liberalization, as well as the trend of increasing cases filed by and against developing countries. What has not been well documented is how dramatically the patterns of antidumping usage have changed, to the point that while obviously impacting trade flows, the impact is now of most concern to the developing world. This paper attempts to stimulate discussion about antidumping policy among development economists, who have largely ignored the topic; evaluating trade policy by developing economies without considering antidumping is incomplete and ignores the extent to which it may be substitutable for other methods of trade protection. Antidumping has become truly a "problem" of development. Despite some debate on the role of international openness in determining economic performance, there is little research on how the use of particular trade policy mechanisms affects either trade openness or economic performance. In what follows we examine the role of developing countries in antidumping, with particular focus on which countries employ this instrument of protection, and which countries are heavily targeted; we also note those countries which are targeted but do not respond in kind.Antitrust Enforcement, Central and Eastern Europe, Competition Policy JEL classification:

Collusion with secret price cuts: an experimental investigation

Theoretical work starting with Stigler (1964) suggests that collusion may be difficult to sustain in a repeated game with secret price cuts and demand uncertainty. Compared to equilibria in games of perfect information, trigger-strategy equilibria in this context result in lower payoffs because punishments occur along the equilibrium path. We tested the theory in a series of economic experiments. Consistent with the theory, treatments with imperfect information were less collusive than treatments with perfect information. However, in the imperfect-information treatments, players seemed to settle on the static Nash outcome rather than using trigger strategies. Players did resort to punishments for undercutting in perfect-information treatments, and this sometimes led to successful collusion afterward.

Do States Free Ride in Antitrust Enforcement?

Recent research has documented a substantial role in antitrust enforcement by U.S. states. While many of the cases litigated involve small local firms, a non-trivial portion encompass multiplestate issues. Some previous literature has investigated whether states engage in free-riding behavior in environmental regulation, and whether governments free ride on private decisions in provision of public goods. In this paper, we analyze a sample of antitrust cases involving crossstate impacts (from the Multi-State Antitrust Database, provided by the National Association of Attorneys General) and explain the determinants of free-riding (which we define as participatingin a case, but not as a lead plaintiff). JEL classification:

Are Credit Unions Just Small Banks? Determinants of Loan Rates in Local Consumer Lending Markets

Only recently have studies of banking markets paid attention to the potential competitive discipline provided by credit unions on consumer loan rates. However, an unresolved issue is the extent to which credit unions are substitutable for banks. We analyze a combined sample of 100 banks and 187 credit union in 68 U.S. markets observed quarterly over the 1992-1998 period, to explain loan rates for two types of consumer loans. Our results suggest that, even after controlling for market shares and deposit sizes of institutions, credit unions charge their members significantly lower interest rates on loans than do banks. Furthermore, an examination of the pattern of responses to lagged interest rates yields an indication of greater inertia in rate-setting by credit unions than by banks.

The Determinants of State-Level Antitrust Enforcement

While there has been a considerable literature exploring determinants of antitrust enforcement in the United States, studies have been based either on aggregate federal enforcement data over time (exploring cyclical influences) or cross-industry studies, usually for a single year or aggregated over several years. What has never been investigated is the pattern of state-level antitrust. This is somewhat surprising, as this has been a major activity of many state Attorneys General. In this paper, we explain state antitrust enforcement across states and time (for a 15-year period), examining a number of economic and political determinants which have been proposed in the literature.antitrust enforcement

Quality competition, Pricing-To-Market and Non-Tariff measures: A Unified Framework For the Analysis of Bilateral Unit Values

This paper presents a unified framework for analyzing several factors that have been independently studied as determinants of unit values in international trade: product differentiation by quality (which suggests that unit values should be positively correlated with exporters' per capita income), pricing-to-market (which suggests they should be positively correlated with importers' per capita income), and non-tariff measures (which suggests that remaining residuals may contain evidence of trade barriers). On a large sample of bilateral unit values for 2005, we find that about 58 percent of all HS-6 products demonstrate both significant quality-ladder effects and pricing-to-market effects, with quality-ladder effects predominating in importance. Distance-related effects appearing directly in prices appear significantly larger than one would expect as a result of shipping margins. We also rank importers by the remaining unexplained variation in import prices, and examine whether these variations are plausibly related to non-tariff measures.

Maintaining New Markets: Determinants of Antitrust Enforcement in Central and Eastern Europe

While others have examined the implementation and/or the stringency of enforcement of antitrust laws in post-socialist economies, this paper is the first study that attempts to explain the determinants of antitrust enforcement activity across post-socialist countries using economic and political variables. Using a panel of ten European post-socialist countries over periods ranging from 4 to 11 years, we find a number of significant determinants of enforcement in these countries. For example, larger economies engage in more antitrust enforcement, and countries have tended to increase their enforcement efforts over time. Our results also suggest that countries characterized by more unionization and less corruption tend to engage in greater antitrust enforcement of all types. Countries more successful in privatizing have filed fewer cases, while more affluent or developed countries investigate fewer cases of all types, consistent with an income-shifting motivation for antitrust.Antitrust Enforcement, Central and Eastern Europe, Competition Policy JEL classification: L4, P3

Trade Policy and Antitrust: Do Consumers Matter to Legislators?

We provide one of the first efforts to measure the importance of consumer preferences in legislators’ trade policy decisions by estimating the degree to which the level of antitrust enforcement in the legislator’s state impacts his or her vote on free trade agreements. To the extent that antitrust and trade liberalization are both viewed as proconsumer in nature, we would expect to see a positive relationship between antitrust enforcement in their legislative district and Congressional votes in support of trade liberalization. We find evidence suggesting that consumer preferences do play a role in legislative decisions on trade policy.Free Trade Agreements, Competition Policy, Antitrust, Voting