Does Money Illusion Matter? An Experimental Approach

Money illusion means that people behave differently when the same objective situation is represented in nominal or in real terms. To examine the behavioral impact of money illusion we studied the adjustment process of nominal prices after a fully anticipated negative nominal shock in an experimental setting with strategic complementarity. We show that seemingly innocuous differences in payoff presentation cause large behavioral differences. In particular, if the payoff information is presented to subjects in nominal terms, price stickiness and real effects are much more pronounced than when payoff information is presented in real terms. The driving force of differences in real outcomes is subjects' expectation of higher nominal inertia in the nominal payoff condition. Due to strategic complementarity, these expectations induce subjects to adjust rather slowly to the shock.Money illusion, nominal inertia, sticky prices, non-neutrality of money

Money Illusion and Coordination Failure

Economists long considered money illusion to be largely irrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion has powerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent payoffs in nominal terms, choices converge to the Pareto inefficient equilibrium; however, if we lift the veil of money by representing payoffs in real terms, the Pareto efficient equilibrium is selected. We also show that strategic uncertainty about the other players' behavior is key for the equilibrium selection effects of money illusion: even though money illusion vanishes over time if subjects are given learning opportunities in the context of an individual optimization problem, powerful and persistent effects of money illusion are found when strategic uncertainty prevails.money illusion, coordination failure, equilibrium selection, multiple equilibria, coordination games

Money illusion and coordination failure

Economists long considered money illusion to be largely irrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion has powerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent payoffs in nominal terms, choices converge to the Pareto inefficient equilibrium; however, if we lift the veil of money by representing payoffs in real terms, the Pareto efficient equilibrium is selected. We also show that strategic uncertainty about the other players' behavior is key for the equilibrium selection effects of money illusion: even though money illusion vanishes over time if subjects are given learning opportunities in the context of an individual optimization problem, powerful and persistent effects of money illusion are found when strategic uncertainty prevails.Money illusion, coordination failure, equilibrium selection, multiple equilibria, coordination games

In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small- Scale Societies,

Homo Economicus, Behavioral Experiments, Small-Scale Societies,

What to Fix? Distinguishing between design and non-design rules in automated tools

Technical debt---design shortcuts taken to optimize for delivery speed---is a critical part of long-term software costs. Consequently, automatically detecting technical debt is a high priority for software practitioners. Software quality tool vendors have responded to this need by positioning their tools to detect and manage technical debt. While these tools bundle a number of rules, it is hard for users to understand which rules identify design issues, as opposed to syntactic quality. This is important, since previous studies have revealed the most significant technical debt is related to design issues. Other research has focused on comparing these tools on open source projects, but these comparisons have not looked at whether the rules were relevant to design. We conducted an empirical study using a structured categorization approach, and manually classify 466 software quality rules from three industry tools---CAST, SonarQube, and NDepend. We found that most of these rules were easily labeled as either not design (55%) or design (19%). The remainder (26%) resulted in disagreements among the labelers. Our results are a first step in formalizing a definition of a design rule, in order to support automatic detection.Comment: Long version of accepted short paper at International Conference on Software Architecture 2017 (Gothenburg, SE

Consumption Externalities and Diffusion in Pharmaceutical Markets: Antiulcer Drugs

We examine the role of consumption externalities in the demand for pharmaceuticals at both the brand level and over a therapeutic class of drugs. These effects emerge when use of a drug by others affects its value, and/or conveys information abut efficacy and safety to patients and physicians. This can affect that rate of market diffusion for a new entrant, and can lead to herb behavior whereby a particular drug can dominate the market despite the availability of close substitutes. We use data for H2-antagonist antiulcer drugs to estimate a dynamic demand model and quantify these effects. The model has three components: an hedonic price equation that measures how the aggregate usage of a drug, as well as conventional attributes, affect brand valuation; equations relating equilibrium market shares to quality-adjusted prices and marketing levels; and diffusion equations describing the dynamic adjustment process. We find that consumption externalities influence both valuations and rates of diffusion, but that they operate at the brand and not the therapeutic class level.