Media Exposure, Juror Decision-Making, and the Availability Heuristic

Although much of the research regarding media exposure has centered on the harmful effects of pretrial publicity in criminal cases, it has been argued that civil cases may be more vulnerable to its effects compared to criminal cases (Bornstein, Whisenhunt, Nemeth, & Dunaway, 2002). In large part this appears to be due to the potential influence of media depiction of high-profile lawsuits and atypical verdict awards on judgments of liability and damages (Robbennolt & Studebaker, 2003). In our study we examined the effect of exposure to a news article (relating a verdict award in a product liability case) on juror decision-making in a conceptually similar case. We varied the amount of damages awarded by the jury in the news article as well as the amount of time between reading the article and the case summary. Our goal wasto investigate whether and to what extent jurors use available information when awarding damages. In addition, we were interested in the influence of media exposure on perceptions of the plaintiff and defendan

Understanding Moral Judgments: The Role of the Agent’s Characteristics in Moral Evaluations

Traditional studies have shown that the moral judgments are influenced by many biasing factors, like the consequences of a behavior, certain characteristics of the agent who commits the act, or the words chosen to describe the behavior. In the present study we investigated a new factor that could bias the evaluation of morally relevant human behavior: the perceived similarity between the participants and the agent described in the moral scenario. The participants read a story about a driver who illegally overtook another car and hit a pedestrian who was crossing the street. The latter was taken to the hospital with a broken leg. The driver was described either as being similar to the participant (a student, 21 years old, the same gender as th­e participant) or dissimilar (a retired person, 69 years old, different gender as the participant). The results show that the participants from the increased similarity group expressed more lenient evaluations of the immorality of the driver’s behavior compared to the participants from the decreased similarity group. The results are discussed within a framework which puts emphasis on motivational and protective reasons

The proposed Apologies Act for Scotland : good intentions with unforeseeable consequences

This article considers Scotland's proposed Apologies Act in the light of experience in other Common Law jurisdictions. A number of Common Law jurisdictions have passed Apologies Acts in the past 25 years, largely motivated by concerns about a 'litigation explosion'. The idea seems to be that providing evidentiary protection to apologies will encourage their use, or at least prevent insurers and lawyers from advising against them. Charlie Irvine considers the plausibility of this hypothesis and suggests that the drafters of the Bill face an unresolvable dilemma: blanket protection for apologies may prevent credible evidence from reaching the courts, while narrowing that protection to exclude admissions of fault may stilt apologies and rob them of credibility

Psychology and Effective Lawyering: Insights for Legal Educators

Psychology-the science of how people think, feel and behave-has a great deal to teach about a range of core competencies related to working with people and making good decisions. For example, psychologists have conducted extensive research into perception, memory, communication, individual and group decision-making, conflict, goal setting and planning, self-assessment, motivation, grit, and many other matters that are central to effective lawyering. This research has much to contribute to an understanding of the work of lawyers and can be effectively incorporated into how we teach law students to practice law

Apology Within a Moral Dialectic: A Reply to Professor Robbennolt

Over the last several years, much has been written about the role of apology in facilitating the resolution of legal disputes. Within this body of work a debate has developed among legal scholars, practitioners, and legislators. Under traditional rules of evidence an apology which acknowledged fault would enter evidence as an admission against interest. Now there is a movement to legislatively protect apologies from the effects of the traditional rule in order to facilitate apology without evidentiary encumbrance. Scholars who have argued in favor of the relaxation of the traditional rule have largely relied on anecdotal evidence to support their arguments. Now, in her recent article Apologies and Legal Settlement, Professor Jennifer K. Robbennolt makes a long-overdue empirical contribution to analyses of the role of apology in settlement. Robbennolt concludes that fault-admitting apologies will indeed enhance the likelihood of settlements, and that this is true regardless of whether or not the apology is protected. This conclusion matters not only because it provides an empirical basis for the efficacy of fault admitting apologies, but also because of its attraction to legislators who like to see empirical studies before changing long-standing rules of law like the evidentiary rule in question here

Contrition in the Courtroom: Do Apologies Affect Adjudication?

Apologies usually help to repair social relationships and appease aggrieved parties. Previous research has demonstrated that in legal settings, apologies influence how litigants and juries evaluate both civil and criminal defendants. Judges, however, routinely encounter apologies offered for instrumental reasons, such as to reduce a civil damage award or fine, or to shorten a criminal sentence. Frequent exposure to insincere apologies might make judges suspicious of or impervious to apologies. In a series of experimental studies with judges as research participants, we find that in some criminal settings, apologies can induce judges to be more lenient, but overall, apologizing to a judge is often unhelpful and can even be harmful

Contrition in the Courtroom: Do Apologies Affect Adjudication?

Apologies usually help to repair social relationships and appease aggrieved parties. Previous research has demonstrated that in legal settings, apologies influence how litigants and juries evaluate both civil and criminal defendants. Judges, however, routinely encounter apologies offered for instrumental reasons, such as to reduce a civil damage award or fine, or to shorten a criminal sentence. Frequent exposure to insincere apologies might make judges suspicious of or impervious to apologies. In a series of experimental studies with judges as research participants, we find that in some criminal settings, apologies can induce judges to be more lenient, but overall, apologizing to a judge is often unhelpful and can even be harmfu

Apology Within a Moral Dialectic: A Reply to Professor Robbennolt

Over the last several years, much has been written about the role of apology in facilitating the resolution of legal disputes. Within this body of work a debate has developed among legal scholars, practitioners, and legislators. Under traditional rules of evidence an apology which acknowledged fault would enter evidence as an admission against interest. Now there is a movement to legislatively protect apologies from the effects of the traditional rule in order to facilitate apology without evidentiary encumbrance. Scholars who have argued in favor of the relaxation of the traditional rule have largely relied on anecdotal evidence to support their arguments. Now, in her recent article Apologies and Legal Settlement, Professor Jennifer K. Robbennolt makes a long-overdue empirical contribution to analyses of the role of apology in settlement. Robbennolt concludes that fault-admitting apologies will indeed enhance the likelihood of settlements, and that this is true regardless of whether or not the apology is protected. This conclusion matters not only because it provides an empirical basis for the efficacy of fault admitting apologies, but also because of its attraction to legislators who like to see empirical studies before changing long-standing rules of law like the evidentiary rule in question here