ANALISA FISIKOKIMIA PATI PADA 5 JENIS PISANG

The objectives of this research was (i) to compare physicochemical starch (amilum) such as pH, water content, ash  and sugar (Glucose) concentration of 5 varieties of bananas ( Pisang Kepok, Pisang Ambon, Pisang Barangan, Pisang Nangka dan Pisang Mas). Those are commonly consumed  in Indonesia, (ii) to analyze the correlation among the parameters.  After the starch was extracted and analyzed, the results were as fallows:  based on analysis of variance, pH varies among the bananas.  LSD (least significant defernces) test, LSD 0.05 = 0.43   concluded that pH of starch pisang ambon and  pisang barangan were higher than pH pisang kapok, pisang nangka and pisang mas.  The highest water content was at starch of pisang kapok, 4.64%,  whilist the lowest water content at starch of pisang mas, only 0.96%. The highest ash content was starch of pisang ambon, 2.60 %, whilist the lowest was at pisang mas, only 1.42%.  The highest sugar content was at starch of pisang kapok  and pisang ambon, both have 22.19 and 19.02 mg/ ml, whilist the lowest sugar content was at pisang barangan that only have 16.08 mg/ 100 ml.  Correlation among the parameters shows that thare was no correlation between pH with water, ash and sugar content.  The highest correlation accured between water content and sugar content, in which r = – 0.89 that means the more water content will be the less sugar content and vice versa. The second highest correlation accured between ash content with water content in which r = 0.76 that means the more water content will be the more ash content. The correlation between ash content and sugar content was relatively low, r = - 0.4

Corporate Social Responsibility in a Corporate Governance Framework

We argue that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) may affect the agency relationship inside a firm. We analyze how CSR and the threat of stakeholder activism influence effort of manager and shareholder, and describe how CSR may arise endogenously in this context. By engaging in CSR the shareholder can commit to less monitoring, increase the manager’s effort, and raise profits. Even a socially indifferent shareholder may thus benefit from CSR and prefer to behave socially responsibly. He may even find it optimal to sponsor a social activist, giving it the means to exert pressure.Corporate Social Responsibility; Corporate governance; Stakeholder activism.

Tunneling and Propping: A Justification for Pyramidal Ownership

This paper presents a formal model of tunneling and propping in a pyramidal ownership structure. Tunneling refers to controlling shareholders shifting resources from one firm to another in the same pyramid. Propping is tunneling that is done to save the receiving firm from bankruptcy. We compare the pyramidal ownership structure to the horizontal ownership structure, in which shifting resources between firms is not possible (i.e. illegal). We show that tunneling may justify the pyramidal structure only in the presence of myopic investors or in combination with propping.Tunneling; Propping; Pyramids; Ownership Structure; Business Groups

Tunneling and Propping: A Justification for Pyramidal Ownership

This paper presents a formal model of tunneling and propping in a pyramidal ownership structure. Tunneling refers to controlling shareholders shifting resources from one firm to another in the same pyramid. Propping is tunneling that is done to save the receiving firm from bankruptcy. We compare the pyramidal ownership structure to the horizontal ownership structure, in which shifting resources between firms is not possible (i.e. illegal). We show that tunneling may justify the pyramidal structure only in the presence of myopic investors or in combination with propping

Tunneling and Propping: A Justification for Pyramidal Ownership

This paper presents a formal model of tunneling and propping in a pyramidal ownership structure. Tunneling refers to controlling shareholders shifting funds from one firm to another in the same pyramid. Propping is tunneling that is done to save the receiving firm from bankruptcy. We compare the pyramidal ownership structure to the horizontal ownership structure, in which shifting funds between firms is not possible. We show that tunneling may justify the pyramidal structure only with myopic investors or in combination with propping.Tunneling, Propping, Pyramids, Ownership Structure, Business Groups

The effect of Strategic Sale of Banks: Evidence from Indonesia

We examine the effect of strategic sale—the sale of banks to strategic foreign investors—on banks’ performance. The Government of Indonesia implemented such a policy as a part of bank restructuring in the aftermath of the 1998 banking crisis. Using difference-in-difference models, we find that strategic sale leads to 12%-15% cost reduction. These results are robust to the use of other estimators such as difference-in-difference matching-estimators and stochastic-frontier analysis, to that of other performance measures such as return on assets and net interest margin, and also to that of different types of samples. These suggest that strategic sale could play an important role in restructuring troubled banks in developing countries.banking crisis, recapitalized banks, the sale of assets, difference- in-difference models, matching estimator

Do Banks Respond to Capital Requirement? Evidence from Indonesia

Using dynamic panel data models, we examine the effect of capital requirement on banks’ behavior in Indonesia. We find inconclusive results. Some banks tend to comply with capital requirement: They increase their capital ratio when their CAR is lower than, or falling towards, the eight percent regulatory minimum. However, most of our results are statistically significant at 20-30% level of significance only. Moreover, our results are mostly driven by private domestic banks and heavily-undercapitalized banks that were closely monitored by regulator in the aftermath of the 1998 crisis. Whether, in normal circumstances, banks in developing countries like Indonesia comply with capital requirement, therefore, remains questionable. This implies that, if regulators in developing countries continue relying on capital regulation, they would also need to improve their supervision capacity, increase the transparency of financial reporting, and strengthen market monitoring of banks.banking crisis, capital requirement, bank regulation, dynamic panel data