Can general purpose technology theory explain economic growth? Electrical power as a case study

Does the concept of General Purpose Technologies help explain periods of faster and slower productivity advance in economies? The paper develops a new comparative data set on the usage of electricity in the manufacturing sectors of the USA, Britain, France, Germany and Japan and proceeds to evaluate the hypothesis of a productivity bonus as postulated by many existing GPT models. Using the case of the diffusion of electrical power in the early twentieth century this paper shows that there was no generalized productivity boost from electrical power diffusion as postulated by many existing GPT models. The productivity gains from this GPT varied widely across economies and industries, suggesting that the power of GPTs to predict aggregate or sectoral growth is limited.Research for this paper has been supported by a Research Grant from the ESRC (No. L138 25 1045).This is the author accepted manuscript. The published advanced access version can be found on the publisher's website at: http://ereh.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/06/03/ereh.heu008.full.pdf+htm

1935 sanctions against Italy: Would coal and crude oil have made a difference?

This article assesses the hypothesis that in 1935 - 1936 the implementation of sanctions on the export of coal and oil products to Italy by the League of Nations would have forced Italy to abandon her imperialistic war against Ethiopia. In particular, the article focuses on the claim that Britain and France, the League’s leaders, could have halted the Italian invasion of Ethiopia by means of coal and oil sanctions, and without the help of the United States, or recourse to stronger means such as a military blockade. An analysis of the data on coal consumption in the industrial census of 1937 - 1938 shows that the Italian industry would have survived a League embargo on coal, provided that Germany continued her supply to Italy. The counterfactual proves that the effect of an oil embargo was entirely dependent on the attitude of the United States towards the League’s action. Given that this attitude was by no means clear, a solitary attempt at such an embargo by the League would have failed