A case of ‘You can always get what you want’? Legislators’ success in gaining their choice of committee assignment in the European Parliament

Committees are central to the operation of the European Parliament, providing fora for the detailed consideration of legislative proposals. This article provides the first systematic assessment of how far and why Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are successful in obtaining places on the committees to which they most want to be assigned. In doing so, we employ a new dataset of MEPs’ committee preferences, information which has never before been systematically collected. Adapted forms of three theories of legislative organization (distributive, informational and partisan) provide a framework for the analysis. The results indicate a high degree of success for MEPs in achieving the committee assignments they want, within the restrictions of proportional representation of party groups on committees. We find strong support for the informational approach to legislative organization when examining variations in success rates. Nevertheless, there is also some evidence that partisan concerns influence the assignment process. This, in combination with the role of party coordinators in the EP, means that party groups and national parties in the European Parliament attempt to limit the agency losses that might result from a high degree of self-selection in committee assignments

Tenure, turnover and careers in the European Parliament : MEPs as policy-seekers

Given the considerable increase in its powers over recent decades this paper asks how far the European Parliament (EP) is an attractive place to build a legislative career. Using a theory of MEPs as policy-seekers, it shows that MEPs are indeed building careers in this supranational institution. Turnover is in decline in the EP and on its committees, average length of service has increased and greater proportions of MEPs aspire to stay than previously. Looking at the 30 years since direct elections began, policy influence and office benefits are associated with lower likelihood of exiting the EP while being on the geographical periphery of the EU makes MEPs more likely to leave

Select Committees and Brexit: Parliamentary Influence in a Divisive Policy Area

In this first comprehensive study of House of Commons departmental select committees and Brexit, we analyse the incidence of divisions (i.e. formal votes) on Brexit-related issues in select committees, showing that unanimity remains the norm with the exception of the Exiting the EU Committee, which is the most divided select committee of recent times. We add to the literature on select committee influence by adapting Russell and Benton’s (2011) methodology to examine government responses to committee recommendations on Brexit. We show that most have been partially accepted but that the level of policy change, rather than divisions on recommendations, is the main factor explaining variation, with greater success for recommendations suggesting a lower degree of change. Committees have also had indirect influence, shaping the agenda and bringing information into the public domain

Rivalry on the right: The Conservatives, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the EU issue

Multi-party politics alters the dynamics of party competition in Westminster elections. In a case study of the Conservative Party and the UK Independence Party (UKIP), theories of niche versus mainstream party competition are used to examine the strategies adopted by a soft Eurosceptic mainstream party and hard Eurosceptic niche party as they compete on the issue of European integration. These theories are also extended to look at how niche parties react to their mainstream competitors’ strategies. In competition with UKIP, the Conservatives have both developed a distinctive soft Eurosceptic position and defused the EU issue. With Conservative policies diluted in coalition government, UKIP has targeted disillusioned Conservative voters. It has sought to raise the salience of the EU issue and highlight its radical position while also developing a broader narrative. The findings suggest that mainstream parties may adopt more than one strategy simultaneously and that niche parties may react to mainstream parties’ adversarial strategies by emphasising differences and attempting to widen their appeal

Unity and Divisions on Departmental Select Committees: a Brexit Effect?

Most reports from UK departmental select committees are agreed by consensus, underpinning their reputation for non-partisan working in an adversarial House of Commons. However, divisions (formal votes) are more common than is often assumed, occurring on 9% of reports between 2010 and 2019. This article provides the first comprehensive analysis of unity and divisions on select committees. It finds that the incidence of divisions increases when opposition parties chair committees, when there are more rebellious members of parliament present and when more new members of parliament are in attendance. Brexit provoked significant inter-party and intra-party divisions in the Commons. In committees, divisions on Brexit reports are higher than those on other reports and the Exiting the European Union Committee has a clear Leave-Remain fault line. But, more broadly, the Brexit effect on select committees is limited and unanimity remains the norm even when there are policy differences between parties

Working up the six-pack: Bargaining success in the European Council’s task force on strengthening economic governance

This article assesses the factors associated with member states’ bargaining success during the negotiations in the European Council’s 2010 task force on strengthening economic governance, the  pre-decision  stage  for  the Six-Pack.  We  test  theories  of  decision-making  based  on the expertise of institutions, and EU member states’ preferences and power resources using new data.  With  methods  derived  from  the  Decision-Making  in  the  EU  projects,  we  find  that proximity to the European Central Bank was associated withgreater bargaining success for member  states  and  that  the  opposite  was  the  case  for  closeness  to  the  Commission’s preferences. We find mixed evidence that member states’ level of indebtedness is associated with bargaining success, defined asthe minimum distance between the position of a member state and the final outcome. The findings indicate the importance of the ECB’s role given its technical expertise, in defining the outcomes of the task force.</p

Beyond Committees: Parliamentary Oversight and Coalition Government in Britain

A legislature’s ability to engage in oversight of the executive is believed to derive largely from its committee system. For example, powerful parliamentary committees are considered a necessary condition for the legislature to help police policy compromises between parties in multiparty government. But can other parliamentary instruments perform this role? This paper suggests parliamentary questions as an alternative parliamentary vehicle for coalition parties to monitor their partners. Questions force ministers to reveal information concerning their legislative and extra-legislative activities, providing coalition members unique insights into their partners behaviour. To test our argument, we build and analyse a new dataset of parliamentary questions in the British House of Commons covering the 2010-15 coalition. As expected, government MPs ask more questions as the divisiveness of a policy area increases. Legislatures conventionally considered weak due to the lack of strong committees may nevertheless play an important oversight role through other parliamentary devices, including helping to police the implementation of coalition agreements

UK Parliamentary Scrutiny of the EU Political and Legal Space after Brexit

‘Taking back control’ was a major theme in the 2016 UK Referendum on European Union (EU) membership and in the UK’s approach to the Brexit negotiations. Supporters of Brexit identified an end to ever closer integration, or Europeanisation, and restoration of parliamentar control over repatriated competences as a key benefit of leaving the EU. Europeanisation utilises a governance framework through which supra-national political institutions legislate and national courts provide effective judicial enforcement. Institutionally, Europeanisation has transferred legislative powers to the Council of the EU and European Parliament at the expense of national institutions. This caused what the literature defined as a ‘deparliamentarisation’ due to absence of national parliamentary participation in EU decision-making, and limited domestic accountability of executives (O’Brennan and Raunio, 2007)

Understanding MEPs: Four Waves of the European Parliament Research Group MEP Survey

This paper presents a new survey of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) conducted during 2015, which adds to a time series of MEP surveys carried out by the European Parliament Research Group. The data allow for comparison of MEPs’ views with those of the EU public, European Parliament candidates, and members of national and regional parliaments in Europe. The survey includes questions on topical issues, such as intra- EU migration and the UK-EU relationship. The dataset can be used to address a range of research questions concerning MEPs’ preferences and representation. This paper presents details of the 2015 MEP survey and uses the data to assess what explains MEPs' attitudes to the question of whether all EP plenary sessions should be held in Brussels

Geographical location of death adder bites, including bites by captive snakes (red star) and bites by snakes in the wild (yellow circle).

<p>Geographical location of death adder bites, including bites by captive snakes (red star) and bites by snakes in the wild (yellow circle).</p