STATE TRADING VERSUS EXPORT SUBSIDIES: THE CASE OF CANADIAN WHEAT

Canada and the United States have used different trade policies to support their wheat industries. Canada conferred sole export powers to the Canadian Wheat Board, allowing it to price discriminate among markets. The U.S. government has funded transfers to its wheat producers from taxpayers, instead, through export subsidies. This study compares these two ways of supporting producers in terms of their transfer efficiency and overall deadweight losses, the incidence on different domestic interest groups, and their consequences for third party traders. In the analysis we consider the implications of market power of wheat marketing firms for the comparison of policy alternatives in the context of the Canadian wheat industry.International Relations/Trade,

DOES BRANDED FOOD PRODUCT ADVERTISING HELP OR HURT FARMERS?

A two-stage model is developed to study food processing firms' brand advertising and its welfare effects on farmers in a duopsony/duoploy setting. In stage 1 firms compete to differentiate their products through brand advertising, and in stage 2 firms engage in quality competition. Farmers may benefit or lose form brand advertising under alternative market conditions.Marketing,

WHEAT DISPUTES UNDER NAFTA

International Relations/Trade,

Demand Enhancement through Food-Safety Regulation: Benefit-Cost Analysis of Collective Action in the California Pistachio Industry

Food safety shocks can threaten the health of consumers, create havoc within an industry and result in severe losses to producers. Governments often attempt to enhance food safety by mandating standards and inspection of food products to supplement the voluntary efforts by private firms. This paper assesses a form of collective action that falls between typical government mandates and purely private action. The California pistachio industry recently established a U.S. federal marketing order. This order sets quality standards and requires inspection and certification, aiming to reduce the likelihood of dangerous or poor quality pistachios being sold to consumers and to provide some quality assurance to consumers. Simulation results indicate that, across the full range of parameters used in the analysis, the benefit-cost analysis was always favorable to the new policy. Continuing work is extending the analysis to account for some particular features of the pistachio industry, to consider alternative policies, and to draw inferences for the application of similar policies to other California specialty crops.Food Safety, Collective Action, Specialty Crops, Government Regulation, Marketing Orders, Pistachios, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Q18, Q13, I18, H4,

ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF MANDATED GRADING AND TESTING TO AVOID A NEGATIVE FOOD SAFETY EVENT: EX ANTE ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL MARKETING ORDER FOR PISTACHIOS

The California pistachio industry led an initiative to establish a federal marketing order, which mandates quality standards and an inspection program to assure food safety and consistency in the quality of California pistachios. We develop a stochastic dynamic simulation model of the pistachio market to investigate quantitatively the likely effects of such collective action enforced by government mandates. Simulation results indicate that, across the full range of parameters used in the analysis, the benefit-cost analysis was always favorable to the proposed policy. The measured benefits to producers, the nation, or the world always well exceeded the corresponding measure of costs, typically by many times.Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety,

Industry-mandated testing to improve food safety: the new US marketing order for pistachios

Food safety shocks can threaten the health of consumers, create havoc within an industry and result in severe losses to producers. Governments often attempt to aid food safety by mandating standards and inspection of food products to supplement the efforts by private firms and industries. This article assesses a form of collective action that falls between typical government mandates and purely private action. The California pistachio industry recently established a U.S. federal marketing order, which sets quality standards and inspection to reduce the likelihood of dangerous or poor quality pistachios. Simulation results indicate that, across the full range of parameters used in the analysis, the benefit-cost analysis was always favorable to the new policy. In the case of California pistachios, collective action is likely to be a helpful tool to ensure a safe product and increase benefits to producers and consumers.food safety, food scare, collective action, marketing orders, pistachios, public good, food regulations, cost-benefit analysis, Agribusiness, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety,

Economic Consequences of Mandated Grading and Food Safety Assurance: Ex Ante Analysis of the Federal Marketing Order for California Pistachios

Crop Production/Industries, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Marketing,

Spring 2007 I Thought I Got an A! Overconfidence Across the Economics Curriculum

Abstract: Students often exhibit overconfident grade expectations and tend to overestimate the actual course grade at the completion of a course. Current theories of student motivation suggest such overconfidence may lead students to study less than if they had accurate grade perceptions. The authors report the findings of a survey of students enrolled in economics and quantitative courses at a large public university. They analyze the difference between a student's expected and actual grade and how teacher pedagogies can influence student overconfidence. They find male students and those with lower GPAs exhibit greater overconfidence. Students in lower division classes have a greater tendency to be overconfident than do those in upper division classes. The findings also indicate that grading practices influence overconfidence

Spring 2007 I Thought I Got an A! Overconfidence Across the Economics Curriculum

Abstract: Students often exhibit overconfident grade expectations and tend to overestimate the actual course grade at the completion of a course. Current theories of student motivation suggest such overconfidence may lead students to study less than if they had accurate grade perceptions. The authors report the findings of a survey of students enrolled in economics and quantitative courses at a large public university. They analyze the difference between a student's expected and actual grade and how teacher pedagogies can influence student overconfidence. They find male students and those with lower GPAs exhibit greater overconfidence. Students in lower division classes have a greater tendency to be overconfident than do those in upper division classes. The findings also indicate that grading practices influence overconfidence

Spring 2007 I Thought I Got an A! Overconfidence Across the Economics Curriculum

Abstract: Students often exhibit overconfident grade expectations and tend to overestimate the actual course grade at the completion of a course. Current theories of student motivation suggest such overconfidence may lead students to study less than if they had accurate grade perceptions. The authors report the findings of a survey of students enrolled in economics and quantitative courses at a large public university. They analyze the difference between a student's expected and actual grade and how teacher pedagogies can influence student overconfidence. They find male students and those with lower GPAs exhibit greater overconfidence. Students in lower division classes have a greater tendency to be overconfident than do those in upper division classes. The findings also indicate that grading practices influence overconfidence