Executive Quirks in Operational Decisions

We ask if corporate executives have fixed effects (quirks) that explain perational decisions made in firms, independent of firm effects. We replicate the approach in Bertrand et al. (2003), solving the empirical challenge of distinguishing firm and executive effects by constructing a dataset of executives who move from one firm to another. We find that executives indeed exhibit fixed effects separate from firm effects. These quirks are large, although there is a wide dispersion of sizes among executives. The quirks also come in themes, such as a bias toward investing in human rather than physical capital. We also find that quirks mostly lead to inefficient outcomes for firms. Finally, we link quirks to observable characteristics of executives, such as their age or education. We conclude by arguing for an increased focus on individual effects in operations management research.operations management; executive fixed effects; firm fixed effects; agency

A Catering Theory of Analyst Bias

We posit a theory that runs counter to how conventional wisdom thinks about analyst bias, that it is the result of distorted incentives by "the system" - especially upstream factors like the analysts' employers. We suggest that analysts are also heavily influenced by what investors believe, the purported victims of analyst bias. We adapt Mullainathan-Shleifer's theory of media bias to build a theory of how analysts cater to what investors believe. The theory also predicts that competition among analysts does not reduce their bias. We provide empirical support for this theory, using an enormous dataset built from over 6.5 million analyst estimates and 42.8 million observations on investor holdings, which we argue is a proxy for what they believe. We use a simultaneous-equations model for estimation, with instruments to rule out alternative interpretations of the direction of causality. For additional robustness, we investigate the time series of analyst bias and heterogeneity in investor beliefs from 1987 through 2003. Dickey-Fuller tests show that both have unit roots, but we establish that cointegration hold. Further, we employ a vector-autoregressive model to show Granger - causality between the two.Analyst bias; behavioral finance; media bias

Why Funds of Funds?

Private equity funds of funds (FOFs) have become big business. Today, FOFs form 14% of new money raised. I test six explanations for the rise of FOFs. First, I find that FOFs do not generally deliver superior returns. They do, however, do well enough for the limited partners (LPs) that hire them. Second, FOFs allow small LPs to scale upward, to invest in more funds. However, I find that they do not contribute to diversification. What they really do is to provide smaller LPs avenues to lower the cost of fund management. Third, FOFs allow large LPs to scale downward, to invest vast amounts over a short duration. However, the mechanism is imperfect because LPs can either use many FOFs and risk coordination problems among them or few FOFs and risk getting held up. Fourth, FOFs are used by LPs with weaker governance structures. Fifth, there is some evidence that LPs use FOFs to learn to invest in new areas, but the support is weak. Last, the use of FOFs is partly due to cyclical booms.Venture capital; agency; economies of scale; outsourcing

The Geography of Retail Inventory

How different are retailers' inventory levels around the world? Specifically, are retailers' inventories constant across countries, converging, or at least co-integrating? These might be viewed as various forms of global determinism. To see which of these forms hold, I use a novel dataset integrated from Dow Jones, Edgar, Bureau van Dijk (Europe), World'Vest Base, Multex, KIS (Korea Information Service), Teikoku of Japan, Huaxia of China, and COMPUSTAT. The dataset consists of 27,000 firm-year observations for 4,100 retailers in 23 countries, for the period 1983 through 2004. I find evidence to reject all the three forms of global determinism. Instead, I report evidence consistent with an alternative hypothesis - local contingency - in which country effects can explain inventory differences around the world. I also show that this conclusion is robust in numerous ways.Inventory; retailing; international comparison; global determinism; local contingency

Does Competition Kill Ties?

Venture capital firms (VCs) form syndicates that compete to invest in deals. Does more competition makes it less likely that VCs will choose syndicate partners based on past ties? Using over 200,000 observations on how VCs choose each other in 572 biotech deals in Massachussetts from 1967 through 2004, I find the answer is: yes. The theory of embeddedness argues that past ties can explain the pattern of who works with who. I interpret my finding as a first step in demarcating when embeddedness might apply and when atomistic, calculative, economic forces might be a better explanation of who works with who.embeddedness; venture capital; ties; competition

Does Public Infrastructure Reduce Private Inventory?

The discipline of operations management is rarely studied with an eye on public policies. Yet, it is glaring to even the casual observer that public infrastructure is very different in different countries. How does public infrastructure affect private sector inventory levels? I develop as a baseline a substitution hypothesis, which predicts that infrastructure reduces inventory. I also consider competing hypotheses that can explain negative correlation between infrastructure and inventory. To empirically distinguish these hypotheses, I use data on public firms from 60 countries. The econometric challenge is in identifying the exogenous component of infrastructure changes. I address that using instrumental variables consisting of physical attributes of countries - such as their elevation, whether they are land-locked, their mean distance to a coast or river. I find evidence consistent with the substitution hypothesis. This finding is robust to many tests.Inventory; public infrastructure; international comparison; instrumental variables

Inventory Signals

How does operational competence translate into market value, when firms cannot credibly communicate their competence to the market? I consider the example of inventory and fill rates. When the market sees a high-inventory firm, it cannot tell whether the inventory is due to incompetence or a strategy to enhance fill rate. Firms might decide to signal their competence to the market by carrying less inventory. I show conditions for separating and pooling perfect Bayesian equilibria. I also provide empirical evidence for this theory that inventory has a signaling role. The theory could potentially provide a framework that describes one way in which a range of operational competences such as purchasing and outsourcing, translate to market value. Practically, it has implications for firms, such as how to strategically communicate to the market, reward managers, or even whether to go public and be subject to market pressures.Inventory; signaling; operations management; asymmetric information

Inventory and the Shape of the Earth

How important are local country conditions to firms' operations performance, as revealed in their inventory levels? Under a “flat world” hypothesis, differences in firms' inventory levels are explained more by differences among industries and firms themselves, rather than differences among country conditions (e.g., institutions, infrastructure). In a “round earth” hypothesis, country factors out-weigh firm and industry factors. Using all COMPUSTAT observations for manufacturing firms in 70 countries, covering the years 1994 through 2004, we find little evidence for the “round earth” hypothesis. In our baseline model, country effects explain at most 12.7% of inventory variance, while firm differences explain 35.5%, and industry differences explain 28.5%. This finding is robust to a number of sensitivity tests. Apart from the empirical contribution, this finding can be a useful stylized fact for further theoretical development into the locus of inventory variance. It also has a practical implication - perhaps inventory practices are much more transportable across countries than we have known before.

A Catering Theory of Analyst Bias

We posit a theory that runs counter to how conventional wisdom thinks about analyst bias, that it is the result of distorted incentives by “upstream” factors like the analysts’ employers. We suggest that analysts are also heavily influenced by the beliefs of investors downstream, the purported victims of analyst bias. We adapt Mullainathan-Shleifer’s theory of media bias to build a theory of how analysts cater to what investors believe. The theory also predicts that competition among analysts does not reduce their bias. We provide empirical support for this theory, using an enormous dataset built from over 6.5 million analyst estimates and 42.8 million observations on investor holdings, which we argue is a proxy for what investors’ beliefs. We use a simultaneous-equations model for estimation, with instruments to rule out alternative interpretations of the direction of causality. For additional robustness, we investigate the time series of analyst bias and heterogeneity in investor beliefs from 1987 through 2003. Dickey-Fuller tests show that both have unit roots, but we establish that cointegration holds. Further, we employ a vector- autoregressive model to show Granger-causality between the two.Analyst bias, behavioral finance, media bias

Inventory Signals

Among practitioners, inventory is often thought to be the root of all evil in operations management. The stock market hates it, the media abhors it, and managers have come to fear it. But high inventory levels can also be the result of strategic buying and high-availability strategies. The problem is that when the market sees lots of inventory, it cannot tell whether it is because of poor or smart operations. We hypothesize that inventory has a signaling role. In our model, publicly- traded firms use inventory levels to signal their operational competence to the market. There is a separating equilibrium that leads some firms to maintain inventory levels below what their capability could achieve. We offer this as one explanation why, for example, stock-outs are pervasive even among operationally competent firms. We provide empirical evidence for the assumptions behind this inventory signaling hypothesis: (1) the market cannot tell the difference between “good” and “bad” inventory; and (2) the counterfactual: the market punishes firms when it can tell that their inventory is bad, such as when they write off supplies. Consistent with these assumptions, we find that inventory levels do not explain firm value. And on average, stocks suffer an abnormal negative return of 7% in the month of announcing inventory write-offs.Inventory, signaling, operations management, asymmetric information