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DARHT: INTEGRATION OF AUTHORIZATION BASIS REQUIREMENTS AND WORKER SAFETY
This document describes the results of consensus agreements reached by the DARHT Safety Planning Team during the development of the update of the DARHT Safety Analysis Document (SAD). The SAD is one of the Authorization Basis (AB) Documents required by the Department prior to granting approval to operate the DARHT Facility. The DARHT Safety Planning Team is lead by Mr. Joel A. Baca of the Department of Energy Albuquerque Operations Office (DOE/AL). Team membership is drawn from the Department of Energy Albuquerque Operations Office, the Department of Energy Los Alamos Area Office (DOE/LAAO), and several divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Revision 1 of the DARHT SAD had been written as part of the process for gaining approval to operate the Phase 1 (First Axis) Accelerator. Early in the planning stage for the required update of the SAD for the approval to operate both Phase 1 and Phase 2 (First Axis and Second Axis) DARHT Accelerator, it was discovered that a conflict existed between the Laboratory approach to describing the management of facility and worker safety
Title: A uthor(s) : R DOSE FROM NITROGEN-I3 I E DARHT SECOND AXIS Dynamic Experimentation Division 42th Biennial Radiation Protection and Radiation Serving Society hieldirrg Division Topical Meeting DOSE FROM NITROGEN-I 3 'THE DARHT SECOND AXIS lamos Nati
Los Alanios National Laboratory, an affirmative actioi~kqual opporl unity employer, is opcraled by thc University of California for the IJ.S. C)eparlmcnt of Energy under contract W-7405-ENCi-36.By acccptancc of lhis article, the publisher recognizes that thc 1J.S. Govennnent rclaius a nonexclusive, roy;iltylfce licensc to pul>lisli or reproduce the published lbrm ofthis contribution, or to allow otliers lo do so, for U.S. Government purposes .Los Alainos Nalional Laboratory requcs:ts that the publisher identi€y this arlicle as work performed under the auspices ol'tlie 1J.S. Ikpartnient of'Energ Los Alauios Natiorial L:tborakiry strongly supports acadcmic freedom and a tesearclicr's rig111 to ~I I inslilution, bowcwr, the Latomlory does not cntlorse the viewpoint of a pnblicatinn or yuaraiilec its technical correctness. Form 83
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DARHT : integration of shielding design and analysis with facility design /
The design of the interior portions of the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility incorporated shielding and controls from the beginning of the installation of the Accelerators. The purpose of the design and analysis was to demonstrate the adequacy of shielding or to determine the need for additional shielding or controls. Two classes of events were considered: (1) routine operation defined as the annual production of 10,000 2000-ns pulses of electrons at a nominal energy of 20 MeV, some of which are converted to the x-ray imaging beam consisting of four nominal 60-ns pulses over the 2000-ns time frame, and (2) accident case defined as up to 100 2000-ns pulses of electrons accidentally impinging on some metallic surface, thereby producing x rays. Several locations for both classes of events were considered inside and outside of the accelerator hall buildings. The analysis method consisted of the definition of a source term for each case studied and the definition of a model of the shielding and equipment present between the source and the dose areas. A minimal model of the fixed existing or proposed shielding and equipment structures was used for a first approximation. If the resulting dose from the first approximation was below the design goal (1 rem/yr for routine operations, 5 rem for accident cases), then no further investigations were performed. If the result of the first approximation was above our design goals, the model was refined to include existing or proposed shielding and equipment. In some cases existing shielding and equipment were adequate to meet our goals and in some cases additional shielding was added or administrative controls were imposed to protect the workers. It is expected that the radiation shielding design, exclusion area designations, and access control features, will result in low doses to personnel at the DARHT Facility