World on Fire? Democracy, Globalization and Ethnic Violence

Recent studies suggest that democracy and globalization lead to ethnic hatred and violence in countries with a rich ethnic minority. We examine the thesis by Chua (2003) that democratization and globalization lead to ethnic violence in the presence of a market-dominant minority. We use different data sets to measure market dominant minorities and employ panel fixed effects regressions for a sample of 107 countries over the period 1984-2003. Our model contains two-way and three-way interactions to examine under which conditions democracy and globalization increase violence. We find no evidence for a worldwide Chua effect, but we do find support for Chua’s thesis for Sub-Saharan Africa.Globalization, Democracy, Ethnic Violence, Market-dominant minorities

Political Regime Change, Economic Reform and Growth Accelerations

Using an improved definition and indicator of growth accelerations, we examine whether political regimes, regime changes, and economic reform are related to growth accelerations. Our results show that economic growth accelerations are preceded by economic reforms. Furthermore, we find that growth accelerations are more likely to happen after the start of a new political regime.economic growth, growth accelerations, regime changes, economic reform

Trade and Business Cycle Synchronization in OECD Countries - a Re-examination

This paper re-examines the relationship between trade intensity and business cycle synchronization for 21 OECD countries during 1970-2003. Instead of using instrumental variables, we estimate a multivariate model including variables capturing specialisation, financial integration, and similarity of economic policies. We confirm that trade intensity affects business cycle synchronization, but the effect is much smaller than previously reported. Other factors in our model have a similar impact on business cycle synchronization as trade intensity. Finally, we find that the effect of trade on business cycle synchronisation is not driven by outliers and does not suffer from parameter heterogeneity.business cycles, trade, synchronization of business cycles

Will business cycles in the Euro Area converge : a critical survey of empirical research

The industrial revolution is mostly seen as a supply side phenomenon. Ever since Gilboy stated that factors of demand may have been equally important, scholars have stressed the importance of investments and technological change. This paper re-considers Gilboy?s ideas, using the dataset of the Dutch historical national accounts for the nineteenth century. Using a counterfactual VAR analysis, it is investigated to what extent changes in (determinants of) consumer demand may have affected patterns of industrial development.

Rich or alive? Political (in)stability, political leader selection and economic growth

We develop a model that studies the incentives of the ruling elite regarding the selection of the political leader. We show that it is optimal for the ruling elite to choose leaders with more military experience in a politically unstable regime while more educated leaders are preferred in politically stable regimes. Using a dataset that includes 1569 national leaders from 177 countries over the period 1946-2011, we find empirical evidence that political stability contributes to the selection of more educated leaders, while the reverse holds for leaders with high military ranks. The empirical findings are robust to different subsamples, various proxies for educational and military attainment, and different measures for political stability. Our results suggest that leader selection is another reason why political instability is harmful for economic growth

No country for old men:Aging dictators and economic growth

Why do some autocracies have higher economic growth rates than others? An emerging literature is highlighting that in addition to economic and institutional variables, personal characteristics of political leaders affect economic growth rates. Within this tradition, we develop a political-economic growth model of the relationship between the age of a dictator and economic growth. The model predicts that if a dictator's mortality risk increases, the economic growth rate in his country decreases. The model predictions are supported by empirical evidence based on a large sample of more than 400 dictators from 76 countries. A 1-year increase in dictator age, decreases economic growth by 0.12 percentage points. Using random leadership transitions due to natural deaths or terminal illnesses we establish that this effect is not driven by endogenous sample selection. As expected, the effect is absent in democratic political regimes