Well Done, Good and Faithful Servant

This essay is an appreciation, remembrace, and tribute, written for our friend and colleague, John Copeland Nagle

Law, Religion, and Politics: Understanding the Separation of Church and State

Professor Richard Garnett, of University of Notre Dame Law School, presented on the topic Law, Religion, and Politics: Understanding the Separation of Church and State. This workshop was presented as part of the Hesburgh Lecture Series through the Alumni & Friends of University of Notre Dame and was co-sponsored by the Notre Dame Alumni Club of Miami. This workshop examined how to understand the Constitution\u27s separation of church and state and what it requires of religious believers and institutions.https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/faculty-workshops/1002/thumbnail.jp

Hesburgh Lecture: Faith, Politics, and the Constitution: Understanding the Separation of Church and State

Rick Garnett delivered Faith, Politics, and the Constitution: Understanding the Separation of Church and StateSeptember 19, 2014 Hesburgh Lecture Ares Auditorium The University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law Tucson, Arizon

Assimilation, Toleration, and the State\u27s Interest in the Development of Religious Doctrine

Thirty-five years ago, in the context of a church-property dispute, Justice William Brennan observed that government interpretation of religious doctrine and judicial intervention in religious disputes are undesirable, because when civil courts undertake to resolve [doctrinal] controversies..., the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern. This statement, at first, seems wise and fittingly cautious, even unremarkable and obvious. On examination, though, it turns out to be intriguing, elusive, and misleading. Indeed, Justice Brennan\u27s warning presents hazards of its own, and its premises - if uncritically embraced - can subtly distort our constitutional discourse. This Article provides a careful and close examination of the statement\u27s premises and implications, and concludes that, far from being a purely ecclesiastical concern, the content of religious doctrine and the trajectory of its development are matters to which even a secular, liberal, and democratic government will almost certainly attend. It is not the case that governments like ours are or can be neutral with respect to religion\u27s claims and content. As this Article shows, the content, meaning, and implications of religious doctrine are and have long been the subjects of government power and policy. Secular, liberal, democratic governments like ours not only take cognizance of, but also and in many ways seek to assimilate - that is, to transform - religion and religious teaching. And, it is precisely because such governments do have an interest in the content, and, therefore, in the development, of religious doctrine - an interest that they will, if permitted, quite understandably pursue - that authentic religious freedom is so fragile. Religion, first amendment, constitutional law, development of doctrin

Hesburgh Lecture: Faith, Politics, and the Constitution: Understanding the Separation of Church and State

Rick Garnett delivered Faith, Politics, and the Constitution: Understanding the Separation of Church and StateSeptember 19, 2014 Hesburgh Lecture Ares Auditorium The University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law Tucson, Arizon

Assimilation, Toleration, and the State\u27s Interest in the Development of Religious Doctrine

Thirty-five years ago, in the context of a church-property dispute, Justice William Brennan observed that government interpretation of religious doctrine and judicial intervention in religious disputes are undesirable, because when civil courts undertake to resolve [doctrinal] controversies..., the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern. This statement, at first, seems wise and fittingly cautious, even unremarkable and obvious. On examination, though, it turns out to be intriguing, elusive, and misleading. Indeed, Justice Brennan\u27s warning presents hazards of its own, and its premises - if uncritically embraced - can subtly distort our constitutional discourse. This Article provides a careful and close examination of the statement\u27s premises and implications, and concludes that, far from being a purely ecclesiastical concern, the content of religious doctrine and the trajectory of its development are matters to which even a secular, liberal, and democratic government will almost certainly attend. It is not the case that governments like ours are or can be neutral with respect to religion\u27s claims and content. As this Article shows, the content, meaning, and implications of religious doctrine are and have long been the subjects of government power and policy. Secular, liberal, democratic governments like ours not only take cognizance of, but also and in many ways seek to assimilate - that is, to transform - religion and religious teaching. And, it is precisely because such governments do have an interest in the content, and, therefore, in the development, of religious doctrine - an interest that they will, if permitted, quite understandably pursue - that authentic religious freedom is so fragile. Religion, first amendment, constitutional law, development of doctrin

Introduction: Religion, Division, and the Constitution

Thirty-five years ago, in his landmark Lemon v. Kurtzman opinion, Chief Justice Warren Burger declared that state actions could excessive[ly] —and, therefore, unconstitutionally— entangle government and religion, not only by requiring or allowing intrusive monitoring by officials of religious institutions and activities, but also through their divisive political potential. He worried that government actions burdened with this potential pose a threat to the normal political process and divert attention from the myriad issues and problems that confront every level of government. And, he insisted that political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect. Accordingly, he concluded that the parochial-school-funding programs under review in Lemon were unconstitutional, not only because they foster[ed] an impermissible degree of entanglement between government and religion, but also because they were likely to intensif[y] [p]olitical fragmentation and divisiveness on religious lines. As I have described in detail elsewhere, Chief Justice Burger\u27s view that the First Amendment not only authorizes, but also invites, judges to look to their observations and predictions of political division along religious lines for the enforceable content of the Establishment Clause has, since Lemon, been endorsed and employed by many scholars, judges, commentators, and citizens, in many cases and contexts. More generally, the claims that America is divided and religion is divisive are unavoidable in—indeed, they animate and shape—much of what is said and written today about law, politics, religion, and culture. The distinguished contributors to this symposium examine and unpack the many empirical, doctrinal, and normative presuppositions and assumptions implied by its title, Religion, Division, and the Constitution