Organic Beef Production - Sire Breed Comparison

The results to date, from this sire breed comparison study indicate that with the contrasting Aberdeen Angus and Charolais sire breeds that is possible to achieve animal performance data comparable to well managed conventional suckler calf to beef systems (300 kg carcass for heifers in Nov and 400 kg carcass for steers in March). Similarly the responses to sire breed type, sex and date of slaughter for the organic beef animals are biologically compatible. Organic beef is produced under organic rules in response to consumer demand for organic product. The organic system contributes to the protection of the environment and animal welfare. “We have not inherited the world from our forefathers we have borrowed it from our children” (Kashmiri proverb)

Interpreting Presidential Powers

Justice Holmes famously observed that [g]reat cases . . . make bad law. The problem may be especially acute in the domain of national security, where presidents frequently interpret their own powers without judicial review and where executive precedents play a large role in subsequent interpretive debates. On the one hand, some of the historical assertions of presidential authority that stretch constitutional and statutory language the furthest seem hard to condemn in light of the practical stakes. On the other hand, to credit the authority of executive precedent risks leaving the president dangerously unbound. To address the conundrum posed by executive precedent, this Article proposes a two-tiered theory for the interpretation of presidential powers. Framed as an analogy to a position in moral philosophy known as threshold deontology, two-tiered interpretive theory treats rules that restrict executive power as normally inviolable, not subject to a case-by-case balancing analysis. Analogously to threshold deontology, however, two-tiered theory also recognizes that when the costs of adherence to ordinary principles grow exorbitantly high, extraordinary interpretive principles should govern instead and should result in the upholding of broad presidential power. For reasons that the Article explains, resort to extraordinary reliance on second-tier justifications for assertions of sweeping executive authority involves a legal analogue to dirty-handed moral conduct and should be labeled accordingly. And executive precedents set in extraordinary, second-tier cases should not apply to more ordinary ones. Through its conjunction of elements, two-tiered interpretive theory furnishes analytical and rhetorical safeguards against executive overreaching, but also allows accommodations for truly extraordinary cases

Decadent Dinosaurs:Paleontology and Directed Evolution in British and North American Literature, 1890s–1970s

Despite paying concerted attention to evolutionary mechanisms, literary scholars have rarely focused on forms of “directed evolution” like orthogenesis (evolution along a linear track) and phylogeronty (the parallel between the lifespan of an animal group and the lifespan of an ageing individual). These analogical concepts represented a paleontological manifestation of wider interest in human decadence. I analyze their exploration in three areas: popular adventure fiction, social reform novels by Marie Stopes and H. G. Wells, and writings by paleontologists. Across these texts, I argue that directed evolution was used to give a recognizable trajectory to prehistoric and modern life alike, turning certain extinct animals into moral exemplars of evolutionary failure. While reformers hoped that humans could escape the orthogenetic grooves confining nonhuman animals to extinction, this optimism was shadowed both with fears that humans might inevitably face decadence and with a sense that survival meant mediocrity

The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay on Law and Political Science

This Essay seeks to illuminate the Supreme Court's habeas corpus cases arising from the War on Terror up through the 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush by supplementing traditional legal analysis with three propositions derived from recent political science literature. First, the space for judicial review under the Constitution is "politically constructed" by the tolerances of Congress and the President, as supported by public opinion. Consistent with this proposition, the Supreme Court has operated mostly on the margins of the nation's War on Terror policy, but has grown more assertive since the near aftermath of 9/11 in recognition of a changing political climate and a lessening sense of the urgency of the terrorist threat. Second, George W. Bush was a failed "reconstructive President" who came up short in his efforts to persuade the public and the courts to embrace a constitutional vision of vast, unilateral, and judicially unreviewable executive branch authority to combat terrorist threats. Third, the Supreme Court is a "they," not an "it," whose War on Terror rulings have often reflected, as future decisions are likely also to represent, the chance dominance of the view of the median Justice. Because Justice Kennedy has cast the decisive vote in a disproportionate share of cases, the emerging doctrine bears his distinctive stamp. In matters involving national security, however, the likelihood of final settlement of disputed issues by judicial doctrine is smaller than in less fraught areas of constitutional law. Should the War on Terror become significantly more terrifying, all bets would be off. It is at least inevitable, and may well be desirable, that the ideal of the rule of law should have some (which is not to say limitless) play in the joints-even with respect to the Great Writ of habeas corpus that our tradition celebrates as liberty's ultimate safeguard

Appraising The Significance of The Subjects and Objects of The Constitution: A Case Study in Textual and Historical Revisionism

In this short Article, I shall express some grounds for respectful skepticism, both about whether Rosenkranz has proven his claims and about whether courts should decide cases on the basis of his arguments, even if judges thought him more likely right than not about the significance that well-informed Americans of the Founding generation would have attached to the “subjects” and “objects” of the Constitution. But, I also hope to train attention on the general methodological challenge—partly for other law professors working in the field and especially for judges and Justices—that work such as Rosenkranz’s poses: How should we appraise, and what significance should we attach to, ingenious, provocatively novel theses that would make constitutional outcomes depend wholly on seemingly plausible, but not clearly proven linguistic and historical claims