State, Society and Political Institutions in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana

Summary Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire have much in common, but their histories since independence have diverged. The conventional explanation for this divergence, which stresses contrasting economic politics, is less convincing than one which focuses on state?society relations and state capacity. Endemic political instability in Ghana has undermined the ability of successive governments to implement any economic policy. Cote d'Ivoire, by contrast, has experienced much greater stability which has made it possible for the regime to control, tax and yet encourage the expansion of peasant export and trading economies. There are marked differences in the relative ‘balance’ and ‘proportion’ between state and society in the two countries. The Ivorian political elite has created an administrative and security machine which is out of all proportion to the small size and weakness of civil society. In Ghana, civil society has always been numerically larger, more autonomous and far more well?organised. The Ghanaian state, despite being more thoroughly integrated with civil society than its Ivorian counterpart, has not been able to maintain sufficient autonomy from or control over civil society to implement policies effectively. Ghana's state may, however, be better able to cope with future stresses and to make creative innovations than will the Ivorian state. The political stability that the latter has maintained has entailed the smothering of civic consciousness which has caused citizens to view the state as an alien entity. Such citizens will be more difficult to draw into productive interaction with the state than will their counterparts in Ghana. Résumé L'Etat, la Société et les Institutions Politiques au Ghana et en Côte d'Ivoire Le Ghana et la Côte d'Ivoire ont beaucoup en commun, mais leur histoire depuis l'indépendence diffère. L'explication conventionelle de cette différence, qui met l'accent sur le contraste de leurs politiques économiques, est moins convaincante que celle dont l'accent est mis sur les relations état?société et les aptitudes de l'état. L'instabilité politique endémique au Ghana a amenuisé la possibilité pour les gouvernements successifs d'appliquer des politiques économiques. La Côte d'Ivoire, par contre, a connu une plus grande stabilité ce qui a permis au régime d'exercer un contrôle, de taxer mais en même temps encourager l'augmentation des exportations de produits ruraux et des économies de commerce. Il existe des divergeances importantes dans le relatif ‘équilibre’ et la relative ‘proportion’ entre l'état et la société dans les deux pays. L'élite politique ivoirienne a créé une machine administrative et de sécurité d'une taille disproportionnée en comparaison de la petite taille et la faiblesse de sa société civile. Au Ghana, la société civile a toujours été numériquement plus nombreuse, plus autonome et beaucoup mieux organisée. L'état ghanéen, bien qu'étant mieux intégré dans la société civile que son partenaire ivoirien, n'a pas été capable de maintenir une indépendence et un contrôle suffisants vis à vis de la société civile pour pouvoir appliquer les politiques de façon efficace. L'état ghanéen sera cependant peut?être plus apte à faire face aux problèmes futurs et effectuer des changements positifs que l'état ivoirien. La stabilité politique que ce dernier a maintenu, a entrainé l'étouffement de la conscience civique, ce qui a amené les citoyens à considérer l'état comme une entité étrangère. Il sera plus difficile de faire participer de tels citoyens dans un dialogue productif avec l'état que ce ne sera pour son partenaire ghanéen. Resumen Estado, Sociedad e Instituciones Políticas en Ghana y la Costa de Marfil Ghana y la Costa de Marfil tienen mucho en común, sin embargo, desde su independencia su historia ha sido muy divergente. La explicación convencional de esta divergencia que acentúa políticas económicas opuestas, no es tan convincente como la que acentúa las relaciones estado?sociedad y la capacidad del estado. La endémica inestabilidad política en Ghana ha dañado la habilidad de gobiernos sucesivos para implementar cualquier política económica. La Costa de Marfil, por el contrario, ha experimentado mucha más estabilidad, lo que ha permitido al régimen controlar, tasar, y al mismo tiempo, fomentar la expansión de las exportaciones rurales y las economías del comercio. Existen en ambos países diferencias importantes en el relativo ‘balance’ y la relativa ‘proporción’ entre el estado y la sociedad. La elite política de la Costa de Marfil ha creado una maquinaria administrativa y de seguridad completamente a un nivel desproporcionado al tamaño y a la debilidad de su sociedad civil. En Ghana, la sociedad civil ha sido siempre numéricamente más grande, más autónoma, y mucho mejor organizada. El estado de Ghana, a pesar de estar mejor integrado con la sociedad civil que el estado de la Costa de Marfil, ha sido incapaz de mantenar la suficiente autonomía o control sobre la sociedad civil que le permita implementar sus políticas eficientemente. El estado de Ghana, sin embargo, puede que esté mejor capacitado que el de la Costa de Marfil para enfrontar futuros problemas y para implementar innovaciones creativas. La estabilidad política que este último pais ha mantenido, ha producido la supresión de conciencias cívicas, lo cual ha ocasionado que los ciudadanos vean el estado como una entidad extranjera. Será mucho más difícil que tales ciudadanos participen en un diálogo productivo con el estado, que los ciudadanos de Ghana

State courts and the regulation of land disputes in Ghana : the litigants' perspective

The majority of land in Ghana is still held under a diversity of customary tenures, embedded in family, community and chiefly institutions; but land disputes may be adjudicated in a variety of institutions: informal arbitrations and family tribunals, chiefs’ courts, quasi-legal state agencies and the formal state courts. Current debates on how to protect the land rights of the majority of customary land holders revolve around the respective merits of customary and non-state regulation (said to be accessible, flexible and socially embedded) versus state systems, which are said to offer more certainty, impartiality and nondiscriminatory codes and procedures. In Ghana, however, customary and state legal codes have been integrated for some time, and the state courts, which are frequently used as first instance adjudicators, apply customary rules. Does this mean that in Ghana the merits of customary law can be combined with the certainty and enforceability of state court dispute settlement? Based primarily on survey and interview data, the research analyses how litigants in three selected state courts perceived the experience of taking their land cases to court. It was found that, in spite of the problems and delays associated with the state courts, there was a very strong demand for authoritative and enforceable settlements which only the state could provide. It was also found that the justice offered by the state courts was not as alien or inappropriate as commonly supposed. Particularly in the Magistrates Court, judges were well respected and their procedures seen as sufficiently flexible and user-friendly. Moreover, the extreme reluctance to entertain out-of-court settlements casts doubt on the notion that proposals to move to more use of ADRs (Alternative Dispute Resolutions) will be successful if they fail to offer equivalent authority, fairness and enforceability. Keywords: Ghana, Land, Litigation, Courts, Disputes, Land Law, Access to Justice, Legal Pluralis

Democratic Decentralisation, Clientelism and Local Taxation in Ghana

It is generally assumed by advocates of democratic decentralisation that maximising locally-raised revenue sources will help to enhance accountability through a closer and more legitimate relationship betweenthe local government authority and citizens. Research on Ghana and other African countries shows, however, that the dominance of clientelist forms of politics undermines the legitimacy of local taxation; where voters expect their representatives to provide specific pay-backs to themselves or their communities in return for support and payment of tax, it is extremely difficult to establish a ‘collective interest’ for the local government area. Citizens tend to interpret allocation decisions over expenditure of revenues as products of patronage relations rather than as a collective public good. This problem is especially acute where resources are very scarce and the revenue base limited. Central government transfers are, therefore, likely to remain the fairest and most effective way of financing local government in such contexts

"Toilet wars" : urban sanitation services and the politics of public-private partnerships in Ghana

There is a continuing debate over the value of public-partnerships in providing public services in poor urban areas. Many policy-makers in the developing countries have been persuaded that the main problem with established direct public service provision lies in principal-agent problems, i.e. the alleged lack of incentive for regularly-employed public servants to provide a good service. They have therefore sought to involve local communities, citizens and the private sector more directly in the management of services. This paper examines the impact of the new forms of partnership between the public authorities and private/citizen-based organisations on urban environmental sanitation in the two largest cities of Ghana – Accra and Kumasi. It traces the history of public toilet policies in the two cities and analyses the factors that contributed to their relative failure in poor neighbourhoods. Toilets consistently have been poorly managed and have been the site of local political conflicts – toilet wars – despite efforts at franchising them and involving communities in their management. This is attributable to the politics of patronage at the urban level, the relationship between city government patronage and community level groups, and the failure of regulation. Public-private partnerships have not worked. The provision of reasonable sanitation facilities may require: full public provision of basic infrastructure; transparent, independent and rigorous regulation of any contracts for service provision given to non-state agencies; and the enforcement of “conflict of interest” laws applying to elected local representatives

Conclusion: Rethinking African Governance and Development

This article draws together the main strands of argument being developed by the Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP), as reflected in this IDS Bulletin. The central question is what kinds of governance arrangements work better to support the provision of the public goods that are essential to sustained and inclusive development in Africa. Evidence at local, sectoral and national levels is pointing to the overall conclusion that what works is often a ‘practical hybrid’, combining authoritative coordination with local problem?solving and constructive borrowing from local cultural repertoires. Consistent with the general idea of ‘going with the grain’, we find that the most likely source of the necessary vertical discipline is a developmental form of neo?patrimonialism, not ‘good governance’, as currently conceived. Similarly, local collective action to address bottlenecks in public goods provision is seldom enhanced by standard donor and NGO approaches to citizen or client empowerment