Two Suggestions for the Future of the Eurozone

Finanzmarktkrise; Geldpolitik; EU-Stabilitätspakt; Eurozone; Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion

Transition Fatigue? Cross-Country Evidence from Micro Data

The transition process has had different distributional impacts across different interest groups and countries. These have led to differences in the support for transition. In this paper, we study support attitudes for both the economic and political transition using data from the New Barometer Surveys for 14 transition economies from 1991 to 2004. We document that the overall support is low and heterogeneous across countries and individuals. Support attitudes are lower among the old, less skilled, unemployed, poor, and those living in the CIS countries. There seems to be an increasing trend in the support for the economic transition in most countries. Our findings are robust to changes in the definition and measurement of the dependent variable. We also find evidence that transition-related hardship, opinions on the speed of reforms, political preferences and preferences towards redistribution, ideology and social capital matter. Finally, we show that individual preferences for secure jobs, the role of state and trust in politicians as well as better institutions, in particular, the quality of governance, seem to contribute mostly to explaining the lower levels of the support in the CIS countries.political economy, transition, subjective attitudes

Did Growth and Reforms Increase Citizens' Support for the Transition?

How did post-communist transformations affect people's perceptions of their economic and political systems? We model a pseudo-panel with 89 country-year clusters, based on 13 countries observed between 1991 and 2004, to identify the macro and institutional drivers of the public opinion. Our main findings are: (i) When the economy is growing, on average people appreciate more extensive reforms; they dislike unbalanced reforms. (ii) Worsening of income distribution and higher inflation interact with an increasing share of the private sector in aggravating nostalgia for the past regime. (iii) Cross-country differences in the attitudes towards the present and future (both in the economic and political dimensions) are largely explained by differences in the institutional indicators for the rule of law and corruption. (iv) Cross-country differences in the extent of nostalgia towards the past are mainly related to differences in the deterioration of standards of living.economic performance, economic reforms, post-communist transition, political economy, support for reforms, public opinion

Individual support for economic and political changes: Evidence from transition countries, 1991-2004

Using a unique dataset, we propose a new measure of public evaluation of transitional reforms and study, for the first time, the evolution of support for economic and political reforms in 14 transition economies over 1991-2004. We show that support for economic changes has been increasing over time after an initial dip, while support for political reforms has generally been higher. Support attitudes are lower among the old, less skilled, unemployed, poor, and those living in the CIS countries, especially during the 1990s. We also find evidence that transition-related hardship, opinions on the speed of reforms, political preferences and preferences towards redistribution, ideology and social capital matter. Finally, we show that preferences for state ownership and the quality of political institutions contribute mostly to explaining the lower levels of support in the CIS countries.political economy; public support; reforms; transition

Monetary Policy Transmission, Interest Rate Rules and Inflation Targeting in Three Transition Countries

In 1991, the rate of inflation in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland was between 35% and 70%. At the end of 2001, it is below 8%. We setup a small structural macro model of these economies to explain the process of disinflation. Contrary to a widespread skepticism, which permeated a large part of previous research on these issues, we show that a simple open macroeconomic model, along the lines of Svensson (2000, Journal of International Economics), with forward-looking inflation and exchange rate expectations, can adequately characterize the relationship between the output gap, inflation, the real interest rate and the exchange rate during the course of transition. We use the estimated models to interpret the main features of monetary policy in each country and identify the channels of policy transmission. We characterize the policy rules and assess the relative importance of the interest rate channel (on aggregate demand) and the exchange rate channel (which affects both aggregate demand and supply) in determining the path of (dis)inflation. In the same context, we also tentatively analyze the consequences of attempting a faster path of disinflation. Finally, we evaluate the appropriateness of the inflation targeting framework which has been adopted recently in all three countries, and discuss to what extent it represents a discontinuity with the past.Disinflation policy, Interest rate rules, Inflation targeting, Transition economies, Small open-economy macro models.

Labor Market Policies, Institutions and Employment Rates in the EU-27

We compare labor market policies, institutions and outcomes for the EU member states, for the period 2000-2005. We document the main differences in Labor Market Policies across EU members, including new member states after 2004. We focus on indicators of policy generosity (expenditures relative to GDP) and relate these and other policy indicators to indicators of labor market outcomes and performance. Our results show that, on a cross-country basis, higher rates of employment are in general associated with: (i) higher expenditures on labor market policies, especially on active policies for countries with a high pro-work attitude; (ii) a lower degree of rigidity in labor market institutions and in product market regulation.labor market policies, labor market outcomes, European social models

Modering Financial Fragility In Transition Economies

Capital inflows have an enormous importance in the financing of investment in emerging and transition economies. However short-term inflows, intermediated by the banking sector of the emerging economy, may be subject to early withdrawals. We model a situation where such withdrawals are motivated by a change in either the domestic or the foreign fundamentals. We show that, for a given change in fundamentals, a reversal in the capital flows (and hence a currency crisis) is more likely the more risk averse are the foreign investors into the emerging economy. We also show that a policy to tax early withdrawals may discourage capital inflows which are more likely to give rise to fundamental runs, by helping to select relatively less risk averse investors. However, such a policy would have to be fine tuned in order not to discourage all capital inflows.Short-term capital inflows, Currency crisis, Financial Fragility, Chilean tax.

Investor Risk Aversion and Financial Fragility in Emerging Economies

Bank intermediated short-term capital inflows play a crucial role in the financial structure of many emerging economies. Yet since these funds are subject to the risk of early withdrawal, an excessive reliance on this financing is often associated with a financial or currency crisis. We model a situation where withdrawals are motivated by a change in either the domestic or foreign fundamentals. We show that, for a given change in fundamentals, a sudden reversal in the capital flows, and hence a financial crisis, is more likely the more risk averse are the foreign investors. We also show that a policy to tax early withdrawals may discourage the inflows more likely to cause fundamental runs, as it prevents the relatively more risk averse investors from investing. However, the policy must be fine-tuned to avoid discouraging all capital inflows

Individual support for economic and political changes: Evidence from transition countries, 1991-2004

Using a unique dataset for 14 transition economies, we propose a new measure for individual evaluations of transitional reforms, which we use to study, for the first time, the evolution of support for economic and political reforms from 1991 to 2004. We show that support for economic changes has been increasing over time after an initial drop, while support for political reforms has generally been higher. Support attitudes are lower among the old, less skilled, unemployed, poor, and those living in the CIS countries, especially during the 1990s. We also find evidence that transition-related hardship, opinions on the speed of reforms, political preferences and preferences towards redistribution, ideology and social capital matter. Finally, we show that individual preferences for state ownership and the quality of political institutions contribute mostly to explaining the lower levels of support in the CIS countries

Did Growth and Reforms Increase Citizens’ Support for the Transition?

How did post-communist transformations affect people’s perceptions of their economic and political systems? We model a pseudo-panel with 89 country-year clusters, based on 13 countries observed between 1991 and 2004, to identify the macro and institutional drivers of the public opinion. Our main findings are: (i) When the economy is growing, on average people appreciate more extensive reforms; they dislike unbalanced reforms. (ii) Worsening of income distribution and higher inflation interact with an increasing share of the private sector in aggravating nostalgia for the past regime. (iii) Cross-country differences in the attitudes towards the present and future (both in the economic and political dimensions) are largely explained by differences in the institutional indicators for the rule of law and corruption. (iv) Cross-country differences in the extent of nostalgia towards the past are mainly related to differences in the deterioration of standards of living