Misconceptions, conceptual pluralism, and conceptual toolkits: bringing the philosophy of science to the teaching of evolution

This paper explores how work in the philosophy of science can be used when teaching scientific content to science students and when training future science teachers. I examine the debate on the concept of fitness in biology and in the philosophy of biology to show how conceptual pluralism constitutes a problem for the conceptual change model, and how philosophical work on conceptual clarification can be used to address that problem. The case of fitness exemplifies how the philosophy of science offers tools to resolve teaching difficulties and make the teaching of scientific concepts more adequate to the actual state of affairs in science. © 2021, The Author(s)

Darwinism and Organizational Ecology: A Case of Incompleteness or Incompatibility?

Recently, Dollimore criticized our claim that Organizational Ecology is not a Darwinian research program. She argued that Organizational Ecology is merely an incomplete Darwinian program and provided a suggestion as to how this incompleteness could be remedied. Here, we argue that Dollimore's suggestion fails to remedy the principal problem that Organizational Ecology faces and that there are good reasons to think of the program as deeply incompatible with Darwinian thinking. © The Author(s) 2013

The proper role of history in evolutionary explanations

Evolutionary explanations are not only common in the biological sciences, but also widespread outside biology. But an account of how evolutionary explanations perform their explanatory work is still lacking. This paper develops such an account. I argue that available accounts of explanations in evolutionary science miss important parts of the role of history in evolutionary explanations. I argue that the historical part of evolutionary science should be taken as having genuine explanatory force, and that it provides how-possibly explanations sensu Dray. I propose an account of evolutionary explanations as comparative-composite explanations consisting of two distinct kinds of explanations, one processual and one historical, that are connected via the explanandum's evolvability to show how the explanandum is the product of its evolutionary past. The account is both a reconstruction of how evolutionary explanations in biology work and a guideline specifying what kind of explanations evolutionary research programs should develop

How can science be well-ordered in times of crisis? Learning from the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic

The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic constituted a crisis situation in which science was very far from Kitcher’s ideal of well-ordered science. I suggest that this could and should have been different. Kitcher’s ideal should play a role in assessing the allocation of research resources in future crisis situations, as it provides a way to balance highly divergent interests and incorporate the common good into decision-making processes on research. © 2020, The Author(s)

The Grounded Functionality Account of Natural Kinds

Most philosophical theories of natural kinds fail to reflect successful classificatory practice in science. Some are developed from a priori considerations and are too detached from actual classificatory practice. Other theories of natural kinds are more naturalistic, but they posit overarching criteria for natural kinds that fail to capture the diversity of reasons scientists have for positing natural kinds. This paper highlights these problems and offers an account of natural kinds that better reflects actual classificatory practice in science. The account offered has two normative components. First, natural kind classifications should achieve the functions they are posited to attain, whether those functions are epistemic or non-epistemic. Second, how natural kind classifications achieve those functions should be grounded in the world and not merely in our thoughts about the world. The resultant account of natural kinds, the Grounded Functionality Account, is properly attuned to scientific practice and at the same time has a significant normative component

How to Incorporate Non-Epistemic Values into a Theory of Classification

Non-epistemic values play important roles in classificatory practice, such that philosophical accounts of kinds and classification should be able to accommodate them. Available accounts fail to do so, however. Our aim is to fill this lacuna by showing how non-epistemic values feature in scientific classification, and how they can be incorporated into a philosophical theory of classification and kinds. To achieve this, we present a novel account of kinds and classification (the Grounded Functionality Account), discuss examples from biological classification where non-epistemic values play decisive roles, and show how this account accommodates the role of non-epistemic values. © 2022, The Author(s)

Financeirização, preços de terra e land grab: um estudo baseado na realidade brasileira

In the last years, the term “land grab” has gained international importance and has been used as a catchall frase for (trans)national commercial land transactions mainly revolving around the production and export of food, animal feed, biofuels, timber and minerals. The main literature explains it as a consequence of the financialization process that included land as an asset. Our main proposition in this article is that for Brazil, speculative land acquisitions played an important role in the portfolio of many economical agents, but with the deregulation of financial markets and the financialization of the seventies it became more intensive. To do so, first we present the different theoretical approaches to the land grab phenomenon and add a post-keynesian view on land transactions to the debate. Second, we analyze the available data on agriculture and livestock foreign investments in Latin America with the main focus on Brazil. Third, we present the legal and institutional aspects of foreign-owned land in Brazil. In conclusion, we propose that land grabbing will always have a speculative component, but after the deregulation of financial markets, the pressure for land acquisition is larger and the efforts in regulation and control over land acquisition in Brazil have not been effective in controlling acquisitions by foreigners2611491179Nos últimos anos o termo “land grab” ganhou importância internacional e tem sido usado como termo genérico para negociações comerciais (trans)nacionais de terras voltadas primariamente para produção e exportação de alimentos e rações para animais, biocombustíveis, madeira e minerais. A literatura internacional explica o termo como uma consequência do processo de financeirização que inclui terra como um ativo. A proposta principal deste artigo é que no caso brasileiro, aquisições especulativas de terras jogaram um papel importante na carteira de investimentos de muitos agentes econômicos, mas é com a desregulação dos mercados financeiros e a financeirização a partir dos anos 1970 que este processo se torna mais intenso. Para tanto, apresentamos as diferentes abordagens teóricas que tratam do fenômeno do “land grab” e adicionamos ao debate nossa contribuição com viés pós-keynesiano sobre as transações de terras. Em seguida, analisamos os dados disponíveis sobre investimentos estrangeiros em agricultura e pecuária na América Latina com um foco no Brasil. A seção seguinte apresenta os aspectos legais e institucionais relacionados às terras detidas por estrangeiros no Brasil. Como conclusão, propomos que o fenômeno de compra de terras por estrangeiros sempre teve um componente especulativo, mas após a desregulamentação dos mercados financeiros e o consequente processo de fincaneirização este componente especulativo tomou força ao mesmo tempo em que as tentativas de regulação e controle no Brasil foram ineficientes para controlar estes investimentos em terra

Ethnobiological kinds and material grounding: comments on Ludwig

In a recent article, David Ludwig proposed to reorient the debate on natural kinds away from inquiring into the naturalness of kinds and toward elucidating the materiality of kinds. This article responds to Ludwig’s critique of a recently proposed account of kinds and classification, the Grounded Functionality Account, against which Ludwig offsets his own account, and criticizes Ludwig’s proposal to shift focus from naturalness to materiality in the philosophy of kinds and classification

An oak is an oak, or not? Understanding and dealing with confusion and disagreement in biological classification

Human interaction with the living world, in science and beyond, always involves classification. While it has been a long-standing scientific goal to produce a single all-purpose taxonomy of life to cater for this need, classificatory practice is often subject to confusion and disagreement, and many philosophers have advocated forms of classificatory pluralism. This entails that multiple classifications should be allowed to coexist, and that whichever classification is best, is context-dependent. In this paper, we discuss some practical consequences of classificatory pluralism, in particular with regard to how one is supposed to find the best classification for a given context. We do so by means of a case study concerning oaks, in particular the pedunculate oak (Quercus robur L.) and the sessile oak (Quercus petraea (Matt.) Liebl.), two important putative species that present several classificatory challenges; and by applying one recent philosophical framework conceptualizing classification, the so-called Grounded Functionality Account (GFA) of (natural) kinds. We show how the GFA elucidates several issues related to oak classification and gives directions to optimize classificatory practices, and discuss some implications for scientific taxonomy