Inequality and Aggregate Savings in the Neoclassical Growth Model

Within the context of the neoclassical growth model I investigate the implications of (initial) endowment inequality when the rich have a higher marginal savings rate than the poor. More unequal societies grow faster in the transition process, and therefore exhibit a higher speed of convergence. Furthermore, there is divergence in consumption and lifetime wealth if the rich exhibit a higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Unlike the Solow-Stiglitz model, the steady state is always unique although the consumption function is concave.Marginal propensity to consume; income distribution; growth; concave consumption funktion

Equity and Efficiency under Imperfect Credit Markets

Recent macroeconomic research discusses credit market imperfections as a key channel through which inequality retards growth. Limited borrowing prevents the less affluent individuals from investing the efficient amount, and the inefficiencies are considered to become stronger as inequality rises. This paper, though, argues that higher inequality may actually boost aggregate output even with convex technologies and limited borrowing. Less equality in the middle or at the top end of the distribution is associated with a lower borrowing rate and hence better access to credit for the poor. We find, however, that rising relative poverty is unambiguously bad for economic performance. Hence, we suggest that future empirical work on the inequality-growth nexus should use more specific measures of inequality rather than measures of ”overall” inequality such as the Gini index.capital market imperfections, inequality, growth, efficiency

Enhancing Efficiency of Water Supply – Product Market Competition versus Trade

This paper analyses and compares potential efficiency gains induced by the introduction of product market competition and cross boarder trade in the piped water market. We argue that due to the specific circumstances in the water sector product market competition, i.e. competition by common carriage is not expected to be very intensive. The connection of networks could alternatively be used for cross boarder trade between neighboured water utilities. We show that competition by common carriage leads to production incentives for the inefficient supplier. This implies that the retail prices tend to be lower than with cross border trade. However, the efficiency effect dominates and resulting welfare is higher in case of trade.Water, Networks, Product-Market Competition, Trade, Bargaining

Structural Change and the Kaldor Facts of Economic Growth

The model presented in this paper reconciles two of the most important features of the long-run growth process: the massive changes in the structure of production and employment; and the Kaldor facts of economic growth. Structural change occurs because Engel-curves are non-linear. Each new good goes through Engel's consumption cycle, i.e. starts out as a luxury with a high income elasticity and ends up as a necessity with a low income elasticity. The coexistence of stagnating and expanding industries imply a changing sectoral composition and a continuous reallocation of labor across sectors. Nonetheless macroeconomic aggregates grow at a constant rate, and the real interest rate and the labor share are constant. Our model also addresses the two-way causality between economic growth and structural change. Complementarities between aggregate and sectoral growth may give rise to multiple equilibria providing a possible explanation for development failuresKaldor facts, Engel-curve, structural change, structural transformation, hierarchic preferences

Who Gains from Non-Collusive Corruption?

We explore the impact of non-collusive corruption on the wealth distribution. We show that the distributional consequences depend crucially on the degree of capital market imperfections. With perfect capital markets, corruption does not redistribute wealth within the private sector. However, if borrowing is limited, members of the ''middle class'' suffer most since bribery drives them out of the capital market. This makes access to credit easier for wealthy individuals such that a group of them even wins. Finally, we provide cross-country evidence showing that a high level of corruption and a polarization of the distribution go indeed hand in hand.corruption, income inequality, development

Mass versus Exclusive Goods, and Formal-Sector Employment

We explore how the underemployment problem of less-developed economies is related to income inequality. Our crucial assumption is that consumers have non-homothetic preferences over differentiated products of formal-sector goods and thus that inequality affects the composition of aggregate demand via the price-setting behavior of formal-sector firms. We find that (i) high inequality divides the formal sector into mass producers (which charge low prices that are within the reach of the poor) and exclusive producers (which charge high prices and sell only to the rich); (ii) high inequality generates an equilibrium where many workers are crowded into the informal economy; and (iii) an increase in subsistence productivity raises the wages of unskilled workers and boosts employment due to the higher purchasing power of poorer households.Income distribution; monopolistic competition; mark-ups; exclusion

Market Imperfections, Wealth Inequality, and the Distribution of Trade Gains

Globalization increasingly involves less-developed countries (LDCs), i.e., economies which usually suffer from severe imperfections in their financial systems. Taking these imperfections seriously, we analyze how credit frictions affect the distributive impact of trade liberalizations. We find that free trade significantly widens income differences among firm owners in LDCs: While wealthy entrepreneurs are better off, relatively poor business people lose. Intuitively, with integrated markets, profit margins shrink -- which makes access to credit particularly difficult for the least affluent agents. Richer entrepreneurs, by contrast, win because they can take advantage of new export opportunities. Our findings resonate well with a number of empirical regularities, in particular with the observation that some liberalizing LDCs have observed a surge in top-income shares.Wealth inequality; trade liberalization; credit market frictions; top incomes

Heterogeneous Mark-ups, Demand Composition, and the Inequality-Growth Relation

We explore the relationship between inequality and demand structure in an endogenous growth model where consumers expand consumption along a hierarchy of needs. This enables us to study the impact of inequality on demand for innovative products, on their prices, and hence on research incentives. As a result, changes in inequality affect the aggregate price structure and there may be market exclusion of the poor. With exclusion, higher inequality tends to increase growth because the profit share increases. However, higher inequality due to a bigger group of poor people may reduce growth. Instead, if the innovators always sell to all, inequality has an unambiguously negative impact on growth.

Inequality and Economic Growth: European Versus U.S. Experiences

This paper discusses long-term trends in the macroeconomic growth performance and in income distribution in Europe and the U.S. We review insights from the recent macroeconomic literature on inequality and growth and use these insights to shed light on the growth and inequality trends