Takeovers of Foreign Banks: A Supervisory Perspective

This paper investigates the determinants of the takeover of a foreign bank by a domestic bank, whereby the former becomes a branch of the latter, and its welfare effects for both the domestic and the foreign country. The analysis is based on a model of a bank that is supervised by an agency that cares about closure costs plus deposit insurance payouts. The agency uses supervisory information to decide on the early closure of the bank. Under the principle of home country control, the takeover moves responsibility for both supervision of the foreign branch and insurance of the foreign deposits to the domestic country. It is shown that the takeover is more likely to happen if the foreign bank is small (relative to the foreign market) and if its investments are riskier than those of the domestic bank. Moreover, the takeover (whenever it happens) is in general welfare improving for both countries.

Liquidity, Risk Taking, and the Lender of Last Resort

This paper studies the strategic interaction between a bank whose deposits are randomly withdrawn and a lender of last resort (LLR) that bases its decision on supervisory information on the quality of the bank’s assets. The bank is subject to a capital requirement and chooses the liquidity buffer that it wants to hold and the risk of its loan portfolio. The equilibrium choice of risk is shown to be decreasing in the capital requirement and increasing in the interest rate charged by the LLR. Moreover, when the LLR does not charge penalty rates, the bank chooses the same level of risk and a smaller liquidity buffer than in the absence of an LLR. Thus, in contrast with the general view, the existence of an LLR does not increase the incentives to take risk, while penalty rates do.

Entrepreneurial moral hazard and bank monitoring: a model of the credit channel

This paper develops a model of the choice between bank and market finance by entrepreneurial firms that differ in the value of their net worth. The monitoring associated with bank finance ameliorates a moral hazard problem between the entrepreneurs and their lenders. The model is used to analyze the different strands of the credit view of the transmission of monetary policy. In particular, we derive the empirical implications of a broad credit channel, and compare them to those obtained when the model is extended to incorporate some elements of the bank lending channel.Credit ; Bank supervision

The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regulation

We assess the procyclical effects of bank capital regulation in a dynamic equilibrium model of relationship lending in which banks are unable to access the equity markets every period. Banks anticipate that shocks to their earnings as well as the cyclical position of the economy can impair their capacity to lend in the future and, as a precaution, hold capital buffers. We find that under cyclically-varying risk-based capital requirements (e.g. Basel II) banks hold larger buffers in expansions than in recessions. Yet, these buffers are insufficient to prevent a significant contraction in the supply of credit at the arrival of a recession. We show that cyclical adjustments in the confidence level underlying Basel II can reduce its procyclical effects on the supply of credit without compromising banks’ long-run solvency targets.Banking regulation;Basel II;Business cycles;Capital requirements;Credit crunch;Loan defaults;Relationship banking

Cyclical adjustment of capital requirements: a simple framework

We present a model of an economy with heterogeneous banks that may be funded with uninsured deposits and equity capital. Capital serves to ameliorate a moral hazard problem in the choice of risk. There is a fixed aggregate supply of bank capital, so the cost of capital is endogenous. A regulator sets risk-sensitive capital requirements in order to maximize a social welfare function that incorporates a social cost of bank failure. We consider the effect of a negative shock to the supply of bank capital and show that optimal capital requirements should be lowered. Failure to do so would keep banks safer but produce a large reduction in aggregate investment. The result provides a rationale for the cyclical adjustment of risk-sensitive capital requirements

Los mitos del amor romántico: S.O.S celos

La comunicación que se presenta forma parte de mi tesis doctoral: “Los peldaños perversos del amor. El proceso de la violencia de género en la adolescencia”. Una investigación cualitativa que perseguía indagar las causas y mecanismos que sostienen y sustentan la violencia de género en la adolescencia a través de los discursos de las chicas que la han sufrido y los chicos que la han ejercido. En concreto se han realizado veintiocho entrevistas en profundidad, veintidós a chicas y seis a chicos. Tras los discursos de unas y otros se esconden los mitos del amor romántico como justificadores de la violencia de género, en concreto, el mito de los celos es el que más sobresale en sus narrativas. Un mito que tiende a justificar en nombre del “amor” formas de violencia de género hacia las chicas adolescentes.The communication submitted here, is a part of my doctoral tesis: “The perverse steps os love. The process of the gender violence in adolescence”. A qualitative investigation that searched to inquire the causes and mechanisms that hold and support the gender violence in adolescence through the speccches of girls who have suffered this violence and the boys who have carried out. Specifically I have done twenty-eight deep interviews, twenty-two to girls and six to boys. After those speeches, the myths of romantic love are hidden as justifiers of the gender violence, specifically, the myth of jealousy is the main in their narratives. A myth that tend to justify in the “name of love”, gender violence forms to adolescents girls

Los modelos de atracción en la adolescencia : ¿el triunfo de las identidades hegemónicas?

La violencia de género sufrida y denunciada por chicas adolescentes, de entre 14 y 18 años, pone las alarmas en los modelos amorosos insanos que están llevando a cabo, así como en los modelos de feminidad y masculinidad tradicionales que están protagonizando gran parte de las relaciones afectivo-sexuales. Unas relaciones que se siguen basando en procesos de atracción y elección construidos socialmente con el único fin de perpetuar las desigualdades y la dominación masculina y que unidos a las premisas y los mitos del amor romántico provocan formas de violencia hacia las chicas. La presente comunicación pone el acento en la importancia de construir nuevos modelos de atracción que transgredan los dominantes incorporando elementos como atracción, deseo, cariño, igualdad, respeto. Erotizar los modelos igualitarios nos llevaría a la deserotización de aquellos dominantes y, por tanto, a una nueva forma de entender las relaciones amorosas.The gender violence suffered and denounced by teenage girls, ages 14 and 18, put alarms on the insane love models that are taking place, as well as in traditional models of femininity and masculinity that are leading much of the relationship affective-sexual. Relationships that are still based on attraction and selection processes socially constructed for the sole purpose of perpetuating inequality and male dominance and attached to the premises and the myths of romantic love cause forms of violence against girls. This communication emphasizes the importance of building new models that transgress the dominant attraction incorporating elements such as attraction, desire, affection, equality, respect. Eroticize egalitarian models lead us to those deserotización dominant and therefore a new way of understanding relationships

Presentación del Informe SESPAS 2006

1880Pla general d'edifici industrial.De planta baixa i quatre plantes pis.Murs de tancament de fàbrica de maó massís, on s'obren grans finestrals, pilars de fosa que suporten jàsseres de fusta i voltes tensades amb tirants de ferro dolç

Moral hazard and debt maturity

We present a model of the maturity of a bank’s uninsured debt. The bank borrows funds and chooses afterwards the riskiness of its assets. This moral hazard problem leads to an excessive level of risk. Short-term debt may have a disciplining effect on the bank’s risk-shifting incentives, but it may lead to inefficient liquidation. We characterize the conditions under which short-term and long-term debt are feasible, and show circumstances under which only short-term debt is feasible and under which short-term debt dominates long-term debt when both are feasible. Thus, short-term debt may have the salutary effect of mitigating the moral hazard problem and inducing lower risk-taking. The results are consistent with key features of the common narrative of the period preceding the 2007-2009 financial crisis