"A hstorian's take on Charlottesville: an interview with Ashley Farmer"

http://sites.bu.edu/impact/previous-issues/impact-summer-2018/a-historians-take-on-charlottesville/http://sites.bu.edu/impact/previous-issues/impact-summer-2018/a-historians-take-on-charlottesville/Published versio

“It’s the end of the world as we know it and we feel fantastic: examining the end of suffering”

This paper examines the consequences of the transhumanist goal to eliminate the suffering of all sentient beings. While transhumanists identify numerous approaches to this goal, the endgame is genetic modification of humans and natural predators. Pursuing this goal would cost trillions, and such treatments/technology would be available only to the wealthy. The transhumanist agenda around suffering is economically irresponsible, socially divisive, and inherently egotistical in its assumption that suffering is universally undesirable and meritless, and that scientists and the techno-elite have the right to modify sentient creatures. If transhumanists narrowed their focus to disease treatment and eradication, they could alleviate suffering while avoiding many of the negative consequences of their broader goal. Critically assessing the implications of the transhumanist agenda is crucial to the future of humanity, nature, and the planet as technology continues its exponential growth.Accepted manuscrip

Endogenous Firm Objectives

We analyze the behavior of a monopolistic firm in general equilibrium when the firm's decision are taken through shareholder voting. We show that, depending on the underlying distribution, rational voting may imply overproduction as well as underproduction, relative to the efficient level. Any initial distribution of shares is an equilibrium, if individuals do not recognize their influence on voting when trading shares. However, when they do, and there are no short-selling constraints the only equilibrium is the efficient one. With short- selling constraints typically underproduction occurs. It is not market power itself causing underproduction, but the inability to perfectly trade the rights to market power.Imperfect Competition, Shareholder Voting, Politico Economic Equilibrium

Inequality, Environmental Protection and Growth

We analyze how, in representative democracies, income distribution influences the stringency of environmental policy and economic growth. Individuals (who differ in abilities) live for two periods, working when young and owning capital when old. Externalities are caused by a polluting factor. The revenue from pollution taxation, as well as capital-income taxation, is redistributed lump-sum to the old. The fiscal decision, at each point in time, is taken by a majority elected representative. In politico-economic equilibrium, more inequality (in terms of the skewness of the distribution) yields a lower pollution tax, a larger capital tax, and lower growth.Environmental policy, redistribution, inequality, political economy, growth.

Inequality, Environmental Protection and Growth

Why do Scandinavian countries perform better in terms of environmental protection than other European Union countries? In this paper, we explore the hypothesis that societies characterised by low income inequality (such as the nordic European countries) generate political-economic equilibria where environmental policy is more stringent. We model an overlapping-generations economy in which individuals differ in skills to address the question to what extent in modern democracies, income distribution influences the stringency of environmental policy and consequently the growth of a country. Individuals work when they are young and own capital when they are old. Pollution externalities are present due to the use of a polluting factor. The government uses the revenue from a capital-income tax and a pollution tax for a lump-sum transfer to the old generation. The fiscal decision at each point in time is taken by a majority elected representative. In politico-economic equilibrium, the lower the skill of the median individual is relative to the average, the smaller the pollution tax and the capital stock are, and the greater the capital income-tax and the relative use of the polluting factor. We perform both steady-state analysis and examine the transition path. Subsequently, we present an empirical analysis for two panels of seven and ten industrialised countries from the late seventies to late nineties. Our framework is able to explain the stylised facts regarding inequality, environmental protection, and growth.Environmental policy;majority voting;endogenous fiscal structure;income distribution;overlapping generations;growth

On Income Inequality and Green Preferences

We derive conditions on individual preferences and technology that give rise to a negative correlation between income inequality and environmental protection. We present a class of models (which captures a static model as well as an overlapping-generations model) in which individuals differ in earning abilities, and where a majority elected representative takes decisions over a pollution tax and a redistributive tax. We show that, if private consumption goods and the environment are non-inferior goods, then if the decisive individual has lower ability than the average, she will prefer a higher redistributive tax and a lower pollution tax.Environmental policy, redistribution, inequality, political economy