Operational alerting on modern commercial flight decks

The glass cockpit and EFB enable new ways of information presentation and interaction on the flight deck of modern commercial jets. This information supports crews in flight plan management, which essentially entails evaluating the plan against (ever-changing) flight constraints and, if necessary, modifying it. Flight constraints emerge from the interaction between the system and its operational environment. Understanding the constraints, and checking the flight plan against these constraints, requires selection and combination of information from many sources. Operational alerting can support this process, by prioritizing and formatting information to match the operational context. A number of modern flight deck systems are evaluated on how they support alerting in an operational ready format. From the comparison we can conclude, that there is a trend towards operational alerting, especially on a tactical level

Operational alerting concept for commercial single pilot operations systems

Reducing high workload levels are a major challenge to enable single pilot operations. Where the pilot is currently supported with many automated systems, the role of mission planner is relatively unsupported, i.e., the flight crew is required to integrate and combine information from various sources to extract the implications on the missions’ high-level goals to determine if the mission can still be completed safely and successfully. An operational alerting display is developed to provide the pilot with a clear overview of the current and future operational flight constraints. This enables the pilot to determine if the initial plan is valid under the existing conditions. The display is not limited to system malfunctions, but combines the full spectrum of operational constraints, e.g., weather and airport operations. The display concept was tested on usability with a commercial pilot to provide a preliminary performance indication on the effectiveness of the concept

Methodology Comparison for Designing a Decision-making Support System

Designing interfaces for effective decision-making supports for complex, dynamic systems is a challenging task. Besides the already challenging task of determining the visual form, the task of defining the content of these supports can be even more demanding. Especially for an unstable and complex work domain with multiple stakeholders and multiple interrelated systems, e.g., commercial flight operations. Various methodologies for designing such supports have been introduced in the last decades. In this paper two methodologies, Ecological Interface Design (EID) and Applied Cognitive Work Analysis (ACWA) are compared to determine what methodology is best suited for the design of an in-flight decision support system. The methodologies are compared on two aspects, (1) development of the knowledge-based model and (2) the means to translate this model into requirements for the actual representation. The functional abstraction network (FAN), as part of the ACWA, is the preferred knowledge-based modelling method for capturing a complex multi-system work domain, like commercial flight operations. Mainly due to the increased flexibility in modeling and ease of extending the model. The ACWA is also found to the preferable method to translate the functional model into representation requirements due to its structured step-wise and system engineering inspired approach.Control & Simulatio

Taking a Closer Look at Flight Crew Handling of Complex Failures: Ten Case Studies

Non-normal events, in particular system failures with serious operational impact are rare in flight operations. These events are not always easy to handle by flight crews. The aim of the performed study is to determine where in this process potential issues may lie. Ten incident reports are studied using a newly developed operational issue analysis framework. The framework is used to determine whether and how the current interfaces communicate the initial functional impact and functional impact delayed in time. Additionally, results from pilot interviews are presented which identified three phases of non-normal event handling: fault detection, fault management and strategic planning. Analysis of the ten cases shows that current alert systems are mainly supporting the first two phases while the strategic planning phase, requiring higher level functional information integrated into the operational context as well as failure impact later in time, is relying almost entirely on pilot knowledge and reasoning.Control & Simulatio

Quantifying automatable checklist items on a commercial flightdeck

In-flight non-normal events can be rather taxing for a flight crew. Numerous tasks, often competing for attention, need to be handled adequately after which, the best plan of action for the remainder of the flight needs to be determined. In the light of recent developments towards reduced crew operations, the demand for reducing workload has become apparent. This requires us to rethink the role of the pilot, which to the authors perspective is mainly one of a flying and flight plan manager. System management is a function that can be assigned to automation. Automation on modern plane often already monitors systems more accurate and faster than pilots can every do. However, in this study we explore the potential checklist step reduction if, the automation will go one step further. Namely, automatically execute reconfiguration steps that do not affect flight characteristic. In total, 39% of the checklist items are potential candidates for this new automation. Average checklist size can be reduced to 4, compared to the current average of 6.5 items per checklists. This result does not provide us with an estimated time saving. Although, the result seems promising to reduce the workload on the flight crew. This exploration can be followed-up by a study to estimate the potential time savings. Besides this improvements can be made to reduce the length of the informative statements and implications on the flight plan can be presented in a more efficient manner.Virtual/online event due to COVID-19Control & Simulatio

A Novel Automated Electronic Checklist for Non-Normal Event Resolution Tasks

Non-normal event resolution in-flight can be challenging on the flight crew with increased time pressure, workload, stress. Other competing tasks impose a risk on flight safety and burdens the decision-making process. Pilots rely on checklists to aid in their effort, which in its state-of-the-art form are presented on the dedicated Electronic Checklist (ECL) display for Boeing aircraft and on the Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) system for Airbus aircraft. However, human-induced errors and limitations remain prevalent. Exploring a different approach from other research efforts, this paper proposes a novel design which assumes automated checklist handling as a viable option to reduce workload durning nonnormal events. In a human-in-the-loop experiment with 12 commercial pilots, the design was compared against a reproduced Boeing 787 ECL over two scenarios. A synthetic setup was used, assuming a touch-based Boeing 737-8 flight deck combined with the Boeing 787 state-of-the-art alerting systems and displays. Results indicate significant checklist completion time reductions with the proposed design of 31.3% and 42.0% for an electrical and hydraulic failure, respectively. Experienced workload and situation awareness remained unchanged, though compressed in a shorter time frame. The novel display was positively anticipated by participants but was found to lack automation feedback.Virtual/online event due to COVID-19Control & Simulatio

The Skill Assumption: Over-Relicance on Perception Skills in Hazard Analysis

In the analysis of human performance and human error, considerable attention is given to the cognitive processes of actors involved in error or success scenarios. Even with awareness of hindsight bias, it takes effort to understand the actions of agents in later inspection of error scenarios. One such topic of heated discussion was the perceived poor performance of pilots in the two 737 MAX MCAS-related crashes in applying the “memory item” checklist pertaining to a runaway trim. In this paper, we argue that it is not so much the reproduction of the checklist that was lacking in these scenarios, but the trigger for even starting the checklist. Not only trim run-away problems, but several other issues likewise require an instant reaction from pilots, designated as “memory items”. Rasmussen’s simplified schematic for the “skill, rule and knowledge” taxonomy already provides the tools for properly analyzing this. The skill to provide the triggers for these reactions relies on pattern extraction from the available sensory input, and, importantly, it can only be learned in a valid training context. It is argued that re-appraisal of these items is needed, addressing explicitly the validity of the training environments that enable pilots to learn the required pattern recognition skills.Control & Simulatio