Opening remarks

Rehnquist W.H. Opening remarks. In: Annuaire international de justice constitutionnelle, 5-1989, 1991. Principe d'égalité et droit de suffrage. pp. 195-197

Allocution d'ouverture

Rehnquist W.H. Allocution d'ouverture. In: Annuaire international de justice constitutionnelle, 5-1989, 1991. Principe d'égalité et droit de suffrage. pp. 199-201

Allocution d'ouverture

Rehnquist W.H. Allocution d'ouverture. In: Annuaire international de justice constitutionnelle, 5-1989, 1991. Principe d'égalité et droit de suffrage. pp. 199-201

Liminaire

Rehnquist W.H. Liminaire. In: Annuaire international de justice constitutionnelle, 5-1989, 1991. Principe d'égalité et droit de suffrage. pp. 193-194

Opening remarks

Rehnquist W.H. Opening remarks. In: Annuaire international de justice constitutionnelle, 5-1989, 1991. Principe d'égalité et droit de suffrage. pp. 195-197

Liminaire

Rehnquist W.H. Liminaire. In: Annuaire international de justice constitutionnelle, 5-1989, 1991. Principe d'égalité et droit de suffrage. pp. 193-194

The American constitutional experience Stress and strain among the three branches of government

SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre-DSC:4645.51235(1999) / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreGBUnited Kingdo

The outcome-prediction strategy in cases denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court

We investigate whether the substantial use of the outcome-prediction strategy by Supreme Court justices occurs in the petitions denied certiorari by the Court. We show with a computer simulation that [Caldeira, G.A., Wright, J.R., & Zorn, C.J.W. (1999). Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15, 549–572], who modeled the missing final votes for denied petitions in order to include them in their study of the use of the outcome-prediction strategy, may have obtained spurious results. Application of the logic of conditional probabilities to the denied petitions suggests that all but those denied by the narrowest of margins are probably considered unacceptable by the justices on non-outcome-oriented grounds, and, therefore, are not subject to use of this strategy. We evaluate the pursuit of the outcome-prediction strategy in petitions that narrowly fail to be granted cert by focusing upon the petitions that are narrowly granted cert and find limited use of the strategy. We conclude that the outcome-prediction strategy probably is little used by the justices in confronting the petitions denied cert and that investigations of the use of this strategy are best confined to those petitions granted cert. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007U.S. Supreme Court, Certiorari, Strategic behavior, Attitudinal model, Rational choice, Selection bias,