Reflections: February 1969

https://spiral.lynn.edu/studentnews/1012/thumbnail.jp

Reflections: November 1967

https://spiral.lynn.edu/studentnews/1007/thumbnail.jp

Reflections: October 1967

https://spiral.lynn.edu/studentnews/1006/thumbnail.jp

Reflections: October 1968

https://spiral.lynn.edu/studentnews/1010/thumbnail.jp

Reflections: May 1968

https://spiral.lynn.edu/studentnews/1009/thumbnail.jp

Reflections: May 1969

https://spiral.lynn.edu/studentnews/1014/thumbnail.jp

Reflections: March 1969

https://spiral.lynn.edu/studentnews/1013/thumbnail.jp

Reflections: February 1968

https://spiral.lynn.edu/studentnews/1008/thumbnail.jp

Possible worlds semantics and the liar: Reflections on a problem posed by Kaplan

In this paper I discuss a paradox, due to David Kaplan, that in his view threatens the use of possible worlds semantics as a model-theoretic framework for intensional logic. 1 Kaplan’s paradox starts out from an intuitively reasonable principle that I refer to as the Principle of Plenitude