36 research outputs found
Instability of Democracy as Resource Curse
We suggest a dynamic game theoretic model to explain why resource abundance may lead to instability of democracy. Stationary Markov perfect equilibria of this game with four players – Politician, Oligarch, Autocrat and Public (voters) – are analyzed. Choosing a rate of resource rent tax, potential Autocrat competes with conventional Politician for the office, and Oligarch, the owner of the resource wealth, bribes Politician to influence her decisions. Actual Autocrat's tax policy may be different from the announced one. If the difference is large, then Public may revolt or Oligarch may organize a coup to throw Autocrat down.
It is shown that the probability of democracy preservation is decreasing in the amount of resources if the institutional quality is low enough. It does not depend on the amount of resources, if the institutional quality is higher than a threshold. The level of the threshold, however, depends positively on the resource wealth. We have found also that under very low institutional quality, a paradoxical effect takes place: the probability of democracy preservation may decrease with small improvements of institutional quality.
It is shown as well that Oligarch earns larger part of rent under democracy than under autocracy. This result conforms to empirical observation which is demonstrated in the paper: under low quality of institutions, democratization leads to higher inequality and inequality entails worsening of the attitude to democracy
Institutions and Poverty: A Critical Comment Based on Evolving Currents and Debates
Tebaldi & Mohan (2010, JDS) have established an empirical nexus between institutions and monetary poverty. We first, reflect their findings in light of recent development models, debates and currents in post-2010 literature. We then re-examine their results with a non-monetary and multidimensional poverty indicator first published in 2010. Our findings confirm the negative relationship and the nexus disappears with control for average income. Hence, confirming the conclusions of the underlying study that institutions could have an indirect effect on multidimensional poverty. In other words, the poverty eradication effect of institutions is through income-average as opposed to income-inequality. We discuss the confirmed findings in light of implications to: (1) debates over preferences in economic rights; (2) China’s development/outlook; (3) the Chinese model versus sustainable development; (4) the Fosu conjectures; (5) Piketty’s & Kuznets’ celebrated literatures and (6) future research to ascertain the inequality mechanism