Why It Is Essential to Teach About Mental Health Issues in Criminal Law (And a Primer on How To Do It)

Studies consistently show a high prevalence of mental disorders among criminal defendants. Forensic mental health issues thus arise frequently in the criminal justice system and are commonly encountered by prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judgesmuch more so than some criminal law doctrines (e.g., necessity, duress, impossibility) routinely taught in criminal law courses. Yet rarely are students taught about mental illness, how to represent mentally ill clients, adjudicative competence, the mental health needs of various offender groups and how these unmet needs may contribute to criminal behavior, or the use of mental health mitigation evidence at sentencing. If taught at all, such topics are only part of a survey course in mental health law.Forensic mental health issues should be an integral part of the criminal law curriculum, beginning with the first-year criminal law course. This Article presents recommendations for teaching mental health issues in first-year criminal law, presents empirical data indicating that first-year students have mixed, though generally positive, reactions to incorporating such non-traditional content into the course, and provides a syllabus for an upper-level course in criminal law and psychology. Incorporating mental health topics into the traditional criminal law curriculum is part of the ongoing trend in legal education towards expanding pedagogy beyond legal doctrine into relevant social science disciplines that can inform legal policy and students' understanding of the criminal justice system, perhaps more so than many of the doctrinal lessons we now teach.

It’s Really About Sex: Same-Sex Marriage, Lesbigay Parenting, and the Psychology of Disgust

The effects of gay and lesbian parenting on children has been the touchstone issue in much of the recent state litigation on same sex marriage, with opponents of same sex marriage arguing that there is a rational basis for denying marriage rights to gays and lesbians because the central purpose of marriage is procreation and childrearing, but that children are harmed or disadvantaged when raised by gay or lesbian parents. To interrogate this claim, I critique the social science research that informs the concerns frequently expressed about the possible negative effects of lesbigay parenting on children\u27s emotional, psychosocial, and sexual development. In particular, I focus on research relevant to whether growing up in a lesbigay household is as positive an experience for children as growing up in a heterosexual household, as much of the literature to date has addressed the issue of whether lesbigay parenting is harmful to children. I conclude that the research fails to support the theory that denying marriage or parenting rights to same sex couples serves the welfare of children. I further argue that public opposition to gay marriage, particularly in the context of lesbigay parenting, is animated by a deeper concern - the proverbial “elephant in the room” on gay rights issues. That elephant is the visceral disgust reaction that many Americans feel toward homosexual sex, and the resulting moral intuition that homosexuality and homosexual relationships are immoral. Thus, many people will conclude that it is better for children to be raised in heterosexual households because they do not want children exposed to the lesbigay “lifestyle.” Nor do they want to increase the “risk” that children will develop a homosexual orientation if they are raised by lesbigay parents. The article discusses new psychological research on moral decision making, which suggests that the “moral” emotion of disgust is at the root of much of the opposition to gay rights. The disgust reaction is likely a byproduct of human evolution that fails to inform rational judgments about the policy questions surrounding lesbigay parenting and marriage rights

Mental Disorders and the Law

This chapter provides an introduction to the major classes of mental disorder and the ways in which they are salient to selected aspects of American criminal and civil law, focusing particularly on criminal law issues

Mental Disorders and the Law

This chapter provides an introduction to the major classes of mental disorder and the ways in which they are salient to selected aspects of American criminal and civil law, focusing particularly on criminal law issues

What Do Juvenile Offenders Know About Being Tried as Adults? Implications for Deterrence

An underlying assumption in the nationwide policy shift toward transferring more juveniles to criminal court has been the belief that stricter, adult sentences will act as either a specific or general deterrent to juvenile crime. With respect to general deterrence - whether transfer laws deter would-be offenders from committing crimes - it is important to examine whether juveniles know about transfer laws, whether this knowledge deters criminal behavior, and whether juveniles believe the laws will be enforced against them. The current study is one of the first to examine juveniles\u27 knowledge and perceptions of transfer laws and criminal sanctions. We interviewed 37 juveniles who had been transferred to criminal court in Georgia, obtaining quantitative as well as qualitative data based on structured interviewed questions. Four key findings emerged. First, juveniles were unaware of the transfer law. Second, juveniles felt that awareness of the law may have deterred them from committing the crime or may deter other juveniles from committing crimes, and they suggested practical ways to enhance juveniles\u27 awareness of transfer laws. Third, the juveniles generally felt that it was unfair to try and sentence them as adults. Finally, the consequences of committing their crime were worse than most had imagined, and the harsh consequences of their incarceration in adult facilities may have had a brutalizing effect on some juveniles. The implications for general and specific deterrence are discussed

The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century

Brain-damaged defendants are seen everyday in American courtrooms, and in many cases, their criminal behavior appears to be the product of extremely poor judgment and self-control. Some have a disorder in the frontal lobes, the area of the brain responsible for judgment and impulse control. Yet because defendants suffering from frontal lobe dysfunction usually understand the difference between right and wrong, they are unable to avail themselves of the only insanity defense available in many states, a defense based on the narrow McNaghten test. “Irresistible impulse” (or “control”) tests, on the other hand, provide an insanity defense to those who committed a crime due to their inability to exercise behavioral control. Control tests have fallen into disfavor, however. Opponents of control tests offer three rationales for their abandonment: (1) that cognitive tests for insanity are sufficient, since those with impaired impulse control will also be cognitively impaired; (2) that mental health professionals are incapable of reliably assessing the capacity for impulse control, particularly in relation to criminal behavior, or of differentiating between a truly irresistible impulse and an impulse that is merely difficult to resist; and, therefore, that control tests lead to erroneous insanity acquittals; and, (3) that because “they directly pose the question of whether a person could control his or her behavior,” control tests run counter to the law’s assumption that people have free will and bear responsibility for their actions. Current neuroscience research presents a challenge to these claims. In the Article, I argue for a return to control tests for insanity, but with important doctrinal modifications