Mobile payments for remittances in Africa: Benchmarking with Latin America

In this article the author seeks to explain the reasons backing the success of mobile technology in money transfers comparing Africa and Latin America.Remittances, Africa, Latin America, mobile phones

Mobile Payments for Remittances in Latin America: Benchmarking with Africa

Rücküberweisung (Migranten); Bargeldloser Zahlungsverkehr; Mobiltelefon; Transaktionskosten; Vergleich; Lateinamerika; Afrika

Telecommunications Technologies: Deployment in Developing Countries

This paper examines some policies pursued in developing countries for the provision of telecommunications services in rural areas. These policies significantly differ from those typically implemented in developed countries in their fundamental objectives, the technological strategies deployed and the market and institutional environments they rest on. A review of some representative experiences suggests that thinking about public utility reforms in this part of the world is quite a challenging exercise. We point out some economic and institutional characteristics of these countries that we believe normative analysis of the reforms should explicitly take into accountTelecommunications; Developing Countries; Universal Access

Does political accountability matter for infrastructure regulation? The case of telecommunications

This paper discusses the link between political accountability, regarded as an important aspect of institutional design, and infrastructure regulation that has been emphasized in the recent literature on the role of institutions in economic development. We report on the findings and lessons drawn from an analysis of telecommunications data covering the period 1985-1999 on two sets of countries; one composed of 29 developing countries and another of 23 developed countries. The main point highlighted by the analysis is that infrastructure regulation in a given country cannot be independent of the institutional environment, in particular, the degree of political accountability that supports the country’s institutions. The argument is demonstrated by means of an econometric estimation of dynamic panel data models that shows evidence of a significant effect of pro- political accountability factors on regulatory performance as reflected in measures of sector output and efficiency. Expectedly enough, this effect is found to be more pronounced in the developing countries data set. A key policy implication of this result is that efforts to enhance institutional quality and support politically accountable systems in developing countries should yield large benefits for infrastructure regulation.Infrastructure regulation, regulatory performance, political accountability.

Political accountability and regulatory performance in infrastructure industries : an empirical analysis

The aim of this paper is to empirically explore the relationship between the quality of political institutions and the performance of regulation, an issue that has recently occupied much of the policy debate on the effectiveness of infrastructure industry reforms. Taking the view that political accountability is a key factor that links political structures and regulatory processes, the authors investigate, for the case of telecommunications, its impact on the performance of regulation in two time-series-cross-sectional data sets on 29 developing countries and 23 industrial countries covering the period 1985-99. In addition to confirming some well documented results on the positive role of regulatory governance in infrastructure industries, the authors provide empirical evidence on the impact of the quality of political institutions and their modes of functioning on regulatory performance. The analysis of the data sets shows that the (positive) effect of political accountability on the performance of regulation is stronger in developing countries. An important policy implication of this finding is that future reforms in these countries should give due attention to the development of politically accountable systems.Infrastructure Regulation,Governance Indicators,National Governance,Statistical&Mathematical Sciences,Econometrics

The Role of Institutional Design in the Conduct of Infrastructure Industry Reforms - An Illustration through Telecommunications in Developing Countries

This paper is concerned with the role of political and economic institutions in the conduct of the infrastructure industries reform process in developing countries. Our point of departure is that the specific features of these countries' economies should be accounted for when considering policy design. We discuss the main results and policy lessons drawn from two studies of the telecommunications sector based on an econometric analysis of time-series-cross-sectional data on developed and developing countries. We synthesise the main empirical findings and policy implications pertaining to two issues. The first issue concerns the impact of the quality of institutions on the function of regulation. Our review points to the fact that political accountability of institutional systems is a key determinant of regulatory performance, in particular in developing countries. The second issue relates to the factors that shape the sectoral reforms themselves and the impact of these reforms on the development of the industry in developing countries. Our main conclusion is that countries' institutional risk and financial constraints are among the major factors that explain which reforms are actually implemented.Political accountability, reforms, infrastructure industries, developing countries

The Determinants and Impact of Telecommunications Reform in Developping Countries

This paper has two related objectives. First, it seeks to identify the key determinants of some policies that have been at the heart of the reforms of the telecommunications industry in developing countries, namely, liberalization, privatization, and the (re)structuring of regulation. Second, it attempts to estimate the extent to which these policies have translated into actual deployment of telecommunications infrastructure. This simultaneous investigation is conducted by means of an econometric analysis of a 1985-1999 time-series-cross-sectional database on 86 developing countries. Sectoral as well as institutional and financial factors are found to be important determinants of the actual reforms implemented. We uncover a positive relationship between the decision to introduce competition in the digital cellular segment and the growth of the fixed-line segment, suggesting that these two segments have benefited from each other. We also find that countries facing increasing institutional risk and financial constraints are more likely to introduce competition in the digital cellular segment and to privatize the fixed-line incumbent, these policies being economically attractive to both investors and governments. In turn, these policies are those that enhance the deployment of fixed-line infrastructure. In contrast, competition in the analogue cellular segment and the creation of a separate regulator seem to be relatively less attractive policies as they are found to be less likely to be introduced in countries facing increasing institutional risk and budget constraints. Their impact on fixed network deployment is found to be negative or non significant