Mapping the American Shareholder Litigation Experience: A Survey of Empirical Studies of the Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Law

In this paper, we provide an overview of the most significant empirical research that has been conducted in recent years on the public and private enforcement of the federal securities laws. The existing studies of the U.S. enforcement system provide a rich tapestry for assessing the value of enforcement, both private and public, as well as market penalties for fraudulent financial reporting practices. The relevance of the U.S. experience is made broader by the introduction through the PSLRA in late 1995 of new procedures for the conduct of private suits and the numerous efforts to evaluate the effects of those provisions. We believe that the evidence reviewed here shows that the PSLRA\u27s provisions have largely achieved their intended purposes. For example, many more private suits are headed by an institutional lead plaintiff, such plaintiffs appear to fulfill the desired role of monitoring the suit\u27s prosecution and their presence is associated with suits yielding better settlements and lower attorneys\u27 fees awards. SEC enforcement efforts, while significant, have tended to focus on weaker targets, suggesting that the big fish get away. Equally importantly, markets impose their own discipline on companies whose managers release false financial reports and, in turn, firms discipline the managers who are responsible for false misleading reporting, perhaps because of the presence of, or potential for, private enforcement actions

Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws: Have Things Changed Since Enron?

In this paper, we examine how those corporations that have been the targets of SEC enforcement efforts compare in terms of their size and financial health vis-a-vis firms that are targeted only by the private securities class action. We also ask whether the SEC or the private bar systematically proceeds against violators that cause the greatest loss to investors. In this regard, we are intrigued by the most basic question posed by private suits, whether settlements bear any relationship to the losses suffered by the class and whether those losses bear any relationship to the size of either the firm itself or the duration of the class action. Our data set consists of 389 securities class action settlements that occurred between 1990 and 2003. Using multivariate regression analysis to examine the determinants of government litigation, we find a sharp change in the pattern of SEC enforcement actions after the end of 2001. We find that the SEC seems to have shifted its enforcement focus away from targeting frauds at firms in financial distress to seeking out frauds at companies where investors may have suffered larger losses, especially if they are smaller firms. Again applying multivariate regression analysis, we look at settlement sizes in private class actions. We find that provable losses, total assets, class period and the presence of an SEC enforcement action, are all positively and significantly related to the dollar amount of the settlement obtained in a private action. These effects do not change over the time period of our sample. The fact that provable losses are such an important determinant of the size of actual recoveries supports the view that the merits do matter

Mapping the American Shareholder Litigation Experience: A Survey of Empirical Studies of the Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Law

In this paper, we provide an overview of the most significant empirical research that has been conducted in recent years on the public and private enforcement of the federal securities laws. The existing studies of the U.S. enforcement system provide a rich tapestry for assessing the value of enforcement, both private and public, as well as market penalties for fraudulent financial reporting practices. The relevance of the U.S. experience is made broader by the introduction through the PSLRA in late 1995 of new procedures for the conduct of private suits and the numerous efforts to evaluate the effects of those provisions. We believe that the evidence reviewed here shows that the PSLRA\u27s provisions have largely achieved their intended purposes. For example, many more private suits are headed by an institutional lead plaintiff, such plaintiffs appear to fulfill the desired role of monitoring the suit\u27s prosecution and their presence is associated with suits yielding better settlements and lower attorneys\u27 fees awards. SEC enforcement efforts, while significant, have tended to focus on weaker targets, suggesting that the big fish get away. Equally importantly, markets impose their own discipline on companies whose managers release false financial reports and, in turn, firms discipline the managers who are responsible for false misleading reporting, perhaps because of the presence of, or potential for, private enforcement actions

Measuring Securities Market Efficiency in the Regulatory Setting

In Nov 1998, the SEC proposed a modification to the federal securities law disclosure requirements to facilitate the process of issuing new securities. Thomas and Cotter discuss how to determine when companies should be able to issue simplified disclosure documents

Addressing Agency Costs through Private Litigation in the U.S: Tensions, Disappointments, and Substitutes

Many scholars argue that over the past seventy years, shareholder representative litigation has acted as an important policing mechanism of managerial abuses at U.S. public companies. Different types of representative litigation have had their moment in the sun – derivative suits early on, followed by federal securities class actions, and most recently merger litigation – often producing benefits for shareholders, but posing difficult challenges as well. In particular, the benefits are qualified by another concern, the litigation agency costs that surround shareholder suits. This form of agency costs arises since the suits are invariably representative with no requirement that the named plaintiffs have a substantial ownership interest in the corporation, so that their prosecution could be easily seen as lawyer-driven. And that perception is further underscored in the U.S. where the “American Rule,” in contrast to the “Loser Pays Rule,” provides no governor on the suit’s initiation and prosecution. In this article, we assess the interactions of shareholder suits and governance mechanisms. Our thesis is straightforward: we claim that the recent rise of some important governance developments is a natural consequence of both the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of private suits to address certain genre of managerial agency costs. That is, just as one part of a balloon expands when another part contracts, we find that governance responses evolve to fill voids caused by the decompression of shareholder monitoring once supplied by private suits. In other words, as representative shareholder litigation comes under increasing attack, greater attention needs to be devoted to governance and market mechanisms as alternative means to address managerial agency costs

Does Political Ambiguity Pay? Corporate Campaign Contributions and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation

Do politicians tend to follow a strategy of ambiguity in their policy positions or a strategy of reputational development to reduce uncertainty about where they stand? Ambiguity could allow a legislator to avoid alienating constituents and to play rival interests off against each other to maximize campaign contributions. Alternatively, reputational clarity could help to reduce uncertainty about a candidate and lead to high campaign contributions from favored interests. We outline a theory that considers conditions under which a politician would and would not prefer reputational development and policy-stance clarity in the context of repeat dealing with special interests. Our proxy for reputational development is the percent of repeat givers to a legislator. Using data on corporate political action committee contributions (PACs) to members of the U.S. House during the seven electoral cycles from 1983/84 to 1995/96, we find that legislators do not appear to follow a strategy of ambiguity and that high reputational development is rewarded with high PAC contributions.

An overview of shed ice impact in the NASA Lewis Icing Research Tunnel

One of the areas of active research in commercial and military rotorcraft is directed toward developing the capability of sustained flight in icing conditions. The emphasis to date has been on the accretion and subsequent shedding of ice in an icing environment, where the shedding may be natural or induced. Historically, shed-ice particles have been a problem for aircraft, particularly rotorcraft. Because of the high particle velocities involved, damage to a fuselage or other airframe component from a shed-ice impact can be significant. Design rules for damage tolerance from shed-ice impact are not well developed because of a lack of experimental data. Thus, NASA Lewis (LeRC) has begun an effort to develop a database of impact force and energy resulting from shed ice. This effort consisted of a test of NASA LeRC's Model Rotor Test Rig (MRTR) in the Icing Research Tunnel (IRT). Both natural shedding and forced shedding were investigated. Forced shedding was achieved by fitting the rotor blades with Small Tube Pneumatic (STP) deicer boots manufactured by BF Goodrich. A detailed description of the test is given as well as the design of a new impact sensor which measures the force-time history of an impacting ice fragment. A brief discussion of the procedure to infer impact energy from a force-time trace are required for the impact-energy calculations. Recommendations and future plans for this research area are also provided