261 research outputs found

    Conceptualizing the psychosocial elements that should be assessed in candidates for hematopoietic cell transplantation: social workers\u27 and psychologists\u27 perspectives.

    Get PDF
    Background: In the United States, approximately 23,000 hematopoietic cell transplantations (HCT), also known as a bone marrow transplant, are performed annually. Patients who undergo HCT are among the most acutely ill and medically vulnerable oncology populations. Given the arduous nature of HCT, patients undergo an extensive pre-transplant evaluation that typically includes psychosocial assessment. The literature lacks a well-defined conceptual framework of the psychosocial elements that should be assessed in HCT candidates. This has led to practice variation, which has in turn inhibited high quality psychosocial research. Method: Social workers and psychologists in HCT were recruited to participate in a concept mapping study to elucidate the conceptual domain of psychosocial elements that should be assessed in candidates pre-HCT. Concept mapping is a mixed methodology that uses quantitative methods (multidimensional scaling and hierarchical cluster analysis) to analyze qualitative data. It results in a series of maps that depict the group’s composite thinking about the conceptual domain. Results: Participants brainstormed 114 distinct psychosocial elements and conceptualized the elements into 12 distinct clusters: Transplant Mindset, Support System, Caregiver, Lodging and Transportation, Financial and Legal, Work, Demographic Characteristics, Mental Health, Communication, Education and Resource Needs, Physical Functioning, and Cognition. Analyses of importance ratings showed that that participants who use standardized psychosocial risk rating scales in their practice did not prioritize these clusters differently than those who do not use risk rating scales in their practice. Conclusion: Findings show that the domain of psychosocial elements is broad and multi-dimensional. The conceptualization converges with the literature in many respects but also contains noteworthy divergences from the current literature. Divergences are of particular interest since the perspectives of these psychosocial professionals have been largely absent from the literature. The maps and findings may be used to inform the development of a pre-HCT psychosocial assessment protocol that would constitute a high quality practice standard and produce consistent data for psychosocial research

    Book reviews

    Get PDF
    Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession,

    Public Relations

    Get PDF

    The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation

    Get PDF
    In 2015, Delaware made several important changes to its laws concerning merger litigation. These changes, which were made in response to a perception that levels of merger litigation were too high and that a substantial proportion of merger cases were not providing value, raised the bar, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to win a lawsuit challenging a merger and more difficult for plaintiffs\u27 counsel to collect a fee award. We study what has happened in the courts in response to these changes. We find that the initial effect of the changes has been to decrease the volume of merger litigation, to increase the number of cases that are dismissed, and to reduce the size of attorneys\u27 fee awards. At the same time, we document an adaptive response by the plaintiffs\u27 bar. Merger cases are being filed in other state courts or in federal court, presumably in an effort to escape the application of the new Delaware rules. This responsive adaptation offers important lessons about the entrepreneurial nature of merger litigation and the limited ability of the courts to reduce the potential for litigation abuse. In particular, we find that plaintiffs\u27 attorneys respond rationally to these changes by shifting their filing patterns, and that defendants respond in kind. We argue, however, that more expansive efforts to shut down merger litigation, such as through the use of fee-shifting bylaws, are premature and create too great a risk of foreclosing beneficial litigation. We also examine Delaware\u27s dilemma in maintaining a balance between the rights of managers and shareholders in this area

    Mootness Fees

    Get PDF
    In response to a sharp increase in litigation challenging mergers, the Delaware Chancery Court issued the 2016 Trulia decision, which substantively reduced the attractiveness of Delaware as a forum for these suits. In this Article, we empirically assess the response of plaintiffs’ attorneys to these developments. Specifically, we document a troubling trend—the flight of merger litigation to federal court where these cases are overwhelmingly resolved through voluntary dismissals that provide no benefit to the plaintiff class but generate a payment to plaintiffs’ counsel in the form of a mootness fee. In 2018, for example, 77% of deals with litigation were challenged in federal court, and in 63% of litigated cases, plaintiffs’ attorneys received a mootness fee. This compares with 2014, when only 4% of deals with litigation had a filing in federal court and no mootness fees were awarded. The rise of the mootness fee and the shift to federal court raise several issues, including a lack of transparency in the quality and resolution of merger cases and an increased potential for blackmail litigation. These problems are compounded by the willingness of some courts to permit the payment of a mootness fee in connection with corrective disclosures that are immaterial but possibly helpful, a standard that we argue is unworkable and increases the potential for vexatious litigation. We argue that the widespread payment of mootness fees reflects an inappropriate tax on the judicial system and corporations. Although we argue that a shift to federal courts is appropriate for litigation challenging the adequacy of merger disclosure, we maintain that a successful shift requires the federal courts to police the quality and resolution of merger litigation carefully. We conclude that federal courts should require that the payment of mootness fees be subject to judicial review. We further argue that the payment of a mootness fee should be conditioned on litigation resulting in a material corrective disclosure—the same legal standard required by Trulia. We propose that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be amended to implement these requirements or alternatively that federal judges use their inherent authority to adopt these requirements. We ultimately view these changes as necessary to limit frivolous litigation and provide for transparency and judicial oversight of the litigation process

    The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation

    Get PDF
    In 2015, Delaware made several important changes to its laws concerning merger litigation. These changes, which were made in response to a perception that levels of merger litigation were too high and that a substantial proportion of merger cases were not providing value, raised the bar, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to win a lawsuit challenging a merger and more difficult for plaintiffs\u27 counsel to collect a fee award. We study what has happened in the courts in response to these changes. We find that the initial effect of the changes has been to decrease the volume of merger litigation, to increase the number of cases that are dismissed, and to reduce the size of attorneys\u27 fee awards. At the same time, we document an adaptive response by the plaintiffs\u27 bar. Merger cases are being filed in other state courts or in federal court, presumably in an effort to escape the application of the new Delaware rules. This responsive adaptation offers important lessons about the entrepreneurial nature of merger litigation and the limited ability of the courts to reduce the potential for litigation abuse. In particular, we find that plaintiffs\u27 attorneys respond rationally to these changes by shifting their filing patterns, and that defendants respond in kind. We argue, however, that more expansive efforts to shut down merger litigation, such as through the use of fee-shifting bylaws, are premature and create too great a risk of foreclosing beneficial litigation. We also examine Delaware\u27s dilemma in maintaining a balance between the rights of managers and shareholders in this area

    The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation

    Get PDF
    In 2015, Delaware made several important changes to its laws concerning merger litigation. These changes, which were made in response to a perception that levels of merger litigation were too high and that a substantial proportion of merger cases were not providing value, raised the bar, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to win a lawsuit challenging a merger and more difficult for plaintiffs’ counsel to collect a fee award. We study what has happened in the courts in response to these changes. We find that the initial effect of the changes has been to decrease the volume of merger litigation, to increase the number of cases that are dismissed, and to reduce the size of attorneys’ fee awards. At the same time, we document an adaptive response by the plaintiffs’ bar in which cases are being filed in other state courts or in federal court in an effort to escape the application of the new rules. This responsive adaptation offers important lessons about the entrepreneurial nature of merger litigation and the limited ability of the courts to reduce the potential for litigation abuse. In particular, we find that plaintiffs’ attorneys respond rationally to these changes by shifting their filing patterns, and that defendants respond in kind. We argue, however, that more expansive efforts to shut down merger litigation, such as through the use of fee-shifting bylaws, are premature and create too great a risk of foreclosing beneficial litigation. We also examine Delaware’s dilemma in maintaining a balance between the rights of managers and shareholders in this area

    Mootness Fees

    Get PDF
    In response to a sharp increase in litigation challenging mergers, the Delaware Chancery Court issued the 2016 Trulia decision, which substantively reduced the attractiveness of Delaware as a forum for these suits. In this Article, we empirically assess the response of plaintiffs\u27attorneys to these developments. Specifically, we document a troubling trend-the flight of merger litigation to federal court where these cases are overwhelmingly resolved through voluntary dismissals that provide no benefit to the plaintiff class but generate a payment to plaintiffs\u27counsel in the form of a mootness fee. In 2018, for example, 77% of deals with litigation were challenged in federal court, and in 63% of litigated cases, plaintiffs\u27 attorneys received a mootness fee. This compares with 2014, when only 4% of deals with litigation had a filing in federal court and no mootness fees were awarded. The rise of the mootness fee and the shift to federal court raise several issues, including a lack of transparency in the quality and resolution of merger cases and an increased potential for blackmail litigation. These problems are compounded by the willingness of some courts to permit the payment of a mootness fee in connection with corrective disclosures that are immaterial but possibly helpful, a standard that we argue is unworkable and increases the potential for vexatious litigation. We argue that the widespread payment of mootness fees reflects an inappropriate tax on the judicial system and corporations
    • …
    corecore